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In 1970, a PhD candidate submitted his dissertation to the Economics
Department at the University of Houston. The thesis, ‘‘The Measure-
ment of the Timing of the Economic Impact of Defense Procurement
Activity: An Analysis of the Vietnam Buildup,’’ set out how defense
contractors and procurement policies of the U.S. Department of De-
fense worked to undermine economic stability:
It is the purpose of this dissertation to demonstrate that sufficiently accu-
rate information about the timing of the impact on economic output of
defense procurement activity did not exist during the Vietnam buildup. As a
result, national stabilization policies were inadequately restrictive to com-
pensate for the increases in defense production and, hence, contributed to
the unstable economic conditions of the late 1960’s. The model which is
developed in this dissertation would have provided more accurate informa-
tion about the timing of this impact and would have improved national
stabilization policies. (1970, 2–3)
Unfortunately, models that show how to improve economic stability
through better information can be flipped into a road map to create
more instability and market power by withholding that information.
This economist was Ken Lay, later head of Enron.
If economic theory tells us that monopoly power, asymmetric infor-
mation, public goods, and negative externalities reflect market failure,
what more do we need to know by way of a starting point if we want
markets to fail our way? Their mess is our profit. Yes, those novel
financial models and instruments that Enron pioneered led to its col-
lapse. But matters didn’t stop there. The same innovations resurfaced
as major causes of the 2008 financial meltdown, as if Enron had not
happened. We will see that the very same innovations are involved as
well in some of the more dangerous messes we are in today. ‘‘It’s not
the tragedies that kill us,’’ the American wit Dorothy Parker insisted,
‘‘it’s the messes’’ (quoted in Miller 2004).
But that’s not quite right, is it? Not all messes are bad, be they in our
personal or our professional lives. Even in policy, some messes are
good from the start. There are some that can be managed for the
better, and it is clear that others are made much worse from mis-
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INTRODUCING POLICY MESSES,
MANAGEMENT, AND THEIR MANAGERS
My first and most important point: Policymakers in government and
policy analysts in the public and private sectors have a great deal to
learn about management from a special class of professionals little
discussed in the literature or media: namely, those control room opera-
tors who manage large technical systems for water supplies, electricity,
telecommunications, and other critical infrastructures that societies
have come to depend on for reliable health, safety, and energy services.
This book is about applying what has been learned from managing
more reliably in one domain (critical infrastructures) to the broader
domains of policy and management that have their own political or
legal mandates to be reliable, yet increasingly fall short of meeting
those mandates.
When we think of policymakers, as we often must these days, we may
have in mind leaders, legislators, and officials who govern our political
institutions. When many of us think of control rooms and the opera-
tors in large-scale energy or telecommunications systems—if we think
of them at all—it is during major emergencies. Among the better-
known examples are the frantic actions of control room operators at
the Fukushima nuclear power plant, on the Deepwater Horizon drilling
rig, or in the lower Manhattan telecommunications hub as the World
Trade Center fell around it on 9/11.
Why should we expect that policymakers, analysts, and political elites
have anything to learn from real-time infrastructure managers? Be-
cause these operators manage every day to prevent all manner of major
accidents and failures from happening, which would occur if the opera-
tors had not managed the way they do. We see politicians, policymak-
ers, and their support staff operating at their performance edges; what
we don’t see is that critical infrastructure managers have to do the same
every day, but more successfully, by managing the way they do.
My second line of argument: What exactly is this ‘‘managing the way
they do’’? To answer succinctly, control room operators are often bril-
liant mess managers, and what is blazingly obvious is we need better
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mess managers when it comes to what seem to be intractable problems
in policies and politics.
When asked why I call these apparent intractabilities ‘‘messes,’’ my
answer is that this is precisely what they are called by those responsi-
ble for managing them. There is no metaphor or argument by analogy
here. The healthcare mess, Social Security mess, financial mess, euro-
zone mess—those are the terms used by the public, analysts, and elites
to sum up the issues and tasks before them. What is less recognized—
and the book’s aim is to fill this gap—is that the same messes can be
managed more reliably and professionally than the public or the policy
establishment acknowledge.
The image that the public may have of control rooms—men and
women undertaking command and control in darkened venues, sitting
in front of computer screens and with grid maps on the walls—cap-
tures none of the daily, if not minute-by-minute, adaptations required
of operators to meet all kinds of contingencies that arise unexpectedly
or uncontrollably and that have to be dealt with if the critical service is
to be provided reliably. I argue that these skills and this perspective
offer a more realistic template for success than do current policy ana-
lytical and decisionmaking approaches, many of which I show are
faith-based in the extreme.
My third line of argument: Just look at the sheer number of different
policy messes for which we need more realistic managers! After I de-
scribe what control room operators do in managing the variety of bad
and good messes that come their way, I spend most of the book showing
how those in and around the policy establishment can be their own
networks of mess and reliability managers. As networks of profes-
sionals, I argue, they are better able to avoid bad or worse messes, take
more advantage of the good messes there are, and more effectively
address the societal and professional challenges ahead in managing
policy messes more reliably.
For some readers these arguments are crystal-clear and in no need of
elaboration before moving directly to the next chapters. Most readers
will require a fuller description of why and how the points matter, as I
intend the readership to be drawn from many fields and concerns. My
examples are drawn from the United States and internationally; they
include policy messes in the arenas of the environment, education,
climate change, social welfare, health, and international development.
I focus in all chapters on one connecting policy mess that enables me
to illustrate the major points in my argument as I develop them. This is
the global financial mess that came to the fore in 2008 and afterward. I
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describe and follow that mess as it has morphed into the multiple
muddles over unfunded pensions, underfunded Social Security and
medical obligations, sovereign debt, banking reform, and currency sta-
bility in the eurozone and elsewhere. I turn now to an expanded dis-
cussion of my three lines of argument.
This Argument in More Detail
Now step back and consider the world around you. It’s a mess, and we
know it. But if almost everything is a mess, is each mess being man-
aged for the mess that it is? It is one thing to say that messes start out
bad; it is something else to say that they are bad because we manage
them poorly. A little bit of both is happening, you say. But that ‘‘little’’
matters considerably when capitalizing on the role of mess in policy,
management, and politics. Good messes are to be had, and we can
manage a major mess well rather than poorly.
For the moment, think of a policy mess as a public issue so uncertain,
complex, interrupted, and disputed that it can’t be avoided. It has to be
managed; the problem is how. The ideal aim would be to prevent the
mess, or clear it up once and for all, but that is easier to say than do. Yet
every day, professionals reliably manage to produce critical services,
including water, electricity, and even financial services. They do this not
by getting rid of messes as much as by continuously sorting them out,
especially when those services are needed most. How do these profes-
sionals do that, and what can they tell us about how to better manage
messes or avoid the truly bad ones in our society? This book illustrates
important lessons for those who need to be mess managers in policy,
management, and the political economy we find ourselves in. My argu-
ment is that those in health, social welfare, development, business, and
the environment, among other arenas, should become much more like
those professionals.
The approach in this book builds on my work with Paul Schulman on
reliability professionals. In High Reliability Management: Operating on
the Edge (2008), we undertook a case study and detailed key concepts
in the way control room operators and managers keep large technical
systems reliable under highly volatile situations, when options are
sometimes few, and success is never guaranteed. This book recasts
those professionals and their networks as exemplary mess managers
and extends the original framework into the wider reconsideration of
political economies not just in the United States but abroad as well. My
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earlier book, Narrative Policy Analysis (Roe 1994; see also Roe 2007),
showed how the disputed stories that drive much of public policy and
management could be better analyzed. But stories have their begin-
ning, middle, and end, and the nub of a policy mess is that those in the
midst of it do not know how their policy and management efforts will
or could end.∞ After a point, decisionmakers may even wonder how the
mess began or evolved. In contrast, mess managers are very good at
answering the question ‘‘What happens next?’’ We will see how the
unique narratives of mess managers play a major role in management
and policy.
Much of this should not be new. It is a truth universally acknowl-
edged that each generation discovers on its own just how complex and
uncertain their surroundings are. As the nineteenth-century essayist
Thomas De Quincey put it in his Logic of Political Economy, ‘‘upon what
is known in Economy there is perpetual uncertainty, and for any in-
roads into what is yet unknown; perpetual insecurity’’ (1849, 35). For a
contemporary example, the debt levels of U.S. states are so substantial,
according to Felix Rohatyn, an expert in this area, that he can’t ‘‘see
where the end of this is’’ (quoted in M. Cooper and Walsh 2010).
Professionals who find themselves in such a tide race of affairs and are
searching for what happens next should read this book.
Specifically, policy analysts, managers, businesspeople, and public ad-
ministrators will find the approach helpful in understanding what
makes for the successful managing of policy messes in the sectors in
which they operate. Business schools and programs as well as providers
of health and social services should find much of use here. The approach
also offers insights and instruction to a wider audience, including econ-
omists interested in the institutional design of governance structures;
engineers committed to better design and risk analysis of large techni-
cal systems; organization theorists analyzing technological accidents
and organizational reliability; social scientists studying major technol-
ogy transformations; and planners for the long term who confront
demands for better management in their arenas.
Some messes, to repeat, start out and stay bad; they may be beyond
the grasp of management. Others are managed poorly or effectively,
and it is essential to determine which is the case and what the results
are. The following pages parse and explain good and bad messes; more
important, they describe good and bad mess management. Many ex-
amples are discussed along the way, not just the 2008 financial melt-
down and its repercussions. For the latter, I rely to a considerable
extent on contemporaneous reports from the press and elsewhere to
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give a flavor of the immediacy of grappling with events in real time. We
have been told that ‘‘the public finances of most advanced countries
are in a greater mess than at any point in peacetime history’’ (Plender
2010b). If so, how do those managing it measure up against profes-
sionals who see to it that the messes they face are managed, not
cleared away?
Were messes no different than problems, we could rely on conven-
tional policy analysis and management to get out of them. No such
luck. As I show in the first chapters, a policy mess involves changeable
individual actions and local contexts confronting unstable principles
and policies. Principles and policies, moreover, diverge significantly
from the fast-moving trends and patterns they are meant to address.
Yet all this slipping and sliding takes place under mandates to manage
a critical good or service reliably—that is, safely and continuously—
through time, no matter what rude surprise crops up. All this occurs in
systems that are not just technical or organizational, but in the same
instant rooted deep in political economy and culture. You can see why
some call this constellation a potent source of ‘‘wicked’’ policy prob-
lems, in which cause and effect are tangled together and next to impos-
sible to sort out.≤
Mess has never been far away in my own profession of policy anal-
ysis and public management, which is full of wicked policy problems,
muddling through, incrementalism, groping along, suboptimization,
bounded rationality, garbage can processes, second-best solutions,
mixed scanning, policy fiascos, relentless paradoxes, fatal remedies,
rotten compromises, managing the unexpected, coping agencies, nor-
mal accidents, crisis management, groupthink, adhocracy, and that
deep wellspring of miserabilism, implementation. As these notions
circle around the same prey, this book takes a closer look at the animal
itself: the policy and management messes we find ourselves in, espe-
cially when it comes to important services like water, energy, transpor-
tation, telecommunications, health, finance, development, and the en-
vironment. In focusing on policy messes and their management, I do
not critique conventional analysis and management as much as re-
think my profession from a different direction. As I go along, I signal
my debt to those who have thought through these issues ahead of me.
It’s easier to belittle messes than avoid them, and the first thing
good mess managers show us is that we manage messes we can’t avoid,
we don’t ‘‘clean them up.’’ Many people believe or insist that the way to
clear up policy messes is by reducing uncertainty, simplifying complex-
ity, resolving conflict, and completing unfinished business. A fair num-
6 CHAPTER ONE
ber of decisionmakers seem to think: This mess needs cleaning up, and
since God isn’t doing it—nor, for that matter, is anyone else—it’s up to
me to do the job. Such assumptions are why there are so many intrac-
table muddles in policy and management.
What should they do instead? We can learn from those professionals
whose job it is to manage mess all the time. There is nothing novel about
the need for learning. What is new is shifting the focus to identifying,
studying, and learning from a unique group of mess managers who are
reliable in terms of the outputs and outcomes of their management.
For them, managing well rather than managing poorly means they
manage messes reliably or reliability messily: They manage the needful
under always-dynamic circumstances. From them we learn that mess
management requires three skills: pattern recognition, scenario formula-
tion, and the ability to translate pattern and scenario into a reliable service,
now when it matters. These professional managers do not achieve reli-
ability directly by designing broad systems to govern all discrete opera-
tions. To be reliable, they and the networks in which they operate
interpret what system patterns mean for the locally specific scenarios
they face now and in the next step ahead. Why the need for transla-
tion? Because designs—be they policies, principles, or laws—have to be
modified both in light of local features and in light of the broader
patterns that emerge across a run of individual operations. Both have
to be accounted for in order to achieve reliable services. This sorting-
out process of recognizing systemwide patterns, formulating local sce-
narios, and modifying scenarios in light of those patterns is compli-
cated, but it is the core of good mess management and what this book
is dedicated to detailing. Put directly, this book aims to renovate the
good name of mess.
To start with, it is important to understand the respective concepts
of mess and reliability, which I introduce in the remainder of this
chapter and discuss more fully in chapter 2. Chapter 3 identifies and
describes those professionals who are officially charged with providing
services reliably, but who unofficially have to do so by continually
managing the messes that arise in that provision. By the end of chap-
ter 3, the reader will have the framework to determine and evaluate
what makes a mess and its management good or bad when it comes to
the reliable provision of a service. The first step in making the most of
policy and management messes is to minimize bad ones, and chapter 4
presents examples of bad messes and poor mess management in pol-
icy. Chapter 5, the longest in the book, devotes considerable attention
to what makes for good and even better mess management. These
chapters illustrate how to be good mess managers, protect such man-
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agers, avoid bad messes, and manage more reliably all those other
messes in policy, management, and politics that have yet to go bad or
are otherwise primed to go from bad to worse.
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the challenges—first societal and then
professional—that we face in managing policy messes. At the societal
level, complexity, conflict, uncertainty, and unfinished business can
make for a clumsy minuet: The more mess there is, the more reliability
decisionmakers want; but the more reliable we try to be, the more
mess is produced. The more decisionmakers try to design their way out
of a policy mess, the messier actual policy implementation gets; but
the messier the operations are at the micro level, the more decision-
makers feel solutions are needed at the macro level. This does not
augur well for the future, and indeed that future is the source of much
of the mess we are now in. What we end up with is politics of fewer
options and much turbulence within which mess managers must be
reliable. In this way, the societal challenges in chapter 6 become the
professional challenges in chapter 7. Professionals have to learn to
better manage those politics by building up their analytic and manage-
ment capacity via networks of like professionals, by capitalizing on
better practices that have been developed across diverse communities
and situations for like issues, by managing complexity much better
than they have hitherto, and by operating more effectively in real time.
Chapter 8 brings us full circle by addressing what the preceding chap-
ters mean for managing the morphing financial mess we continue to
be in as well as other major policy messes.
At no point in this book do I argue that the only way to get out of our
policy messes is to create far better human beings, incentives, policies,
laws, or politics than we currently have. All this may be required, but if
that is true, so is the fact that such insistence frequently makes for
more messes. This book focuses instead on what professionals and
their existing better practices imply for policy messes, financial or
otherwise.
To get to chapter 8’s conclusion, we must begin the journey by under-
standing just what mess is and what makes for all this talk about ‘‘good’’
and ‘‘bad’’ messes. As we will see, these distinctions come back to those
who are managing the policy messes and how are they doing it.
Mess: Good and Bad
‘‘Mess’’ and ‘‘bad’’ almost always go together when it comes to policy,
management, and politics. For that matter, mess is mentioned every-
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where—except in the indexes of our textbooks on public policy, eco-
nomics, and management.≥ Messes are considered bad, if only because
they are difficult to sort out—or, more subtly, if they require a dif-
ferent sort of management, one that many decisionmakers find less
than straightforward.
Almost everyone who experienced the financial meltdown in 2008
thought of it as bad. It evolved out of a ‘‘mortgage mess,’’ morphed into
a ‘‘credit mess,’’ and became a comprehensive ‘‘economic–employ-
ment–government debt–current account deficit mess,’’ also unprece-
dented in recent history (see, for example, Blinder 2007; Calomiris and
Wallison 2008; Economist 2009b). For those in its midst, it has proved
difficult to see any good coming from it, apart from the usual attempts
to make the best of a bad situation.
Bad messes are taken to be many, frequent, and long-lived, while
good messes—if they are recognized—are considered ephemeral, spo-
radic, and certainly not to be relied on. Moreover, when it comes to
messes, it’s reliability that counts. Policy analysts, public managers,
and businesspeople are expected to clear major messes up by making
affairs more reliable. Reliability is controllability, or at least predic-
tability and stability. More mess is a sign of more unreliability, so more
reliability should mean less mess. What saves this from being a thor-
oughgoing tautology is the fact that there are conditions under which
mess can be managed so as to increase the options for reliability, even
if it leaves things messy—though more manageable.
Just what is a mess in policy and management? For starters, issues
are a mess not only when they are complex, but also when they are
uncertain, incomplete, and disputed. They are uncertain when causal
processes are unclear or not easily comprehended. They are complex
when more numerous, varied, and interdependent than before. Issues
are incomplete when efforts to address them are left interrupted,
unfinished, or partially fulfilled. Issues are disputed when individuals
take different positions on them because of their uncertainty, com-
plexity, and incompleteness. A policy mess is an amalgam of these
contingencies that has become so accident-prone along its multiple
dimensions that it has to be managed.∂ In less formal terms, a mess is
what can happen when ‘‘different parts of the system contribute to dif-
ferent decisions in different ways at different times’’ (March 1966, 66–
67)—which, not unimportantly, also describes the exercise of power.
For me, mess and its management go together very differently than
problems and their solutions do, as the rest of the book demonstrates.
Several features follow from this definition of a policy mess when it
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comes to the challenge of managing for reliable services. First, it is
next to impossible to measure mess. In particular, we still have no
good empirical measure of interdependence (see LaPorte 1975). Reli-
ability, however, is measurable (for example, your atm is highly reli-
able because it has never been out of order when you needed to use it).
Second, those who are mandated by law, regulation, or their mission to
provide what society considers critical services want complete knowl-
edge of cause and effect in their systems, especially when it comes to
identifying the factors that are essential for reliability. These people
avoid, wherever possible, working in what engineers call ‘‘unstudied
conditions.’’ Lack of complete causal knowledge, however, is at the core
of messy policy when societal conditions are changing all the time.
Third, when has the human condition ever been ‘‘completely studied’’
in terms of its mess and reliability? Consider these long-standing ca-
veats: ‘‘Things of this World are in so constant a Flux, that nothing
remains long in the same State’’ (John Locke, philosopher); ‘‘All human
institutions and none more than government, are in continual fluctua-
tion’’ (David Hume, essayist, economist, and historian); ‘‘All countries
are and always have been in a state of transition, and it is the character
and purpose of human nature that all societies should be constantly al-
tering’’ (Lord Palmerston, nineteenth-century prime minister of Great
Britain). Fourth, and not surprisingly in the midst of all the flux, most
people end up having to tolerate messes (in this book, mess means
specific messes). Rather than putting up with what they dislike, they
would much rather have their messes prevented, and reliably so, espe-
cially when circumstances are so mutable.
So where does that leave those who take mess and reliability se-
riously? Difficult-to-measure interdependence but with measurable
declines in reliability; working in unstudied conditions but mandated
to have reliable services; constantly having to tolerate change but al-
ways insisting on more stability along the way—no wonder many see
risk on all fronts. All these and more were found in the financial mess
of 2008 and its ongoing incarnations. How so?
‘‘Risk is now driven by the increasingly tight coupling of markets and
the resulting complexity and interdependence,’’ a financial derivatives
specialist told us early on (Das 2007). Starting with risk as the likelihood
and consequence of failure, then spreading that risk in a financially
interconnected world had four disastrous consequences for finance and
beyond, as we shall see in greater detail. First, it concealed risk; second,
it increased risk; third, it concentrated risk; and fourth, it had people
talking about ‘‘risk’’ in situations where they could not even calculate
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the probability or consequences of failure. While derivatives have been
long used in other sectors, such as commodities (Raeburn 2009; see
also, for example, Grant, Milne, and van Duyn 2009), financial deriv-
atives and other innovative instruments hid risk while spreading it,
thereby increasing uncertainty and unpredictability. Here is how one
new financial instrument, the collateralized debt obligation (cdo), is
described as playing its part in the financial mess:
The system works only if the securities in the cdo are uncorrelated—that
is, if they are unlikely to go bad all at once. Corporate bonds, for example,
tend to have low correlation because the companies that issue them operate
in different industries, which typically don’t get into trouble simultane-
ously. . . . Mortgage securities, by contrast, have turned out to be very
similar to one another. They’re all linked to thousands of loans across the
U.S. Anything big enough to trigger defaults on a large portion of those
loans—like falling prices across the country—is likely to affect the bonds in
a cdo as well. (Mollenkamp and Ng 2007; see also Davies and Ishmael 2008)
Instead of diversifying risk, major investment houses, banks, and oth-
ers ended up acting in convergent ways. Either ‘‘too many funds bought
the same assets’’ (Zuckerman and Strasburg 2009) or the ‘‘problem was
that, while these assets are heterogeneous, the owners were not. In
tough times they behaved the same way. . . . Diversification was there-
fore fake’’ (Lex Column 2008a).∑ Perhaps more troubling, efficient mar-
ket mechanisms like auctions could not work because of the sheer com-
plexity of the financial instruments to be auctioned.∏ Secretary of the
U.S. Treasury Timothy Geithner summed the situation up succinctly:
‘‘As the [financial] system grew in size and complexity, it became more
interconnected and vulnerable to contagion when trouble occurred’’
(2009).
For John Kay, a Financial Times columnist, the ‘‘financial innovation
that was once the means of spreading risk is now an unmanageable
source of instability’’ (2008). What were often intended to be tax- or
regulation-avoiding financial instruments (see, for example, Houlder
2009) ended up as innovations—such as credit default swaps—that
‘‘turned into a monster . . . [and] came close to destroying the entire
financial system,’’ thereby playing a principal role in that ‘‘financial
mess,’’ according to Burton Malkiel, a professor of economics at Prince-
ton University (2008). Writing about himself in the third person, a
Goldman Sachs vice president who was the subject of a lawsuit said he
was ‘‘standing in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged,
exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all the im-
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plications of those monstruosities [sic]!!!’’ (quoted in Rappeport 2010).
While alarms were raised about these weapons of mass destruction (as
Warren Buffett famously called them), many mainstream economists
thought otherwise, thereby adding to the uncertainty. ‘‘I am surprised
Warren Buffet [sic] is so unenlightened,’’ said Robert Shiller, a professor
of economics at Yale University, adding, ‘‘he is such a smart guy. Deriva-
tives are just another form of risk management’’ (2003, 124).π
If a mess such as this has to be taken as bad, are there good messes to
be managed out of any of it? By the time you read this, the financial
upheaval of 2008 and onward will have joined with and transformed
itself into all manner of other policy messes to be managed. We may
well have returned to the novel financial instruments that got us into
trouble in 2008 (Bullock, Demos, and Nasiripour 2012; Plender 2011a)
and, before that, with Enron. We will be muddling through to some
new ‘‘normal’’ in the midst of a sovereign credit crisis here, the pension
overhang there, or debt and defaults wherever. Whether or not we will
be managing the messes that ensue for countries, counties, cities, or
corporations is altogether a different issue.
The irony in all this is that ‘‘mess’’ started out good. The first ‘‘policy-
maker’s’’ mess was the officers’ mess. The term ‘‘mess’’ initially meant
a portion of food, ‘‘a mess of pottage.’’ Later on the term came to
denote partaking of meals together and, when at sea, the actual loca-
tion where these meals took place—the mess decks (Dickinson 1973).
Even today, good messes are to be found by those in search of them.
When told that Britain’s renegotiation of European Union member-
ship would end in a muddle, Harold Wilson, then prime minister,
responded: ‘‘I am at my best in a messy middle-of-the-road muddle’’
(quoted in Harding 2006).∫ The Harvard Business Review assures busi-
nesspeople that ‘‘messiness isn’t all bad’’ (2003, 96), and an article in
the same publication is titled ‘‘When Organization Messiness Works’’
(R. Freeland 2002). Eric Abrahamson and David Freedman’s A Perfect
Mess (2006) serves up the same idea in its subtitle: The Hidden Benefits
of Disorder—How Crammed Closets, Cluttered Offices, and On-the-Fly
Planning Make the World a Better Place.Ω Current research methods in
the social sciences are, in turn, criticized for not taking mess seriously
(Law 2004). As we will see later, mess takes center stage in the work of
Russell Ackoff, the late professor emeritus in the Wharton School and
a popular management and business expert.∞≠
While good messes have been little studied in the policy analysis and
public management literature, other disciplines have been more forth-
coming. ‘‘All psychoanalyses are about mess and meaning, and the
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links between them,’’ according to Adam Phillips (2001, 59), a psycho-
analyst and essayist:
What is a good mess? Which might mean from whose point of view is it
good (or bad) and what are the unconscious criteria for deciding? In one
mood I might think despairingly, ‘‘This room is too cluttered’’; in a different
mood I might take it for granted, find it rather cozy, be impressed by being
the kind of person who lives in creative chaos, and so on. In other words,
what makes clutter work for us, and how does it work when it does? A good
life, one might say, involves making the messes you need. (67–68)
The good mess, Phillips argues, is the mess that can be used (71). A rise
in the ruble or fall in the price of oil creates messes that are good for
some but not for others. ‘‘One investor’s disclosure clutter is another
investor’s golden nugget,’’ argues an informed observer about the de-
bate on regulatory requirements (Jones 2012). Less overtly, the good
mess can benefit only after being ‘‘stumbled upon’’ or found by asking:
What is hidden, as it were, by plain sight that could be used? So too in
‘‘clutter you may not be able to find what you are looking for, but you
may find something else instead while you are looking for it. Clutter
may not be about the way we hide things from ourselves but the way
we make ourselves look for things’’ (Phillips 2001, 64). How we use
clutter depends on how we sort it out. When it is a rainforest, it is a
mess we can use (for example, it could hold the cure for cancer); when
it is a jungle, it is a bad mess of no good use (according to Kurtz’s ‘‘the
horror, the horror,’’ in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness). Abraham-
son and Freedman’s A Perfect Mess provides examples of when disorder
leads to innovation or discovery.
If a good mess is a mess that can be used, then how can we use it? It
depends on that word ‘‘use,’’ doesn’t it? Some of this is making the best
of a bad situation. Researchers took advantage of the August 2003
North American power-grid blackout to evaluate and recalibrate mod-
els of the effects of power-plant emissions on smog and haze in the
region and beyond (Marufu et al. 2004). Threats of network hacking
sometimes bring forward upgrades that had been planned anyway (Sen-
gupta 2012). Some of this is managing to look on the bright side: At-
mospheric cooling was noticeable after all planes were grounded on
9/11 (Robbins 2007), while air pollution diminished significantly in
Russia during the 1990s because of that nation’s economic decline
(Cherp, Kopteva, and Mnatsakanian 2003; Revkin 2006). Chinese air
pollution, one headline tells us, led to more snowfall in California’s
Sierra Nevada mountain range (Upton 2012). The financial mess and
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economic recession after 2008 led to an unprecedented fall in green-
house gas emissions, according to a study by the International Energy
Agency (Harvey 2009b). It may be that one environmental mess, the
ozone hole, has protected Antarctica from an even worse mess, that
being further melting induced by global climate change (Harvey 2009a).
Sometimes, however, the issue is one of pulling a good mess out from
one that could go bad. One salutary, albeit unintended, effect of the y2k
retrofitting was the advanced contingency planning for information-
technology management developed in response to the feared millen-
nium bug (Valentine 2005). In the follow-up to legislation mandating
‘‘living wills’’ for major financial institutions that outlined how they
would sell off major divisions should the need arise, one bank for-
tunately ‘‘discovered that it had only one global Microsoft Office li-
cence, so its various divisions would be unable to communicate if the
parent entity went down’’ (Masters 2011). When credit froze at the start
of the financial mess, institutions such as the European Investment
Bank and the World Bank were able to borrow money by issuing bonds
at record-low interest rates; as one article noted, ‘‘the public sector has
become one of the few beneficiaries of the financial crunch as a flight to
quality has enabled these top-grade triple-A rated issuers to carry on
regardless in the business of raising capital’’ (Oakley 2008). As the last
example illustrates, good messes can as well go bad later on, unless they
are managed reliably. I return later to this notion of ‘‘pulling out a good
mess,’’ but here I only note that a good mess is not just ‘‘a matter of
perception.’’ It is a matter of the actual behavior of professionals as
mess managers, even if they realize the existence of the mess at the last
minute or for a short time only.
Mess Managers, Not Crisis Management
Studies underscore the role of a unique cadre of professionals in manag-
ing critical services reliably (Roe and Schulman 2008). Staying with fi-
nance and banking for the moment, these professionals are the mana-
gers, operators, and support staff whose supervision, networks (formal
and informal), and skills (measurable or not) ensure that financial ser-
vices do not fail as often as they otherwise would in an interconnected
financial sector. These are the people preventing the technical and sys-
tem accidents or failures waiting to happen, albeit sometimes just un-
der the wire, with close calls and near misses. The net present value of
averting these failures is in the billions of dollars. These networks in-
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clude engineers, it specialists, front-line operators, and middle-level
managers of control rooms, operation centers, and trading floors—and
not just in the banking and finance sector, but in those electricity and
telecommunications infrastructures without which financial services
would not be reliable in real time. The professionals may include the
chief financial officer, regulatory staffer, legislative analyst, supervisor
or inspector, auditor, and others who ensure the safe and continuous
provision of the critical service under severe time pressures. I describe
these professionals in the subsequent chapters and identify the limita-
tions of such professionalism when I focus on professional challenges in
chapter 7.
There are no guarantees of persistent or universal success when it
comes to this cadre of professionals. As the financial crisis demon-
strates, mess can morph into crisis, and even the best mess managers
can and do fail. ‘‘Could you just imagine the mess we would have had?’’
pressed Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Henry Paulson in defending the
March 2008 bailout of the major investment firm Bear Stearns before
the 2010 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (fcic). ‘‘If Bear had gone
there were hundreds, maybe thousands of counterparties that all
would have grabbed their collateral, would have started trying to sell
their collateral, drove down prices, create even bigger losses. There was
huge fear about the investment banking model at that time’’ (fcic
2011, 291).
For our purposes, a crisis is having to cope in the manager’s no-go
area beyond known patterns and scenarios. Let’s call that area ‘‘un-
studied conditions.’’ ‘‘The truth is that no one in business has lived
through a financial crisis such as this,’’ the Financial Times reported in
2008, ‘‘so top executives and their advisers have no experience to draw
on in evaluating the prospects’’ (Willman 2008). That said, this book is
not about coping better with policy crises (for those interested in crisis
management, see Boin et al. 2005). It is about how to manage so that a
mess doesn’t become a crisis. As the chairwoman of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation said, ‘‘We don’t want to be glamorous; we
want to be safe and reliable’’ (Bair 2009). While I have a great deal to
say about how to manage the policy messes leading up to and following
from a crisis, I hope to convince you that many messes, even some bad
ones, can be managed differently than full-blown crises. In the same
way that climate change, healthcare, and overpopulation are said to be
crises, significant features of these issues continue to be policy messes
that can be managed better for increased reliability.
If there is one major ‘‘crisis’’ examined in this book, it is that mess
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management is being eroded by societal challenges when it need not
and should not be. Let’s now turn to a fuller explanation and descrip-
tion of the key terms ‘‘mess’’ and ‘‘reliability’’ and the ways in which
they have become so knotted together that they can no longer be
untied.
TWO
WHEN RELIABILITY IS MESS MANAGEMENT
From initial media reports you would think that it was the unreliability
of mortgage holders and lenders, computer models and trading, rating
agencies and investors, along with banks, bailouts, and our animal
spirits, that accounted for the financial mess. But that argument was
quickly turned on its head: The real culprit was reliability.
‘‘Financial stability itself creates confidence and risk-taking, even-
tually leading to recklessness and instability,’’ declared the Economist
(Carr 2009, 8, 10).∞ Bubbles, conceded Alan Greenspan, the former
head of the Federal Reserve, require all those ‘‘low long-term interest
rates, low inflation and macroeconomic stability,’’ which we had been
told up to that point were a Good Thing (quoted in Guha 2008a; see
also Goodhart and Persaud 2008).≤ According to a leading Financial
Times economist, Martin Wolf: ‘‘A long period of rapid growth, low
inflation, low interest rates and macroeconomic stability bred compla-
cency and increased willingness to take risk. Stability led to instability’’
(2008a).≥ Another economist, Robert Samuelson, concluded: ‘‘People
were conditioned by a quarter-century of good economic times to
believe that we had moved into a new era of reliable economic growth’’
(2011, 16). In short, boom leads to bust; good leads to bad; and the
more stable the financial system, the greater the incentive for others
who rely on it to take more and greater risks.
The stakes are high in getting this issue right. For example, a great deal
of attention was paid to the moral hazard involved in bailing out risk-
taking banks and investors. The fear is that bailouts and handouts serve
only to whet the appetite for risk. The stability-leads-to-instability ar-
gument suggests a more urgent moral hazard, however: Every day that
mess managers reliably provide critical services under increasing bud-
get and staff constraints is one more day that executives, politicians,
and other leaders feel they can bet the company by taking riskier Big
Experiments. Even journalists saw this. Writing about the financial
mess, Christopher Caldwell underscored the point: ‘‘The longer the
[credit and finance] system went on without collapsing, the more incen-
tive there was to strip protective ‘give’ out of the system’’ (2008a).
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In order to make sense of mess and its management, we must have a
sharper appreciation of reliability’s role in all of this. To do that means
we have to have a better definition of ‘‘reliability’’ than a stability that
is both the cause of and antidote to instability. In chapter 1, I initially
defined ‘‘reliability’’ as predictability or controllability of a service that
society considers vital. Let us begin, then, with the professionals who
aspire to meet critical service requirements safely and continuously,
even during peak demand and turbulent times. The critical services
can be in the form of financial services, electricity, telecommunica-
tions, and water; in the same way, managers and operators outside
society’s critical infrastructures insist that they too provide critical
services, as for social and health services. Reliability means the lights
stay on, even when some generators do not, and the atm works, even
when electricity does not. When the lights go out or atms fail, the
subsequent effects across interconnected personal and professional
systems can be dramatic. Mess metastasizes.
In what sense can we speak of mess that arises because these sys-
tems are operated reliably? One conventional answer has it that we are
a risk society, where the policy muddles to be sorted out today—air
pollution, traffic congestion, financial instability, the junkspace of mo-
dernity generally—are those created in the process of trying to pro-
duce reliable goods and services (Beck 1999; Bowe 2005; Offer 2006).
The resulting messes call for further management and further re-
liability. What stops this from being a treadmill is that, as we shall see,
more and more reliability seems to be directed toward keeping bad
messes from happening, while making better use of the good ones that
come along. Increasingly, reliability is a form of mess management,
not of mess production.
Different Modes of Reliability as Mess Management
To better understand the concept of reliability as mess management,
let’s see how control operators and managers of major critical infra-
structures handle all the surprises and glitches that come by way of
having to meet legal and regulatory reliability mandates, all the time
and whatever the conditions. Again, reliability here means providing a
critical service safely and continuously, even during turbulent circum-
stances.
A little background is helpful. Reliable infrastructures today differ
strikingly from those of earlier periods (LaPorte 1996; Rochlin 1993;
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Schulman 1993). In the past, large technical systems were often housed
in and controlled by an overarching organization, such as those inte-
grated public utilities that generated, transmitted, and distributed elec-
tricity or water. With deregulation, liberalization, and privatization,
networks of different organizations are now mandated to provide reli-
able telecommunication, electricity, and financial services (de Bruijne
and van Eeten 2007). Waterworks become comanaged not just by gov-
ernment water departments but now by agencies mandated to protect
habitats and species (van Eeten and Roe 2002). Earlier theorizing ar-
gued that networks of organizations, some of which have competing or
conflicting goals (think of Enron during the 2001 California electricity
crisis), should find it more difficult to ensure highly reliable service
provision (Roe and Schulman 2008). Parallel developments in social and
human services under pressure to outsource have been subject to the
same forces. Elements that were once unified under one organization
by law for the provision of a vital service have been decoupled by law,
only to be recoupled through networks of private and public organiza-
tions. That this ‘‘management for reliability’’ now looks and is messy
should be no surprise.
Here is what more recent research has to say about such management
(first presented in Roe and Schulman 2008).∂ Imagine a large technical
system that faces a wide task environment of varying volatility, while
the available responses to that volatility also vary. Volatility is the ex-
tent to which system managers and operators confront uncontrollable
or unpredictable conditions that threaten their ability to provide the
critical service. Some periods are of low volatility: There are no surpris-
ing or unscheduled interruptions in the electricity supply, water provi-
sion, or financial services. Other periods are ones of high volatility:
Temperatures go up, causing increased difficulties to the providers of
electricity, water, or health services. In some cases, volatility is high
because what no one expected to happen actually does—for example,
the Icelandic banking system collapses in a matter of days. Volatility, in
other words, refers to the persisting or emerging instabilities in the task
environment that confront the network or networks of managers, in-
cluding system operators. In this chapter, when I speak of ‘‘managers,’’ I
primarily mean both large-infrastructure control room managers as
well as real-time financial services providers—including face-to-screen
traders and brokers—along with their immediate specialist staff. Later
chapters extend the analysis to managers of related and other policy
messes.
The managers we are talking about here have different resources in
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terms of money, personnel, and strategies with which to address the
volatility they face. This is called ‘‘option variety.’’ High option variety
means that an electric grid or investment firm has more resources
available than the regulators require; low option variety means fewer
resources are on hand to meet requirements. The systems we are talk-
ing about also operate under reliability mandates. They may be de jure,
as in the case of a bank’s regulated capital reserve requirements, or de
facto, as when a transmission operator informally keeps a higher re-
serve of electricity than regulation mandates. Such reliability require-
ments can derive from system technology and/or organizational fea-
tures. Supply and demand on the electricity grid (roughly, load and
generation) must be balanced to equal each other in real time, or the
grid could eventually collapse. Reliability efforts in regard to natural
gas transmission focus on avoiding having to shut off the flow of gas
completely because it can take days to reactivate the flow, building
by building. The hospital emergency room, the highway during rush
hours, and the bank’s set of atms are reliable only if they ensure safe
and continuous critical services when it matters—namely, when the
service is needed, often ‘‘always right now.’’ As for the financial services
sector, too-safe-to-fail triple-A ratings proved to be highly unreliable
when such a rating mattered the most during the panic at the end of
2008.
The two dimensions of task environment volatility (high and low)
and options variety (high and low) set conditions for four performance
modes that operators and managers work within as reliable service
providers. The argument is that reliability in critical service provision
(I am now thinking of critical services generally) requires access to all
the performance modes, with each mode being its own form of mess
management. To be clear, the performance modes are not diamond-
sharp categories (that would be too much to expect of the messes of
interest here). When reliability requires shifts across performance
modes, the distinction between messes demanding to be sorted out
and mess management as a demanding way to sort messes blurs into
much the same thing (more on this point below). While specific terms
for the performance modes vary, for ease of reference I build on the
terminology of our electricity research: ‘‘just-in-case,’’ ‘‘just-on-time,’’
‘‘just-for-now,’’ and ‘‘just-this-way’’ performance. Each is briefly de-
scribed and then elaborated on as I discuss their features in terms of
mess management.
‘‘Just-in-case’’ performance. When options are high and volatility low,
many different options, resources, and strategies exist ‘‘just in case’’
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they are needed.∑ Reserves are large, excess capacity exists, and ample
backups or fallbacks are available, all with little unpredictability or
uncontrollability. This seems to be the ideal state of affairs in which to
be (for the manager, not the economist), but it is not without its own
risk. Operators and managers can grow complacent and end up not
paying attention to changes in system volatility and/or options avail-
ability. Compared to the other modes, however, managing against
complacency is a good mess to be in.
‘‘Just-on-time’’ performance. When options and volatility are both
high, just-on-time performance moves center stage. What worked to-
day or yesterday may not work under very similar conditions tomor-
row. A specific resource that was available just before could well not be
available right now, and the manager has to be creative on the fly with
the other options that remain. This performance condition requires
real-time flexibility—that is, the ability to quickly make use of options,
resources, and strategies in order to meet the reliability requirements
for safe and continuous service provision. Flexibility in real time means
operators and managers are so focused in the moment on meeting a
reliability requirement that they customize the match between the
high volatility they face and the responses available. The match is just
enough, just when needed. For example, a supply chain may be flexible
(or ‘‘resilient’’) because multiple vendors in a chain are ready to fill in
when one falls short with little notice (Sheffi 2005). (This is why just-
on-time performance is not to be confused with just-in-time manufac-
turing: The latter can be just-plain-late when it actively discourages
such flexibility.)
Note that the same system interconnectivity that poses problems
also can make new options and resources available. The major risk in
just-on-time performance that combines creativity and discretion in
how to sort out and assemble different options is misjudgment under
the pressures of time and having too many balls in the air. Just-on-
time performance means pulling a good mess out of ones that could go
bad even in an instant.∏
‘‘Just-for-now’’ performance. Using up resources can draw down the
options available with which to respond, now and at the next steps
ahead. When option variety is low but volatility remains high, just-for-
now performance comes into play. ‘‘Just keep that valve open for now!’’
‘‘Just stay late, that’s all I’m asking!’’ ‘‘You’ve got to dial up the pressure
from this point on . . .’’ Just-for-now is the most unstable performance
mode, and it is the one that operators and managers want to avoid
most or exit from as soon as practicable. Why? Because they could well
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back themselves into a corner by trying to be reliable. In this mode,
options and volatility are linked, and being reliable now can make
reliability all the more difficult to achieve later on. For example, opera-
tors and managers might have to go outside official channels or formal
procedures to keep things reliable: ‘‘Keep that generator online, just
for now!’’ Yet keeping equipment online when maintenance is overdue
or insisting that already fatigued workers keep working longer can end
up making things worse—which poses a major risk when there are few
other options. What would otherwise be marginal, small adjustments
can, if prolonged indefinitely, become deviations from the norm that
amplify hazards rather than reduce them. Keeping something or some-
one working for just one hour more under these conditions may crash
the system, even when one more hour would be nothing to worry
about most other times.
From the standpoint of reliability, this performance mode cannot
continue indefinitely. Operators and managers know they are not in
complete control here; they know they are resorting to firefighting,
band-aids, and quick fixes. They understand how vulnerable the sys-
tem is, how limited and interdependent options are, and they are
busily engaged in trying to develop or secure resources to move out of
this state. Just-for-now performance is such a bad mess that, if pro-
tracted, it could become the worst imaginable—the system could fail
entirely.
‘‘Just-this-way’’ performance. When the only option left is to reduce
volatility directly, just-this-way performance moves front and center.
One-way-only command and controls are asserted. A banking holiday
is declared, mandatory job furloughs instituted, water conservation
measures imposed, and shedding load is enforced through scheduled
blackouts. The great risk is that not everyone who needs to comply will
comply, when following orders is the only way to ensure reliability.
Just-this-way performance is stopping an already bad mess from wors-
ening into a full-fledged crisis.
We are now positioned to summarize the four performance modes
as they translate into different forms of mess and mess management.
The bad mess is having to manage under just-for-now conditions (high
volatility with few options), for if firefighting and temporary fixes
don’t work, then major failure needn’t be that far away. Good messes
exist with just-in-case or just-on-time performance (high options
whatever the volatility), though managing in either of these ways is
not without its own hazards. If there is a good mess in just-this-way
management (reducing volatility through command and control), it is
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stopping the bad from becoming worse. As for the best mess, staying
reliable in the face of all the risks means being able to maneuver across
performance modes as conditions change with respect to volatility and
options. Looked at from the other side, the worst mess is one in which
it is not possible to work within any mode, let alone maneuver across
them as conditions change. When that occurs you are coping, not
managing, in unstudied conditions. The quickest way to go from a bad
to worse mess is by extending ‘‘until further notice’’ just-for-now per-
formance, eventually leading to the only ‘‘option’’ left when even emer-
gency declarations and the like simply don’t work: failure and crisis.
The following chapters describe the flesh and bones of these good,
bad, worst, and best messes along with their management. What is
important to reiterate is that both moving across performance modes
and working within any one of them involve risk. Professionals, even
at their best, face likely hazards in managing different messes in order
to stay reliable in their service provision. These operational risks—
complacency, misjudgment, deviance amplification, and noncompli-
ance—are multiple and, as we just saw, vary by conditions and re-
sources. This means that when managers are unable to work within
and across the performance modes, risk appraisal on their part ends up
becoming very difficult indeed, if not actually impossible. Unable to
assess risk and differentiate which risks demand attention, no one can
manage the messes for reliability because they are now in unmanage-
able conditions. This difficulty is nowhere better illustrated than with
the 2008 financial meltdown.
Limits of Management in the Financial Mess
The financial meltdown has been attributed to a failure in risk manage-
ment by banks, investment firms, rating agencies, and regulators, most
prominently. One proposal has been to separate risk management from
actual banking and investment operations and to elevate the former in
importance. ‘‘Risk and control functions need to be completely inde-
pendent from the business units,’’ recommended Lloyd Blankfein, the
head of Goldman Sachs, ‘‘and clarity as to whom risk and control man-
agers report to is crucial to maintaining that independence’’ (2009). But
consider the following carefully: How is risk to be separated from opera-
tions, as if performance modes could be divorced from their respective
risks and messes? True, chief risk officers and their units were margin-
alized or co-opted by senior banking and investment executives leading
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up to the financial mess (fcic 2011). Granted, one may want to em-
power risk officers or the enterprise unit to oversee the additional risk
imposed by having to manage through different performance modes in
order to maintain reliable financial services. But it is quite another
matter to assert that it is more useful to have the management of
respective risks separated from real-time operations. When not only is
the devil in the details but only a devil could know the details, then that
can make for the worst mess possible.
It is important to underscore the fact that good as well as bad messes
have been witnessed throughout the financial mess—even in events
leading up to and after 2008. Just-in-case management is what banks
tried to do by increasing their capital reserves through bailout funds
without, however, passing those funds on through increased lending;
they held onto cash just in case things got worse. That was a good mess
to be in from their viewpoint, but the way they managed their mess
was part of the bad mess we borrowers found ourselves in at the same
time.
Just-on-time management surfaced when liquidity was readily ac-
cessible when needed most. Liquidity in finance is the ability of a seller
to assemble a deal when times get tough, which in our terms is the
ability to assemble options, even if only at the last moment.π Just-on-
time liquidity is illustrated in the demise of the $6 billion hedge fund,
Amaranth, in 2006, a collapse foreshadowing worse things to come. As
Gillian Tett of the Financial Times described it then: ‘‘In recent years
hedge funds have proliferated, creating a vast pool of investors willing
to take risk, and thus act as buyers of the last resort when a crisis
strikes. . . . Amaranth illustrates the point. No sooner had it admitted
to its losses, than buyers offered to purchase its gas portfolio (averting
the prospect of dumping them on the open market)’’ (2006b). This was
a good mess for Amaranth, in contrast to the 2008 bankruptcies that
followed.
Just-this-way management in the form of command-and-control
measures characterized a significant element of the meltdown. Those
special government entities that were central to the U.S. mortgage
market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, ended up nationalized. The U.K.
government took over management of Northern Rock to stop a bank
run. Direct command and control were asserted to ensure that mort-
gage rates and other lending became less mercurial—all in the name of
securing greater authority over reducing volatility directly.∫ An article
in the Financial Times noted: ‘‘Tensions in money markets are so high
we have witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of central banks not
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only providing liquidity but in effect becoming the market’’ (P. Davies
2008).
All of which leads to that most unstable performance mode, that bad
mess of just-for-now. The blowup of those novel, securitized financial
instruments meant all manner of just-for-now relaxing of rules, spe-
cial dispensations, emergency exemptions, and one-time events like
the fdic’s ‘‘systemic risk exemption’’ (on the latter, see Guha et al.
2008). For instance, in March 2008 the Federal Reserve arranged a last-
ditch bailout for the nation’s fifth-largest investment bank, Bear
Stearns, because the latter risked bankruptcy. How the bailout was
managed is illuminating:
In an action almost unprecedented in takeover history, JPMorgan bought
39.5 percent of Bear on the spot to ensure that it would have close to a
majority of the votes to approve the deal. That agreement completely dis-
regards New York Stock Exchange’s rules that prevent anyone from buying
more than 20 percent of [the] company without a shareholder vote. Other
parts of the new agreement either stretch the rules or disregard years of
precedent in Delaware, where both banks are incorporated. Of course, all of
this rule-bending was done with the tacit, if not outright, approval of the
federal government. (Sorkin 2008)
Paul Volcker, the former head of the Federal Reserve, summarized this
just-for-now behavior as having taken the Fed to the ‘‘very edge of [its]
lawful and implied powers’’ (quoted in Scholtes 2008). Paul Krugman,
the Nobel Prize–winning economist, called it ‘‘barely legal’’ (2008a).Ω
Many other just-for-now transactions in banking occurred before the
end of 2008, ranging from temporary lines of credit (Chan and McGinty
2010) to just-for-now circuit breakers and kill switches intended to
‘‘temporarily’’ interrupt market prices from falling below set limits.
Being the most unstable performance mode, management under
just-for-now conditions bears close scrutiny. In earlier critical infra-
structure research (Roe and Schulman 2008), operators and managers
told of their great dissatisfaction in having to work under such condi-
tions. In some cases, it meant they had to commit an official violation in
order to avoid an even graver error. Worse yet, prolonging such just-for-
now performance is a sure way to deprofessionalize operators and man-
agers. You could even define prolonged just-for-now activities as the
inability of professionals to come up with better operating practices.
When continually resorting to firefighting, quick fixes, and band-aids
because they perceive no other alternative, professionals degrade their
expertise, and their skills atrophy. This kind of ‘‘panic engineering,’’
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even when necessary, is not something to be prolonged (see Sengupta
2012). What does that mean practically? In one of many examples,
Henry Paulson clearly went into his job as Secretary of the Treasury
with his professionalism recognized; how that professionalism sur-
vived the prolonged 2008 financial meltdown will be a continuing mat-
ter of much historical contention, even among Paulson’s admirers
(fcic 2011; Sorkin 2009).
Nor is the problem solely one of how endless firefighting can erode
the competence of a Treasury secretary or a central bank head. An
equally worrisome issue has to be that options and volatility are fully
interdependent in just-for-now messes. For example, serious reserva-
tions were expressed over loosening restrictions with respect to fair-
value accounting during the financial upheaval (Norris 2009). Assets, it
was argued, should instead be priced by their owners at what they were
forecast or modeled to be, which would be higher than fire-sale prices
of distressed sales. Doing so did improve the balance sheets of some
who owned these otherwise illiquid assets. In this way, resources and
options increased—but, sadly, so did worries over the possible adverse
effects on volatility. The gap between these now-imputed prices and
what potential buyers really thought the assets were worth could prove
to be even greater than imagined before the loosening of restrictions.
That would make things even messier (see, for example, Hughes 2009).
These distinctions between modes of mess and mess management
matter for two other reasons. First, proposed improvements all too
often fall short of producing reliable financial services when effects of
those proposals on options and volatility are not made explicit. Adding
liquidity in a volatile financial environment means that the system can
at best be managed just-on-time rather than just-for-now; in other
words, increasing financial liquidity may add options but do little to
reduce financial volatility. For instance, a central bank window for
emergency lending or a Treasury line of credit may be better at increas-
ing options through added liquidity than at reducing financial volatil-
ity. Increasing capital reserve requirements or putting limits on lever-
age—the ratio of borrowings to equity—may, on the other hand, have
everything to do with stabilizing financial volatility without neces-
sarily adding more options for financial managers. A government plan
for bank recapitalization to allay public fears over widespread bank
insolvency may, in contrast, have just as much to do with reducing
system volatility as increasing those banks’ options. So clearinghouses
for over-the-counter derivatives may also have the virtue of addressing
simultaneously the reduction of volatility and the increase in options,
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at least to the degree that the clearinghouses are not themselves so
interconnected as to increase risks (Dudley 2012; it was even difficult
to get detailed counterparty data after 2007 [Tett 2009c]).∞≠
The differentiated nature of risks is the second reason why the per-
formance modes matter when it comes to managing the financial mess
better. We’ve seen how varying system volatility and options with
which to respond to unpredictability or uncontrollability pose differ-
ent risks of misjudgment, complacency, compliance, and backing one-
self into a corner for managers. But these risks together point to two
general ones directly related to options and volatility. When there is (1)
a permanent reduction in the variety of options for responding to
changing task volatility and/or (2) a permanent increase in task vol-
atility that cannot be responded to by a variety of options (whether
because of misjudgment, complacency, or whatever), the risk of pro-
ducing bad messes increases dramatically. That is why the permanent
loss of capital in the face of doggedly unstable situations has been one
of the most important risks emerging from and evident in the finan-
cial mess (see Plender 2011b). Or to put the point the other way round,
when implemented proposals actually increase options and/or reduce
volatility as just discussed, managing the mess becomes far easier.
Let’s stop there for the moment and shift the discussion from good
messes that can become bad and bad messes that can get worse to what
were the best and the worst messes in the financial meltdown. We’ve
sketched good and bad mess management in terms of specific perfor-
mance modes, but what about the best financial mess to be in (that is,
being able to operate across all performance modes as needed) versus
the worst mess to be in (that is, being compelled to operate in un-
studied conditions entirely outside known performance modes)?
So far, the worst mess in the financial crisis—and here ‘‘crisis’’ is the
correct term—was the panic recorded in the last quarter or so of 2008,
when it was in no way evident just who was going to be saved and who
would be left to fail. ‘‘It feels as if we are 15 minutes away from the end
of the world,’’ the head of equities at a large U.K. bank told the Financial
Times at that time (quoted in Financial Times 2008). ‘‘The market has
changed more in the past 10 days than it had in the previous 70 years,’’
reported a senior executive at a European investment bank (quoted in
Thal Larsen and Guerrera 2008). ‘‘The reality is that we are not going
to know what the right price is for years,’’ said a bond portfolio man-
ager at a major mutual fund (quoted in Bajaj 2008). ‘‘It was just may-
hem,’’ said the ceo of a New York–based hedge fund about the mar-
kets (quoted in Mollenkamp et al. 2008). ‘‘People were paralyzed by
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fear of what could erupt.’’ ‘‘We have no idea of the details of our
derivative exposures,’’ conceded a senior official at Lehman Brothers at
a meeting of bankers and regulators just before that firm collapsed,
‘‘and neither do you’’ (quoted in Guerrera and Bullock 2008, 16). Just
after the Lehman collapse, the chairman of the Federal Reserve was
asked, ‘‘Well, what if we don’t do anything?’’ ‘‘There’ll be no economy
on Monday,’’ Ben Bernanke replied (quoted in Wolf 2009).
After the plunge in Morgan Stanley shares, a senior manager at the
Swiss bank ubs said: ‘‘It felt like there was no ground underneath your
feet. I didn’t know where it was going to end’’ (quoted in Sorkin et al.
2008). Nor was he alone. To the global investor George Soros, it felt as
if ‘‘the financial crisis [was] spinning out of control’’ (2008, 11). The
chair of Morgan Stanley Asia concluded: ‘‘We have gone to the edge of
an abyss that few thought was ever possible’’ (Roach 2008, 26). Other
citations could be added, but the point remains: The people in the
midst of the financial turmoil at that moment—the traders, bankers,
and investors—were operating outside of known performance modes
and in a region of pervasive unknown unknowns. It turns out that
these financial managers hadn’t been managing reliably after all, or
else they wouldn’t have ended up where they did, in free fall. If things
were this awful, how then can we speak of the best mess to have at the
same time?
That Other Mess . . .
The best mess was a very big dog that didn’t bark in the financial
upheaval. In circumstances uniformly described as bad to awful, the
financial meltdown was accompanied by a silence that went largely
unreported. Simply put, while banking and finance are a global infra-
structure, the financial mess—even when it morphed into a crisis—did
not spread to other critical infrastructures as rapidly and pervasively
as it did through the real economy.
The effect on the real economy has been much noted. In the words of
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: ‘‘Distress in one area of the
financial markets led to failures in other areas by way of interconnec-
tions and vulnerabilities that bankers, government officials, and oth-
ers had missed or dismissed’’ (2011, 27). True, but then why didn’t it
spread further into other critical infrastructures? After all, critical
infrastructures are said to be highly connected. ‘‘Interconnected sys-
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Figure 1. Interdependencies among eight critical infrastructures
Source: Heller 2002
services,’’ writes the economist John Kay (2009a). ‘‘Failure could also
have catastrophic consequences in electricity networks, oil refineries
and petrochemical plants.’’ Which is to say we should expect the fail-
ures themselves to be potentially interconnected and propagated. Con-
sider the cat’s cradle of interconnected critical infrastructure in figure
1. Other immeasurably more complicated diagrams have been devel-
oped since this one (Europeans focus on even more critical infrastruc-
tures, as we see below), but figure 1 is sufficient to make the present
point.
Consistent with figure 1’s feedback loops across infrastructures, we
witnessed some impact of the financial crisis on the sectors of transpor-
tation and of oil and natural gas, if only through the freezing up of
credit, trade finance, and investment in shipping and public transporta-
tion (see Wright 2008, 2009). The financial contagion certainly ham-
pered infrastructural projects in transportation and ports (Little 2009).
Associated volatility in markets has as well affected state government
revenues (see, for example, Bullock 2011), which in turn affected main-
tenance and construction budgets and planning for infrastructures. As
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the financial mess developed between 2007 and 2008, the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission found ‘‘countless governments, infrastruc-
ture projects, and nonprofits on tight budgets were slammed with in-
terest rates of 10% or higher’’ (2011, 278). Still, figure 1—and again, not
only this figure—suggests that a considerable impact of the financial
mess should have been felt through the electricity sector, for example,
because electricity, like telecommunications, is a critical infrastructure
bookending other infrastructures and their sectors depicted in the figure.
Was electricity affected by the financial mess in the similar ways that
transportation was? Not if we rely on those same reports about the
financial meltdown. While the upheaval clearly affected plans for future
infrastructure in electricity (see, for example, Crooks 2008; Wiggles-
worth, Sakoui, and Kerr 2009), it did not affect real-time operations in
any newsworthy way, at least not up to the time of this writing—save
for one major possible exception: the massive 2012 electrical blackout in
India. That outage was connected to interrelated problems in India’s
electricity and banking sectors, though how much those problems were
due to the global financial mess as distinct from political issues in India
remains an open question (Sender and Crabtree 2012). Reports, how-
ever, predict that the ‘‘world will witness [a] big demand for investment
in energy infrastructure over the coming decades’’ (Davis 2008). There
is also confirmation that other large technical systems, such as rail-
roads, have taken advantage of the post-2008 economic downturn to
construct new facilities, as construction companies eager for work
come in under budget (Schwartz 2012).
No one doubts that the real economy was hit hard by the financial
upheaval, so what is going on here?∞∞ The short answer appears to be
that other infrastructures continued to manage, however messily, in
the face of the financial turmoil and in ways demonstrably different
from what was happening in parts of the banking and finance infra-
structure. The only study I know that examines cross-infrastructure
cascades has been undertaken by the Dutch research body, tno De-
fence, Security and Safety, and the Delft University of Technology
(Luiijf et al. 2008). As of September 2008, the tno database covered
2,650 critical infrastructure (ci) disruptions in 164 nations with 1,090
cascading outages. Table 1 records the subset of 1,749 ci failure inci-
dents in 29 European nations, where an incident—when not indepen-
dent and isolated—could initiate a cascade in the critical infrastructure
or result in a cascade in another infrastructure. The majority of inci-
dents are isolated within the infrastructure concerned (1,017 versus
769). The tno study concludes: ‘‘Our analysis of the collected data
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Education ≠ ≥ ∞ ∂ ∂
Energy ∞∂∏ π∑ ≥∫∫ ∏≠Ω ∑Ω≠
Financial services ∞ ≤∏ ≥≥ ∏≠ ∏≠
Food ≠ ∂ ∂ ∫ ∫
Government ≤ ∂≠ ≤∏ ∏∫ ∏π
Health ∞ ∞∏ ≤≤ ≥Ω ≥Ω
Industry ∑ ∞∑ π ≤π ≤π
Internet ∞∑ ∑∞ Ω∑ ∞∏∞ ∞∏≠
Postal services ∞ ≠ ≠ ∞ ∞
Telecom ∏Ω ∞≤∑ ∞∞∂ ≥≠∫ ≤Ω∑
Transport ∞Ω ∞≤∫ ≤π∏ ∂≤≥ ∂≤≤
Water Ω ∞∫ ∑∞ π∫ π∏
Total ≤∏∫ ∑≠∞ ∞≠∞π ∞π∫∏ ∞π∂Ω
Source: Adapted from Luiijf et al. ≤≠≠∫
shows that most cascades originate from only a limited number of
critical sectors (energy, telecom) and that interdependencies occur far
less often than most theoretical studies assume’’ (Luiijf et al. 2008).∞≤
Note how few cascades are initiated by the financial services sector,
compared to the energy and telecom sectors.
In contrast to figure 1 with all its interconnections, but in light of the
patterns emerging from tno’s database, what is striking is how re-
silient other infrastructures have been in the face of the financial
mess, when we would have expected them to have been more vulner-
able. Again, circumstances could have changed by the time you read
this—the collapse of Lehman Brothers, for example, took a weekend.
Even so, nearly all these tightly coupled, complexly interactive connec-
tions between and among infrastructures seem to have been managed
reliably, at least during the first thirty-six months of the financial
mess. Yet bankers and their critics still focus on contagion and the
high interconnectivity of banking and finance to the rest of the world
(fcic 2011; Tett, Freeland, and Braithwaite 2010).
Why was there any capacity to be resilient and anticipatory in such a
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world? Why exactly was there the ability of operators and technology
to absorb a shock or bounce back while working out the next steps
ahead? Here we must speculate, as so few have reported on this dog
that didn’t bark. Research on water and electricity suggests the re-
silience is due to the ability of their operators and managers to change
their management as conditions change. That is, interconnections
that appear to be tightly coupled are more loosely coupled than many
think—and they are loosely coupled because they were engineered and
are managed to be so. ‘‘Dependencies’’ among many infrastructures,
write Eric Luiijf and his colleagues (2010, 16) in a later and longer
review of the tno data, ‘‘are anything but unmanaged.’’ When true,
that is the very best mess to be in for other critical services if parts of
the banking and finance infrastructure are rife with contagion. Mess
has been always possible given the sheer interconnectivity between
and among infrastructures, while the best mess was best because many
infrastructures have managed those interconnections in ways to keep
many of them latent—so far.
The best and worst messes occurred at the same time during the
financial upheaval. If the worst mess when it comes to reliable perfor-
mance means having to work outside what you know, while the best
mess is managing reliably with no more than what you do know, then
both were visible in the period up to and after 2008. That leads to a
question: If one major reason why this happened was due to the fact
that the interconnectivity that brought down much of the securitized
finance system was managed differently than the interconnectivity
within and between other systems, then just what were those more
successful ‘‘management skills’’?
We turn to these skills next. The typology I’ve detailed in this chap-
ter is part of a wider framework, which enables us to see what it takes
to manage a bad mess so it does not get worse or to pull out a good or
even better mess. We have been introduced to types of messes and
mess management, but what skills do managers actually have that can
help them manage well rather than poorly? What is their domain of
competence, and how does it relate to managing messes reliably? We
turn now to that wider framework and what it means in practice for




FOR MANAGING MESS RELIABLY
Hubs, Skills, and the Domain of Competence
It’s rush hour and traffic is its usual mess. As luck would have it, three
cars arrive simultaneously at the four-way stop, with traffic backed up
behind each. The three cars’ turn signals aren’t on, but each driver can
see the other two clearly. Drivers 1 and 3 are going in the opposite
direction, with driver 2 to the right of driver 1 and driver 3 to the right
of driver 2 (see figure 2). In the United States, the rules of the road are
that the driver on the right proceeds first. On this principle, driver 3
begins to cross the intersection, and in theory driver 2 would go next,
followed by driver 1. Driver 2, however, does not go next. Drivers know
that in this kind of situation, in rush hour with cars stacking up, it is
important to keep the traffic moving. So driver 1 crosses the road just
as driver 3 does, and driver 2 goes afterward, none of the three seeing
anything untoward in doing so. Of course, the three drivers have to
keep alert in case something unexpected happens that requires an
immediate reaction on their part.
All the principal features of managing a mess reliably are here. The
rules of the road are design principles developed to make traffic flow
reliably. Local circumstance can and does require their modification in
practice, however. In these cases, reliability depends on the ability of
the drivers to recognize then-pertaining patterns and formulate con-
tingency scenarios. Skilled drivers familiar with a situation like the one
described know that in these cases, moving across the intersection in
the sequence these three drivers did can be quicker than keeping to the
rule. In fact, keeping to the rule could make the traffic mess worse.
Even though our drivers may never have been at this intersection
before at just this time of day, each formulates a scenario in light of the
known patterns and proceeds on that basis. Those in cars farther back
would be upset otherwise, as all three drivers are connected with oth-
ers behind them in the ensuing traffic flow. Sometimes the mess goes
from bad to worse regardless. If a driver gets a flat tire while turning




Figure 2. Managing a
traffic mess
into the intersection, that may be a scenario none of the drivers pres-
ent have witnessed before. A first-time driver in this area might get
confused. Where no pattern or scenario exists, drivers have to depend
on their reaction skills.
The basic elements of macro design, pattern recognition, scenario
formulation, and reactive micro operations are roughly captured in
this familiar example of managing in rush hour. The analytic frame-
work for connecting these concepts was originally developed by my
colleague, Paul Schulman, to understand how electricity control room
operators think through their management under pressing time and
knowledge constraints. Here and for the rest of the book, I move
beyond control room managers and operators by adjusting the frame-
work and its elements to describe reliable mess managers. In formal
terms, I argue that these managers should be seen as ‘‘mess and re-
liability professionals’’ whose special skills, expertise, and competence
lie in reliably sorting out the policy and management messes they
confront and doing so within the politics they face.∞ I begin by intro-
ducing basic concepts and terms, starting again with service reliability,
and show how the discussion relates specifically to mess. I apply the
extended framework to what many consider the major messes driving
economic and social upheavals—namely, overpopulation and global-
ization. Once the overall framework is presented, chapter 2’s fourfold
typology of messes and mess management will be located within it. In
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the process, I recast core concepts such as risk and learning, while
showing how mess and reliability professionals differ from others. The
chapter ends with a fuller definition of a policy mess and their difficul-
ties. I defer discussion of the politics involved to chapter 6. Through-
out, I talk about ‘‘you,’’ ‘‘we,’’ and ‘‘us’’ in the belief that we all are better
mess managers in the making.
A General Framework
Leave the cars at the intersection and ratchet the analysis up to the
system level. The wider organizational literature to which my col-
leagues and I have been contributing tells us that the drive to highly
reliable management in critical infrastructures can be, for heuristic
purposes, characterized along two dimensions:≤ (1) the type of knowl-
edge used in activities to make system services reliable; and (2) the
scope or focus of attention for those reliability activities. Reliability
management is grounded in knowledge bases that range from experi-
ence, based on informal tacit understandings of the activities, to for-
mal or representational knowledge, in which abstract principles and
deductive models are also core to understanding activities. Knowledge
bases blend induction and deduction in varying ways, which are re-
flected in the assembly of different arguments and scenarios with
respect to reliability.≥
The scope of those managing for reliability ranges from a position
that assumes reliability is an entire system output, encompassing
many variables and elements, to a position that treats each case of
reliability as a particular event with its own distinct properties or
features. Typically, scope refers to the different scales, ranging from
general to specific, that managers must take into account when re-
liability matters. Knowledge and scope define a cognitive space for
managers, where reliability—the continuous and safe provision of the
critical service even during turbulent periods and now not just in
critical infrastructures—is to be pursued. Things get messy if only
because the perspectives of those operating within the space vary in
terms of their knowledge bases and scope. As we will see momentarily,
things get even messier in the name of reliability.
In this cognitive space, there are four nodal activities (see figure 3),
each position being a different mix of perspectives along the two con-
tinua. The nodes—I call these positions within the mess and reliability
space the principal hubs for thinking about and managing reliably—
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MESS AND RELIABILITY PROFESSIONALS
Pattern Recognition and Anticipations
Scenario Formulation and 
Localized Contingency Scenarios








Figure 3. Mess and reliability space of professional activities
are macro design, micro operations, pattern recognition, and scenario
formulation. We will see how and why the mess and reliability profes-
sional operates in the domain bound by the latter two hubs.
At the extreme of both scope and knowledge, where the scope is the
whole system and the knowledge is formal, is the hub of macro design.
Design—be it in the form of policy, law, mission statement, or blue-
print—asserts that formal deductive principles applied at the system-
wide level govern a wide variety of critical processes for service provi-
sion. Here design is meant to cover the operation of an entire system,
including every single case relevant to providing system services. At
the other extreme of the cognitive space is reactive behavior in the face
of real-time challenges at the hub called micro operations. Here re-
liability depends on the immediate activities of system operators using
tacit knowledge to manage a particular event rather than relying on
preexisting designs at the system level for any eventuality. The field
activities of crisis managers and emergency responders are micro oper-
ations par excellence.
Designers, however, cannot anticipate every eventuality. Worse, the
more ‘‘complete’’ a logic of design principles aspires to be, the more
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likely it is that its full set contains two or more principles that contra-
dict each other—for example, we must not commit genocide . . . except
when authorized to do so by the nuclear doctrine of mutually assured
destruction.∂ On the other side, operator reactions are likely to give
the operator too specific or partial a picture, causing him or her to lose
sight of the forest for the burning trees in the foreground. Micro
operations, in other words, instill in us a kind of trained incapacity
that undermines reliability because operators are not aware of the
wider context(s) of their activities.
What to do then, when high reliability is at stake? Moving across the
cognitive space from one corner to its opposite is unlikely to be suc-
cessful. Research has found that attempts to impose systemwide for-
mal designs directly onto an individual event or case—to anticipate,
fully deduce, and determine behavior in each instance from macro
principles alone—are inadequate, if not illusionary. From the other
side, an individual’s reactive operations scarcely make for a widely
tested template that can be applied to the system as a whole.
Instead of corner-to-corner movements, figure 3 indicates that re-
liability is enhanced when multiple shifts in scope are accompanied by
multiple shifts in knowledge. Becoming more reliable means becoming
more knowledgeable about varied things at variable scales. To that
end, professionals approach and reach reliability through different
skills than those for macro design and micro operations. Their ap-
proach is not direct, but indirect. System managers have to tack to
reach reliability, much in the way that a sailboat does not get from A
to B in a straight line, but rather frequently must cross into the wind to
get there faster. To do that, however, requires knowing more than a
straight line.
Specifically, we know from research that designers enhance reliabil-
ity when they apply their designs less globally and relax their commit-
ment to identifying principles that are meant to fully determine sys-
tem operations. Both happen when designers contextualize design
principles by embracing a wider range of contingencies in their analy-
ses. They formulate alternate, more localized scenarios for system
behavior and performance (the ‘‘scenario formulation and localized
contingency scenarios’’ hub in figure 3). Food policy, for instance,
works better when differentiating management protocols by crop or
location (see Godfray et al. 2010, 813).
We also know that reliability is enhanced when operations shift from
real-time reactions to recognizing patterns and anticipating their con-
sequences across a run of cases of micro behavior and experience (the
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‘‘pattern recognition and anticipations’’ hub in figure 3). Here ‘‘recogni-
tion’’ means looking for and into patterns, and ‘‘anticipation’’ means
not only having expectations based on those patterns but also being
prepared for their implications. Some patterns may be visible at one
scale rather than others (see Schelling [1978] on micro motives ag-
gregating into macro behavior). By recognizing and anticipating pat-
terns across cases, operators and managers learn to adapt, and better
practices emerge. These anticipations and evolving strategies, based
on empirical generalizations, trends, or other (quantitative or qualita-
tive) patterns, are likely to be less formal than protocols developed
through contingency analysis and scenario formulation. Signal detec-
tion and the ability to ‘‘read’’ feedback in terms of what these events
indicate for the system as a whole are crucial for reliability manage-
ment when operators don’t have full, immediate causal knowledge of
the system they are managing.∑
It is in this middle ground, bridging the formulation of design-
inflected contingency scenarios realized more locally and the recogni-
tion of patterns and associated anticipations systemwide, that we find
the reliability-managing professional networked with similar profes-
sionals. In the middle is where patterns and the anticipations based on
them are probed, and where design-mediated scenarios are modified in
light of the system patterns then pertaining. In the middle is where the
skills in pattern recognition and scenario formulation reinforce each
other, as when repeated pattern recognition helps increase sensitivity
to context-rich differences—and vice versa.∏ In the middle is where
reliability managers exercise their skills of interpretation as they trans-
late pattern and scenario into managing reliably. And in the middle is
where the reliability manager must be the mess manager.
For the middle is where we see operators and managers maneuver
across the performance modes of the preceding chapter to ensure the
safe and continuous provision of a critical service. This happens, more-
over, with respect to services for which there are no formal control
rooms or dispatch centers or trading floors, only networks of profes-
sionals to ensure that a service is provided reliably.π This middle is, in
brief, the domain of competence for these professionals. To say that
managers are operating competently and skillfully is to say that they
are managing within their unique domain of pattern recognition, sce-
nario formulation, and interpretation so as to maneuver across the
performance modes as conditions change. Otherwise, they could not be
reliable mess managers; otherwise, they would not be the professionals
that they are in terms of managing mess and reliability together. As
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figure 3 indicates, no one else operating in the cognitive space of mess
and reliability management has this unique knowledge base.
All of this sounds mushy, so some examples are useful. Within that
space, the worst mess for professionals to be in—as first sketched in
chapter 2—is to be pushed outside their domain of competence. You,
the mess manager, are being asked to operate beyond your skills and
talents. To be pushed from the credit derivatives you know to the
derivatives of derivatives no one comprehends is a very bad mess. In
contrast, the best mess is being well within the domain of known
patterns and scenarios and translation skills, where managers can use
their unique knowledge to maneuver across multiple performance
modes under changing conditions. In other words, for those who take
reliability seriously, good mess management is what occurs well within
their domain of competence, with known but different patterns and
known but different scenarios—sometimes with time to spare, some-
times with hardly a moment left. For these professionals, the chances
of managing a mess badly increases the closer it is to the limits of
known patterns and scenarios—that is, the closer it is to the edge of
the domain of competence (or what Paul Schulman calls the precursor
zone). It is here where reliable mess managers are short of knowable
options and where the options they have could have important but
unknown effects.
This management is, again, without any guarantees. Bridging sce-
narios and patterns, each of which differ with the others, is the diffi-
cult part of the professionals’ translation, because the interpolation
involves transposing, transforming, and synthesizing scenario and
pattern in light of others in order to manage in the present.∫ Transla-
tion is needed if only because localized scenarios and systemwide pat-
terns are drawn from very different knowledge bases (figure 3). Again,
that translation is interpretative rather than literal, and this is how
new or different knowledge is generated—though that process is not
without its own risks, as we have seen.
But just what exactly is involved in ‘‘translation’’ or ‘‘synthesis’’ of
patterns and scenarios? One way to start thinking about this is to
recognize that the macro designers and micro operators around the
two extreme hubs who talk about ‘‘risk,’’ ‘‘coordination,’’ and ‘‘learning’’
are frequently doing so differently from those in the middle domain. If
the differences were appreciated by decisionmakers, those endless de-
bates over planning versus implementation or comprehensive plan-
ning versus piecemeal incrementalism, among others, would have to
be rethought. Let’s introduce each briefly here, leaving fuller com-
ments to later.
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When professionals in the middle talk about objective risks in large
technical systems, they mean not only worst-case scenarios that they
have formulated or the hazards and frequencies that they have recog-
nized. They also mean the risks that emerge out of the unique knowl-
edge it takes to manage the systems across and within the four perfor-
mance modes—each of which has its own dominant risk. Activities in
the middle domain are not more certain and less risky (or less messy
and more reliable); rather, the operating complexities and risks are
multiple and change with shifts in scope of management and knowl-
edge needed to manage reliably in that domain.Ω The professionalism
comes in knowing these differences and why reliability is risky in the
ways it is.
Learning is also different for those looking from the middle to out-
side the domain of competence. The domain in figure 3 is not static.
Patterns and scenarios are added to or dropped from the repertoire, as
messes and the professionals who manage them adapt to changing
circumstance. By implication, not only can macro-design ‘‘solutions’’
that bypass this learning pull professionals and their networks outside
their middle domain of competence, but the interventions just as
often fail to capitalize on the evolutionary advantage of these middle
mess managers in improving reliability operations and rejiggering pro-
cesses and technology to ensure those improvements.
‘‘Coordination’’ must also be rethought. By calling for greater team-
work or stakeholder coordination, mess and reliability professionals in
the middle often mean ‘‘bringing the system into the room’’ (Weisbord
and Janoff 1995). To do so is to bring in those with expertise in macro
design and micro operations, but also those who network patchy pat-
terns and scenarios into reliability. This ability to reconnect discon-
nected activities in ways that better match or mimic the connected-
ness of reality is at the heart of the professionals’ translation.
If you look closely at figure 3, you will see that we are talking about
professionals who are experts not because they ‘‘bridge’’ macro design
and micro operations directly. On the contrary, professionals synthe-
size knowledge about planning and about operations into reliable ser-
vices, however messy their translation may be in the face of uncertain
success. One great mistake in conventional policy analysis and public
management has been to assume that implementation is all about con-
verting macro design into micro operations or that implementation at
the micro level ends up as a kind of de facto policymaking at the macro
level. Nothing could be further from the truth. Implementation takes
place in the middle across a network of professionals. Here, the locus
of implementation shifts away from micro operators—the fabled
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street-level worker, including the cop on the beat, the teacher in the
classroom, and the caseworker on a home visit, who may not even see
themselves as implementing policy∞≠—to networks of middle profes-
sionals and the risks they face. It is there where messy trade-offs and
interpretative muddles are to be found between the pattern recogni-
tion and scenario formulation hubs, and where any better practices
that emerge across a run of micro operations have to be modified in
light of local contingencies.
Stay with those street-level workers for the present, because the
differences between them and the middle domain of mess managers
help us to understand just what the latter professionals actually do by
way of managing for service reliability. Each of the two groups is
oriented differently to the hubs and domain of competence, and the
differences in orientation are instructive—although nothing is hard
and fast here—when it comes to understanding the nature of mess
management as discussed in this book.
First, there are differences with respect to pattern recognition. At best,
street-level workers avoid labeling and stigmatizing clients: ‘‘Street-
level workers do not see citizen-clients as abstractions—‘the disabled,’
‘the poor,’ ‘the criminal’—but as individuals with flaws and strengths
who rarely fit within the one-size-fits-all approach of policies and laws’’
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 94). But in my extended frame-
work, pattern recognition differs considerably from a macro design of
one size fits all. For the mess and reliability professional, stereotyping is
its own systemwide phenomenon, with its own patterns. For example,
how do people vary in terms of education, age, ethnicity, income, or
gender when it comes to stereotyping? Mess and reliability profession-
als want to know the better practices for dealing with such stereotypes
when it comes to ‘‘juveniles’’ or the ‘‘disabled.’’ Street-level workers have
to first know persons, though they too stereotype from time to time;
mess and reliability professionals have to first know how populations
differ, though they too work one-on-one from time to time.
There are differences with respect to one’s stand toward macro de-
sign. For the mess and reliability professional in a network, macro de-
sign is as disputed, incomplete, uncertain, and complex as any other
hub in his or her operating space (we will see this in the overpopulation
example that follows). There is no one overarching morality or standard
when it comes to trying to avoid trade-offs. That is why professionals
connect with other professionals in order to get anything done halfway
reliably. For the street-level worker, the moral order is clearer: ‘‘For
example, the decision to subvert the rules by an exasperated [social
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service] counselor . . . redeems the state by breaking through the bu-
reaucratic labyrinth’’ (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 24). Street-
level workers may be willing to subvert departmental protocols and
procedures in order to do the right thing. Mess managers in the middle
managing for reliable critical services face a greater variety of plural
values when it comes to rights or wrongs.
There are differences with respect to where the street-level worker
and the middle professional stand with respect to localized scenarios.
The street-level worker may have a more negative view of localized
scenarios than the mess and reliability professional does, when those
scenarios are protocols and rules devolving from departmental policy.
For the street-level worker, macro policy and localized rules are much
the same thing: the problem and a cause of difficulty. For the reliable
mess manager, those localized rules are resources to be exploited in
order to keep departmental services reliable, as task conditions change.
Differences in orientation to micro operations are also notable. For
mess and reliability professionals, the individual case is a starting
point from which to search out patterns over a run of such cases. How
else do you find better practices? For the street-level worker, the indi-
vidual constitutes the center of gravity of service provision. Numbers,
trends, and procedures are really not the endpoint; the worker’s rela-
tionship with the client is. ‘‘Indeed, the worker’s decision of when to
conform to rules and procedures and when to break them and when to
cooperate with authority and when to act independently is the essence
of street-level judgment’’ (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 68).
Finally, there are also differences in the stand the two groups take
with respect to what I have been calling ‘‘the middle.’’ For street-level
workers, the middle drives the system and is very much part of the
problem: ‘‘In their stories, the system is described as an undifferenti-
ated amalgam of other units in their agency, other agencies, elected
officials and the media. . . . Street-level workers see themselves as
moral actors working in opposition to the system and rarely describe
themselves as part of it’’ (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 22). For
the mess and reliability professional, the middle is far more differenti-
ated, set as it is between the hubs that bookend it—namely, localized
scenarios and recognized systemwide patterns that rely on different
mixes of knowledge.
To summarize, for the reliable mess manager, patterns and better
practices matter as much as protocols and procedures, and it is within
networks that these are to be managed. For the street-level worker,
face-to-face relationships matter more than protocols, and headquar-
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ter networks are power elites to be circumscribed, when not circum-
vented. When the latter happens, the street-level worker can be part of
the bad mess in which middle mess managers find themselves. From
the other side, when there is no network of reliable mess professionals
in the middle (assume that they’re all operating in unstudied condi-
tions), the street-level worker is indeed alone, acting in ways that
necessarily equate professionalism with reliable micro operations.
Before next turning to a specific policy application of the framework,
a preceding point must be highlighted. Where you see one mess and
reliability professional, you see a network of them. Policy messes are so
complex that a reliable mess manager in the middle cannot manage
any one of them on his or her own and still be reliable. There has
always been something dangerously misleading in public policy and
management literatures that perpetuate deracinated notions of ‘‘pol-
icy entrepreneur’’ or ‘‘change agent,’’ as if each were the counterpart to
the solitary street-level worker.
An Application
Arguably, the world’s most important mess when it comes to public
policy and management has been the long-standing controversy over
global overpopulation and associated overcrowding.∞∞ The crisis narra-
tive is a familiar one. Human population numbers—some seven billion
people with a net increase of over seventy-five million a year (see, for
example, Bloom 2011; Wolf 2003)—threaten our planet with unprece-
dented overcrowding, environmental spoliation, and resource conflicts.
We are fast approaching, if we are not already past, the sustainable
limits of water, clean air, and energy. Without population restrictions,
including but not limited to birth control and growth limits on cities
and all manner of resource utilization, the globe is headed for irrevers-
ible decline, assuming that has not already been assured. The Long Emer-
gency (Kunstler 2005), not The Long Boom (Schwartz, Leyden, and Hyatt
1999), is under way.
Consider the numbers, we are urged. In the early 1950s, global popu-
lation was predicted to be 3.6 billion by 2000; the actual figure was more
like 6.1 billion (R. Cooper and Layard 2002, 8). The planet’s population
has been forecasted to reach up to 12 billion by 2050 (9). What about our
natural resources? The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations calculates that forest loss has been huge: a net loss of 6.4 million
hectares between 1990 and 1997 alone (Kaiser 2002, 919). Projections for
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energy and water use signal terrifying depletions (Brown 2002). More
than half of the world’s population turned urban in the first decade of
the twenty-first century; a century or so earlier, urban populations
represented less than 15 percent of the total (see, for example, Crossette
2002; Greenhalgh 2010). Surface temperatures have risen over the last
century, and global climate change continues unabated (Ramanathan
and Barnett 2003). The world’s greatest problem is population growth,
according to James Watson and Francis Crick, the discoverers of dna
(Daugherty and Allendorf 2002, 284). What, Jared Diamond asks in
Collapse (2005), was that Easter Islander thinking when cutting down
the island’s last tree? Two conservationists in Science conclude: ‘‘One
word sums up the overall and long-term problem [in creating a sustain-
able future]: overpopulation. We wonder how any sane person could
disagree’’ (Wright and Okey 2004, 1903).
Here is how sane people disagree. First, the numbers are disputed,
and population projections remain full of uncertainties (see, for exam-
ple, Walker 2009). The United Nations revised its global population
projections substantially downward at one point, and it was estimated
that the total would be around nine billion by 2050 (see, for example,
Chamie 2010, 157; United Nations 2003). The figures were subsequently
revised upward, to just over ten billion by 2100 (Gillis and Dugger 2011;
R. Lee 2011). ‘‘There is, however, considerable uncertainty surrounding
these projections,’’ as a professor of economics and demography insists
(Bloom 2011, 562). One study indicates a forest loss of 20 percent less
than the original Food and Agriculture Organization estimates, while
major water-use projections have been overestimated (Brown 2002;
Kaiser 2002). The only certain thing about global energy projections is
that they are wrong, if we believe the experts. Temperatures have been
increasing, but a vigorous controversy continues over what this actually
means regionally and in terms of costs and benefits (again, start with
Ramanathan and Barrett 2003). Instead of focusing on that Easter Is-
lander, we might just as well ask what European explorers thought they
were doing when they knowingly introduced venereal diseases to the
Pacific (N. Thomas 2003, xxv–xxvi). Finally, and with all due respect to
Watson and Crick, when did they become experts on population growth?
Other problems with the data and methods must be registered.
Strong taxonomic biases in documenting species have long existed in
conservation research (Clark and May 2002), estimates of biodiversity
losses remain disputed, and there are those who consider global urban-
ization to have net benefits for controlling total population numbers—
for example, family size and birthrates tend to drop when populations
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become more urban (Revkin 2002). We must, of course, tread cau-
tiously here. I am not saying that there is nothing to worry about by
way of overpopulation—no one wants some ecologists equating him or
her to a Holocaust denier.∞≤ Does this mean, then, that analysts are
wedged between two conflicting narratives with respect to population
and crowding, waiting for the evidence to free them?
Figure 3 suggests how to sort out this policy mess. Explicit in the call
for population curbs, particularly those limits on growth and births, is
the macro-design concept of a global carrying capacity, which is the
upper limit or cap on the total number of people that the planet can
support without collapse. The idea that the level of sustainable popula-
tion can be derived from a calculation of global carrying capacity is
contentious on several counts, however. First, which global carrying
capacity estimate do we rely on? At the time of writing, the only
certain number has been sixty-nine, which is the number of past stud-
ies reviewed in a meta-analysis of the widely divergent estimates of
global carrying capacity. The meta-analysis found the lower and upper
population bounds were 0.65 billion and 98 billion people, with its
best-point estimate of 7.7 billion (van den Bergh and Rietveld 2004).
Second, major ecologists doubt whether there is a ‘‘carrying capacity’’
for arid and semi-arid lands, which constitute much of the surface area
of the planet (Roe 1999; see also Scoones 1996).
As for the other extreme, the micro operations of overcrowding—
the actual experience of overcrowding—are full of distinctions. What
feels overcrowded to someone in Europe need not be so to someone in
Southeast Asia. What feels overcrowded to rural residents may not to
urban residents within the same country. Even when both sets of
residents concede that their areas are overcrowded in the same way,
one group might say the solution is not fewer people as much as it is
more education or technology. Even if they agreed that their areas
were overcrowded for exactly the same reasons with exactly the same
effects, it is unrealistic to believe that anyone knows enough, no mat-
ter what his or her expertise, to recommend what the actual popula-
tion levels should be for a wide area concerned. It is difficult enough
for a long-term resident to make such judgments for his or her smaller
locality, let alone the most complex ecosystem there is: the planet.
As we tack from macro design and individual experience in figure 3,
we add to the knowledge bases about population, age structures, popu-
lation densities, and related factors. We have already seen that the very
different global trends and generalizations do not match the domi-
nant, more uniform macro narrative about global overpopulation
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(that is, we have noted the differences between carrying capacity as a
macro-design concept and the actual variability in estimates across the
globe at the pattern-recognition hub).
Substantial differences also emerge when we move the analysis from
macro design to localized contingency scenarios. Stay with global car-
rying capacity as core to the determination of overpopulation at the
macro level. When we move from that governing concept to its re-
gional counterpart, it turns out that a handful of the world’s regions—
most notably India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nigeria—have
accounted for recent major increases in world population (Wolf 2003),
and other substantial regional differences persist (Roberts 2011). In-
deed, birthrates have started to decline in China, while fertility rates in
Bangladesh are projected to decline (Walker 2009). So what are the
carrying capacities of these specific countries, and who knows enough
to give that answer for the next twenty or more years?
Once we stay focused on conventional regions of the world, Europe
comes readily into view, as a big policy mess there has been shrinking
population levels and declining fertility relative to health and social
service demands (Lutz, O’Neill, and Scherbov 2003; Ringen 2003; see
Walker 2009 for intra-European differences). Other regionalized pro-
tocols and scenarios come to the fore as well. Concern for climate
change at the global level has moved to developing and improving
regional climate models, just as national weather models have become
more regionalized (Kerr 2004). There are clear regional differences in
climate changes and their effects on species, for example (see Myers
and Pimm 2003).∞≥
Now, let’s plot these positions and findings for the overpopulation
and overcrowding controversy in a mess and reliability space (see fig-
ure 4). The dimensions and plot of positions in figure 4 help us to
answer these questions: Just who are the mess and reliability profes-
sionals in this controversy? Who is competent enough to move across
the four hubs and translate the system patterns and regional scenarios
into reliable service provision (be they for water, air, or energy) that
are said to be challenged by population growth and overcrowding?
Whoever the middle professionals are—again, they most certainly
are not all in control rooms—they have different knowledge bases than
those at the extremes of macro design and micro operations. They
must work somewhere between the regional (localized contingency
scenarios) and the global (system pattern recognition). We must also
expect that the professionals and their networks are already there—
they do not have to be created from scratch. For highly controversial
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Figure 4. Mess and reliability space for the policy mess relating to
global overpopulation and overcrowding
Source: Adapted from Roe 2007
policy messes like the one regarding overpopulation and overcrowd-
ing, we can assume that almost all points in the mess and reliability
space are occupied.
But why are we interested in these professionals? It is not because
they have the ‘‘solution’’ to overpopulation or overcrowding, but be-
cause the policy messes around the four hubs have to be translated, if
possible, into unique knowledge for securing more reliable services in
the face of all manner of population and crowding pressures. Look
again at figure 4 and move to the middle from the localized-scenario
and pattern-recognition hubs. What falls between a major region, for-
mally ‘‘Europe’’ or ‘‘Southeast Asia,’’ and the globe? One familiar an-
swer is the classic nation-state. Choose two countries whose popula-
tions are treated as having similar systemwide patterns and localized
scenarios when it comes to this policy mess—that is, the citizens of
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both countries by and large say they are overpopulated and over-
crowded and will become increasingly so. In this way, the countries are
taken to share the features purported to exist in the dominant crisis
narrative about worldwide overpopulation and overcrowding. For ex-
ample, choose the Netherlands and Singapore. Ask people in both
places ‘‘Is this country overcrowded?’’ and you would probably get a
qualified ‘‘Yes.’’ The population densities are perceived to be very simi-
lar between the highly urbanized western Netherlands—the Randstad
—and Singapore (Roe and van Eeten 2001). Now the question to ask is:
Based on experience and familiarity with the two countries, what pol-
icies enable their residents to accommodate their human populations?
Or bluntly, when the countries are perceived to be overpopulated, why
aren’t more and more of their citizens being pushed outside, beyond
the national borders?
From a management perspective, a country is overcrowded and
overpopulated when its mess and reliability professionals have few
ideas about how to keep people residing, employed, and productive
there. Countries can move in and out of conditions of over- and under-
population and over- and undercrowding, depending on the livelihood
strategies adopted by their residents. This means a country that is not
overcrowded can become so, even if population numbers or densities
do not change. All that needs to happen is that the management of its
policies worsens. This suggests that an explicit management goal of
economic and social policy of a country or region should be one of
retaining and sustaining people who are already there and want to
stay. The Netherlands and Singapore risk becoming (more) overpopu-
lated and overcrowded only when increasing numbers of residents
there want greater well-being yet choose to leave, even if they are
uncertain as to whether their greater well-being lies somewhere else.
They are pushed out, rather than pulled elsewhere.
This translation of the policy mess of overpopulation and overcrowd-
ing stands in sharp contrast to current orthodoxy about global popula-
tion increase. Our new policy narrative does not claim that overpopula-
tion and overcrowding are not problems; then again, it does not claim
that one country’s medley of policies for addressing population and
crowding will or should work elsewhere. There is a story here, but it is
unique and does not have the same ending for everyone. It is a con-
tingent narrative, provisional on how the networks of professionals
translate the patterns and scenarios involved for where they are.
What the new policy narrative does claim is that the dominant narra-
tive and those who criticize it without offering alternatives avoid, dis-
48 CHAPTER THREE
regard, or dismiss the middle domain of competence. The dominant
crisis narrative insists: System trends are this way, and therefore macro
solutions must be that way. But there is no ‘‘therefore’’ when we are in
the middle, looking out. Why ever would we jump from pattern recogni-
tion to macro design without first consulting those who are already
addressing population and crowding in varied and instructive ways? We
return to and expand on this point in the next two chapters, which
discuss what makes for bad and good mess management.
It should go without saying that the mess and reliability professionals
who deploy this translation of an overpopulation and overcrowding
narrative vary from country to country and cannot be equated to any
single cadre, such as macroeconomic planners. The professionals I’m
talking about are the ones who excel at cross-scale, context-dependent,
case-by-case analysis. When it comes to dealing with population and
crowding, they are the ones who are adept at finding several ways of
achieving the desired policy ends, albeit sometimes with little time to
spare and without ‘‘proper’’ planning. They bring others into meetings
so that the entire system is better represented. They seek to recouple
what has been decoupled through disciplinary specialization, program
fragmentation, and agency turf battles. They continue to search for
better practices to avoid losing options; they distrust estimates of haz-
ard when it is not based on intimate knowledge of the system to be
managed; and they frequently strive to achieve flexibility—though they
never get as much slack as they can reliably use—in the provision of
services that society considers critical. Of course this is messy, but there
is no other way to be as reliable.
This recoupling through management of what has been decoupled
organizationally is critical to professional mess managers. But how
does it work? I once attended a presentation on an ecosystem restora-
tion project in Montana. A leader of the project described his take on
its key contribution: He could now see how his forested acres fit into
the wider valley landscape. The approach gave him a way to integrate
the small and large scales, with cross-scale implications both ways. Not
only could the project leader stand in his woodlot and see its role
within the larger scale of the ecosystem and landscape, but he was able
also to plan at the smaller scale for the longer term. Similarly, as the
ecosystem manager stands at the ridge looking down into the valley,
she is able to plan at the larger scale for the shorter term. She can now
see what the next steps are when it comes to managing the entire
ecosystem. ‘‘Think globally, act locally’’ becomes ‘‘Think long term
from the small scale, act real time from the large scale.’’∞∂ If and when
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this happens (again, no ironclad assurances here), recoupling—as
messy as it might be—can end up reworking policy and management.
The difficulties with recoupling lie in searching far and wide for
better practices and in having both the requisite contextual knowledge
so as to formulate a local scenario and the know-how to modify the
better practices in light of that local context. In this way, ‘‘context’’ is
brought into the analysis not just at the aggregation stage across a run
of cases (what we have been calling pattern recognition) but also in the
modification of these practices in light of the relevant local scenario(s).
In terms of figure 3, we are in the domain of professionals, seeking to
apply and modify systemwide better practices with respect to eco-
system management to the local scenario at hand, which is rich in its
own specifics. Professionals ask, ‘‘Who has figured it out better, and
how can that be modified for use here?’’ This is how small actions add
up to big effects: Local actions are based on broader practices that have
been found to work in similar situations, where the learning involved
in modifying the practices to the specific site can and should feed back
into the broader knowledge base of what works by way of manage-
ment. The great advantage of learning this way is that better practices
import the scales at which management actually works across a run of
cases without having to prejudge what are ‘‘the right planning areas.’’ If
this sounds like old-fashioned incrementalism—though it is nothing
like the version I was taught—then call it ‘‘Incrementalism,’’ where the
capital I indicates a scope of search for better practices that aspires to
be truly international.
It should go without saying that this process of feedback and updat-
ing better practices is dynamic: There is never a ‘‘best practice,’’ and
even the economists’ default to second-best solutions may still be far
too simplistic. Current better practice is not some kind of macro stan-
dard to which we all are meant to aspire. This is not about measuring
any one-meter stick against the hermetically sealed international stan-
dard meter bar at the Bureau of Weights and Standards outside Paris.
Better practices are more akin to pointing out how this heart I am
looking at on the screen compares to those digitized ones that I am
using by way of comparison. Where does this heart fit into those that
are said to run the gamut from healthy hearts to unhealthy ones? Too
many decisionmakers look for the equivalent of platinum bars in pol-
icy and management while ignoring the instructive specimens in front
of them, each a messy original on its own but sharing family resem-
blances with others. In the language of narrative analysis, better prac-
tices transform patterns into stories that can be used by decision-
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makers. To put it differently, better practices ensure that the emergent
behavior of micro operators is not reducible to ‘‘just statistics’’ but has
meaning for management in ways that substantively differ from those
stories told by macro designers, including policymakers and lawgivers.
Speaking of which, what family resemblances do this framework and
its implications identify for conditions leading up to and including the
2008 financial mess?
Turning Back to the Financial Mess
It takes only a few small steps in the crisis narrative to move from
insisting that there are too many people on the globe to concluding
that these people are now globally interconnected, and importantly so.
In this logic, more people mean more resource scarcity, and fewer
resources mean more interdependence, and more interdependence is
just what has been happening through globalization policies that inte-
grate economies together—and their financial systems. Many such
examples exist: At one point, for instance, the announcement of even
more quantitative easing in the United States was followed a few hours
later by the Mumbai stock market moving to its highest level in nearly
two years (Sri-Kumar 2011). A Financial Times correspondent deduces:
‘‘There is a strong case to be made that the current [financial] crisis is
in the strictest sense a crisis of globalization’’ (Guha 2009a).
What does our framework have to say about this line of argumenta-
tion? Start with the major macro-design position on financial globali-
zation prior to the events of late 2008: The integration of a country’s
financial markets into the world’s economy increases that country’s
economic growth and worldwide economic growth. Given figure 3, we
can expect that other positions in the mess and reliability space for
globalization would differ substantially from this macro position, and
that was the case well before the financial upheaval. First, economic
growth under always-late capitalism has never been uniform across
the globe. There really is no one ‘‘protocol’’ for economic growth world-
wide. According to the head of the Global Economic Research unit at
Goldman Sachs, since 2001 (but before the financial mess), the handful
of bric economies—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—‘‘contributed
about one-third of all global growth’’ (O’Neill 2006, 12). Not only does
the macro-design position for financial globalization not conform to
the existing but differing scenarios for emerging economies, but the
systemwide patterns and trends also vary significantly from the macro
THE WIDER FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING MESS 51
standpoint. Prasad and Rogoff reported earlier on the findings of a
study on globalization’s effects:
Interestingly, the more financially integrated developing countries do seem
to have achieved higher per capita incomes than others. However, it be-
comes difficult to make a convincing connection between financial integra-
tion and economic growth once other factors, such as trade flows are taken
into account. . . . We found that financially integrated developing economies
have in some respects been subject to greater instability than other develop-
ing countries. (2003)
As for examples among developed countries, there never was one ‘‘Eu-
ropean social model’’ from which to design individual welfare systems.
Rather, a handful of social models were discernible in the empirical
evidence across Europe, none of which applied directly to any single
country’s scenario without a good deal of translation (see, for example,
Sapir 2005). Certainly, when it comes to the global financial mess,
some regions and countries—notably Canada and Australia, as we shall
see—came out relatively unscathed.
Let us stay with the difference between the pattern-recognition and
macro-design hubs a moment longer, because even thoughtful com-
mentators on globalization conflate the two. Martin Wolf took this to
be one of his ‘‘ten commandments of globalization’’: ‘‘It is in the long-
term interest of countries to integrate into global financial markets.
But they need to understand the need for an appropriate exchange rate
regime, often a floating rate, and a sound and well-regulated financial
system’’ (2004). This statement, cast as a principle, is at best an empiri-
cal generalization contingent on a reading of the weight of evidence—
that is, pattern recognition—at the time. Patterns, however, are not
macro principles, and we will see in chapter 4 that such a conflation of
hubs can lead to very bad mess management. While it would be a fairly
simple matter to continue showing how positions in the globalization
space differ, the core issue circles back to these questions: Who are the
mess and reliability professionals in the middle who can make sense of
this globalization space? Whose task is it to reconcile these conflicting
and complex positions in the name of reliably managing globalized
services, such as finance?∞∑
Let’s return to the media reports about the 2008 financial upheaval.
You would think the real managers in the global financial mess were
senior officials in Treasury departments, central banks, and finance
ministries. In our framework, those decisionmakers are better under-
stood to have been macro designers acting reactively as micro opera-
52 CHAPTER THREE
tors. If so, this should be troubling to anyone interested in the re-
liability management of major financial institutions. We cannot and
should not expect senior officials to be the primary professionals who
actually determine whether the bailout and other interventions achieve
and sustain reliable real-time financial services, as messy as the after-
math of the financial meltdown must be. Baron de Montesquieu, the
French political thinker who was also criticized from many sides, once
compared himself to someone living on a second floor ‘‘disturbed by the
noise upstairs and the smoke downstairs’’ (quoted in Todorov 2009, 27).
Caught as they are between loud macro designers and firefighting micro
operators, many reliability professionals in the financial mess doubt-
less felt and still feel the same.
Who, then, are the real-time managers and operators called mess
and reliability professionals when it comes to the financial upheaval?
We introduced them in chapter 1, but the framework is now in place
that connects them and underscores the seriousness of their role. They
are the members of that unique class of professionals—especially
middle-level managers and support staff—whose supervision, infor-
mal networks, and skills ensure that financial services do not fail as
often as they could. As we have discussed, you find them in it units,
accounting units, engineering divisions, line operations, business con-
tinuity staff, inspectorates and supervisory units, auditing depart-
ments, and regulatory and legislative offices as well as on trading
floors and in the field, and not just working in the area of financial
services.
Some in the executive office suite, like the chief financial officer or
immediate staff, might be part of the network, though they are scarcely
leading all the real-time operational decisions involved in managing
reliably. Occasionally the middle-level staff and specialists appear in the
press as self-identified ‘‘plumbers’’ (Grant 2009b; O’Connor 2008), but
they rarely surface to the public’s attention—and when they do, even
more rarely are the networks in which they work made visible. In fact,
some call this managerial and networked know-how ‘‘dark matter’’
(Hausmann and Sturzenegger 2005). This means that there is abso-
lutely no reason to believe all major executives have this operational
knowledge, though some of the founders of the United States, for in-
stance, insisted that it should be otherwise.∞∏ During the financial mess,
we witnessed the tribulations of a private equity investor in a major car
firm who, by one account, ‘‘did not have a clue about the automobile
industry’’ (Story 2009); the partial dismantling of another major auto-
mobile firm by ‘‘a not-quite graduate of Yale Law School who had never
THE WIDER FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING MESS 53
set foot in an automobile assembly plant’’ (Sanger 2009); and the new
chairman of that firm who admitted, ‘‘I don’t know anything about
cars’’ (Gapper 2009). Also in the period leading up to the financial mess,
we witnessed the problematic role that consultants played when they
saw their task as one of macro-designing system changes rather than
supporting networked professionals already in those operations. For
example, Citigroup’s ‘‘reliance on outside consultants for strategic ad-
vice on credit instruments contrasts with the practices of rivals that
fared better than Citi in the crisis, such as Goldman Sachs and JP Mor-
gan’’; the latter relied on in-house talent before and during the melt-
down (Guerrera and Politi 2010). For the time being, think of this kind
of know-how as one depending ‘‘on complex mixtures of judgment,
problem-solving and information exchanges, often involving group be-
haviour that is difficult to replicate’’ (Manyika 2006, 13).∞π
Summing Up
We are now positioned to say much more than that a policy mess is an
amalgam of uncertainty, complexity, conflict, and unfinished business,
or that it varies in terms of the performance conditions. This chapter’s
framework enables us to define and summarize more formally what a
policy mess is and the management it entails.
A policy mess is any controversy or issue, the multiple and differing
standpoints of which can be sorted out into the four hubs of macro
design, micro operations, scenario formulation, and pattern recogni-
tion. For our purposes, a policy controversy is not really a mess until
different and conflicting positions across the different hubs are taken
on the issue. Management is to sort out the different positions at each
hub and across hubs, and the following two chapters show how that
can be done poorly or done well. Whether reliable mess managers in
networks of like professionals can extract a good policy mess from a
bad one, or stop a policy mess from going bad, depends on their unique
knowledge of how to synthesize patterns and scenarios into reliable
service provision. Pattern recognition and scenario formulation are, if
you will, the oxygen of that management.
In a policy mess, gaps in knowledge always exist between macro
design and pattern recognition, between scenario formulation and
micro operations, and between pattern recognition and localized sce-
narios. A gap does not mean the respective hubs are polar opposites,
only that different blends of deductive and inductive knowledge sepa-
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rate them. When it comes to mess and reliability management, what a
manager holds at the level of macro theory for the system and what
that professional finds in practice at the system level necessarily differ.
Similarly, system patterns and the anticipations based on them ines-
capably differ from local scenarios that seek to contextualize design
considerations better. It should never surprise any serious manager to
find a gap between what a regulation says formally and how its require-
ments are realized in a given region or between that formal regulation
and what is actually found in emerging practice across multiple re-
gions. In fact, to try to ignore such gaps is to turn reliability manage-
ment into bad mess management, thereby undermining the critical
service these professionals are trying to provide.
Finally, I have been writing as if policy messes are good, bad, or ready
to go one way or the other, depending on how they are managed. But, as
we already saw, some messes are good and bad at the same time, and
that fact raises a question we should be asking about all policy messes:
Just what are we managing for? The painter Gérard Fromanger points
out that a blank canvas is white but also ‘‘black with everything every
painter has painted before me’’ (quoted in Shatz 2010)—and so too
there are messes that are both bad and good in the same instant. Bad
policy mess: It is said that one out of every two young African-American
men in major urban areas is enmeshed in the criminal justice system.
Good policy mess: Why, then, are we not interviewing the other 50
percent of young urban African-American males outside the criminal
justice system to find out what they are doing, and what the rest of us
could learn from them?∞∫ Bad policy mess: At one point, three to four
billion people—up to two-thirds of the world’s population—lived in
regions without adequate water supplies or sanitation (see, for exam-
ple, World Health Organization 2007), a dire situation for development
agencies and experts to address. Good policy mess: Now that is a very
large number of people, right? This is such a huge distribution of people
without adequate water supplies, that some of them must be doing
much better than the others. That means then there are tens of millions
—hundreds of millions?—of people who have many things to say about
how to better survive without adequate water to those millions more
who are also trying to survive without it.
So the next time someone complains, ‘‘The economy is in a mess,’’
press them a bit: Is it that trends observed at the systemwide level are
at historic lows; or that the trends differ from some design optimum,
as when economists talk about the output gap; or that individuals they
know are having a harder time? Or is it that, while all this is going on, a
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good part of the mess lies in the hodgepodge of bustling economies
mixed in with deep-recession others, depending moreover on how ‘‘the
economy’’ is defined locally?
That good and bad mess can go together—and that the task may be
to pull the good mess out of the bad—is also illustrated through the
example of one favorite whipping boy of public policy: government
subsidies and interventions that encourage redevelopment of areas
that have repeatedly flooded. A flood breaches the levee; the houses,
roads, telecommunications, sewers, and electricity lines are destroyed
—and what does the government do? It rebuilds the levee so that the
redevelopment of critical services starts all over again! Really, how
dumb can the government be, right?
Wrong. For my part, I would also want to know if the flood enabled
the telecommunications provider, for example, to replace legacy equip-
ment it could not replace otherwise due to prior regulatory and insur-
ance considerations. I’d want to know what eventuality that provider
prefers: (1) taking advantage of the opportunity to replace out-of-date
or unprofitable equipment it could not replace except as a result of
emergency action during the ‘‘bad times’’ of a flood; or (2) having to
maintain its market share by severe cost-cutting for equipment main-
tenance, repair, and replacement, as a result of man-eat-dog competi-
tion during the ‘‘good times’’ between floods. Such two-sided policy
messes are extremely important because their pushes and pulls force
decisionmakers to focus on asking what we all should be asking of any
policy mess, be it in health, environment, social services, finance and
banking, or another arena: Just what mess are we managing, and how




The first task of a good mess manager is to avoid managing policy
messes poorly. So far, bad messes and bad mess management have
been discussed in the same breath, with examples drawn from the
critical infrastructure field. We’re now positioned to distinguish be-
tween bad messes and bad mess management and, in the process,
underscore the importance of knowing what makes for bad mess man-
agement across a variety of policy and management arenas. Managing
poorly ranges from creating more muddles than already exist to pro-
ducing really bad messes. I start by returning to chapter 2’s bad and
worst messes and then move to a longer discussion of the principal
ways messes are managed poorly. There are many ways to screw things
up in policy and politics, but figure 3’s mess and reliability space high-
lights several pivotal ones revolving around those hubs of macro de-
sign, scenario formulation, reactive micro operations, and pattern rec-
ognition. In particular, you make a policy mess worse by trying to
manage it from one hub only, by confusing one hub for another, and by
jumping from hub to hub in all manner of leaps of faith that ignore,
undermine, or otherwise avoid reliable mess managers in their middle
domain of professional competence.
Going from a Bad to a Worse Mess:
No Known Patterns or Scenarios
We saw how the autumn days of 2008 were fresh with panic after the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The federal bankruptcy examiner of
that collapse found ‘‘each Lehman trading desk had its own method for
pricing assets and there was little consistency across desks as to meth-
odology’’ (Valukas 2010, 501). ‘‘Frankly, everything is uncertain right
now,’’ a property developer told a gathering of bankers, business lead-
ers, and decisionmakers in Moscow later. ‘‘We don’t know whether to
cut any contracts in roubles or dollars, or something else. We don’t
know what prices for anything will be, what demand will be, what our
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market will look like’’ (quoted in Tett 2009b). When the failure of prac-
tices hitherto grounded in trends and patterns combines with nonexis-
tent or otherwise wildly divergent contingency scenarios, nobody—and
that includes the bridging mess and reliability professionals in banking
and finance—can credibly claim to know what to do next.
It is one thing to be pushed into these unstudied conditions by an
earthquake, tsunami, or other disaster. It is quite another matter to
rush deliberately into what you don’t know and then wonder why this
turbocharges a crisis. Turnover was so high in the financial trading
sector before the 2008 meltdown that there were few traders left who
had experience with the derivatives-and-leverage collapse of the hedge
fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. Jeffrey Aronson, the
chief executive of a New York–based hedge fund, told the Financial
Times, tongue only slightly in cheek:
I think the best thing about working on Wall Street is that people can’t
remember what they did yesterday. It’s remarkable. We do not use leverage
in our distressed-security strategy. Now that times are better, some people
have asked us, why don’t you employ a little leverage? People forget. They
said it wasn’t so bad, maybe if we use a little leverage to enhance our
returns, that’s an OK thing to do. A little more time passes and maybe let’s
use a little more leverage, and before you know it we’ll do it all over again.
(quoted in C. Freeland and Demos 2010)
Not to put too fine a point on it, some financiers willfully enter areas
for which there are no known system patterns, no known localized
scenarios, and no known managers to reconcile both—however mess-
ily—into something reliable. This kind of behavior is referred to as
‘‘faith in our financial system.’’
Nor are investors and bankers alone in making such leaps. The presi-
dent assures us of weapons of mass destruction that are not there. His
second in command says there will be cheering in the streets when we
arrive. The secretary of defense tells us the war will cost a fraction of
what it costs. His second in command assures us that oil revenues will
fund the war. The secretary of state gives the United Nations mislead-
ing information, and the head of a major intelligence agency says the
invasion will be a slam-dunk. And so on in what ended up as a conga
line of ignorance because—and this is the essential point—when you
are outside your domain of competence and deliberately in unstudied
conditions, you can believe anything you want and ignore anything
you don’t want to hear. This has been demonstrated by preceding and
succeeding presidents as well.∞
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As for banking and finance, we know people in that sector were oper-
ating outside their domain of competence when that ‘‘super-senior
debt,’’ whose triple-A debt rating made it ‘‘nearly as riskless as Treasury
bonds,’’ brought aig, the multinational insurance corporation, to its
knees because that debt no longer had a market (see, for example, Tett
2008b). We know they were operating outside their domain of compe-
tence when British banks had become ‘‘so fragile that Northern Rock,
which was nationalized after it collapsed, is now perceived to be the
safest place for savings because its deposits are guaranteed by the gov-
ernment’’ (Werdigier 2008). We know they were operating outside their
domain of competence because all this talk about safety and risk was so
wrong-headed.
The financial mess has been called ‘‘the mother of all risk manage-
ment failures’’ (Cifuentes 2008, 30). This is like thinking that walls
tumble down around us because they are not supported by the best
wallpaper. Once you are unable to calculate the probabilities and con-
sequences of failure, all calls for better risk management are beside the
point. You can’t manage risks if they can’t be estimated. So when
reliability standards atrophied (as in housing appraisals leading up to
the mortgage crisis) or were nonexistent (as in some over-the-counter
derivatives), risk is incalculable. To be outside your domain of compe-
tence is to be undertaking activities that are dangerous precisely be-
cause risk assessment and management cannot navigate all that un-
predictability. ‘‘It seems to me that in the whole of economic thought,’’
Paul Samuelson argued, ‘‘you cannot find an adequate solution to the
problem of uncertainty as different from risk’’ (quoted in Pizano 2009,
117). Yet this confusion between risks that can be calculated and un-
studied conditions that can’t be continues. A 2012 JPMorgan scandal
(which also involved derivatives) led two business-page commentators
to conclude: ‘‘The problem may be that JPMorgan, because of its size,
has created a new risk: it’s too big to manage’’ (Eavis and Craig 2012). If
a major interconnected firm truly becomes too big to manage, that is
not a new risk, but something altogether more fearsome: a potentially
unmanageable uncertainty and hazard.
How much was finance and banking operating in unstudied condi-
tions leading up to the 2008 panic? The answer certainly wasn’t hidden
from view in media reports. A Citibank study found that one daily
change in the dollar-yen exchange rate was nearly eleven times the
standard deviation. According to one commentator, Benoît Mandel-
brot, ‘‘Not if Citibank had been trading dollars and yen every day since
the Big Bang 15 billion years ago should it have happened, not once’’
(quoted in Coggan 2004). More memorably, a sequence of ‘‘25 standard
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deviation’’ trading days occurred on the U.S. stock market, each of
which should have happened only once in every 100,000 years (Au-
thers 2007). ‘‘If stocks really followed a bell curve . . . then a swing of
more than 7 per cent in a day for the Dow Jones industrial average
should happen once every 300,000 years. In fact there were 48 such
days during the 20th century’’ (Mandelbrot quoted in Authers 2009b).
If, as has been argued, the financial meltdown was ‘‘a once in the
lifetime of the universe’’ event (Eadie 2010), then what sense does it
make even to talk about a distribution of chances?
How dangerous is it to mistake risk models for the reality of un-
studied conditions? Presumably the more types of risks in any given
market, the more hazardous it is not to be able to measure them. Only
four major types of risk were identified with respect to chapter 2’s
performance modes for reliable mess management. The reality is that
‘‘the list of risks that has been added to investors’ check lists has
grown’’ (van Duyn and Tett 2009). Some banks believe there are at
least nine risks to be assessed, only one of which is said to be opera-
tional. The nine include risks associated with leverage, concentration
of investment, and liquidity (Authers 2009a). The more risks there are
to measure, the more difficult it is to measure any one of them, and the
more that ignorance is a threat to management. After a point, this is a
bit like asking you to commit to another human being who turns out to
be a complete mystery.
None of this is to insist that system patterns and local scenarios
must be clear in order to manage mess reliably or reliability messily.
Policy messes are, to repeat, characterized by all manner of positions
that are complex, uncertain, disputed, or incomplete. That said, where
no patterns or scenarios exist but where you want reliability in the
driver’s seat, we should expect pressure to move from prevailing and
conflicting macro and micro orientations to pattern recognition and
scenario formulation. A nonfinancial example of a major management
mess under such pressures is instructive.
For years, the use of fingerprinting and analysis of bullets, hair, and
handwriting has revolved around a macro-micro axis:
Traditional forensic scientists seek to link crime scene evidence to a single
person or object ‘‘to the exclusion of all others in the world.’’ . . . They do this
by leaning on the assumption of discernible uniqueness. According to this
assumption, markings produced by different people or objects are observa-
bly different. Thus, when a pair of markings is not observably different,
criminalists conclude that the marks were made by the same person or
object. (Saks and Koehler 2005, 892)
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The primary difficulty in the conventional approach has been its re-
liability (Begley 2004). A former editor of Science, Donald Kennedy,
concluded,
The problem . . . is that its reliability is unverified either by statistical
models of fingerprint variation or by consistent data error rates. Nor does
the problem with forensic methods end there. The use of hair samples in
identification and the analysis of bullet markings exemplify the kind of
‘‘scientific’’ evidence whose reliability may be exaggerated when presented
to a jury. (2003, 1625)
A study of eighty-six wrongful convictions found that over 60 percent
had erroneous forensic-science expert testimony as a contributing
factor—the second most common one next to eyewitness errors (Saks
and Koehler 2005, 893). Indeed, ‘‘error rates [have been] as high as 63
percent for voice id, 40 percent for handwriting, 64 percent for bite
marks, [and] 12 percent for hair’’ (Begley 2005a; see also Mnookin
2003; Santos 2007). At these magnitudes, dog sniffing is more reliable,
with highly trained dogs having reported error rates of 30–40 percent
(David 2004, 42). As for eyewitness testimony, a U.S. judge recently
summed up the situation this way: ‘‘Study after study revealed a trou-
bling lack of reliability in eyewitness identifications. . . . Indeed, it is
now widely known that eyewitness misidentification is the leading
cause of wrongful convictions across the country’’ (quoted in Weiser
2011).
That is not the mess forensic scientists want to be in. From our
framework perspective, it is not surprising that forensic science is being
pushed to greater reliability by moving to the hubs of pattern recogni-
tion and localized scenarios through ‘‘developing measures of object
attributes [for hair, fingerprints, teeth], collecting population data on
frequencies of variations in those attributes, testing attribute inter-
dependence, [and] calculating and explaining the probability that dif-
ferent objects share a common set of observable attributes’’ (Saks and
Koehler 2005, 892). More reliable databases from which clearer patterns
and practices emerge are a specific focus for plugging the holes in cur-
rent forensic science (Fountain 2009). As ‘‘basic knowledge grows, ex-
perts will be able to inform courts about the relative strengths and
weakness of their theories and methods, and suggest how that knowl-
edge applies to individual cases’’ (Saks and Koehler 2005, 895). Whether
or not this is a paradigm shift (Begley 2005a), it is very much a major
movement to different hubs in forensic science’s mess and reliability
space.≤
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It is too early to say whether a comparable paradigm shift has been
taking place in the securitized banking and finance sector, a significant
portion of which operated outside established patterns and scenarios
during the financial turmoil. What pathways financialization and se-
curitization take in the future and how global imbalances will work out
in terms of current account deficits and surpluses remain unanswered
questions at the time of this writing. The same holds for the future of
fair-value accounting and use of ‘‘dark pools’’ of liquidity for transac-
tions outside conventional price discovery (on the latter, see Grant
2009c). Reporting on dark pool prices, for example, ‘‘in both the US
and Europe is notoriously unreliable’’ (Lex Column 2010).≥ That said,
better financial practices are emerging, although that development has
yet to be widely reported in the media (for an early discussion of possi-
ble improved practices resulting from the financial mess, see Acker-
mann 2008).
It is important to understand that the emergence of better practices
is possible, even when initial conditions made for a bad mess or worse.
Precisely when conditions are unknown, the response may be to im-
pose tougher legal and regulatory mandates to operate reliably, which
in turn encourage those skilled at pattern recognition and scenario
formulation to come to the fore—particularly those who already work
from better practice. We saw some of this after the Lehman bank-
ruptcy. It became an urgent priority to close out Lehman’s trading
positions, many of which were very complicated. Yet the transfer of
almost all trading positions held by Lehman to other banks proceeded
more smoothly than expected. The former head of the New York Fed-
eral Reserve, Gerald Corrigan, reported:
First, in line with [earlier recommendations], the dealer community adopted
a common methodology for the execution of close-out against a defaulted
counterparty. Because this was accomplished prior to the Lehman failure,
the extraordinarily complex and delicate close-out process in the Lehman
case is being managed with greater certainty and greater safety than would
otherwise have been the case, helping to contain systemic risk. (2008)
The closeout was undertaken primarily by lch.Clearnet, Europe’s
largest clearer, which ‘‘in the space of just over a week, managed down
the main risks associated with the Lehman default without any disrup-
tion to the markets and without having to resort to using the clearer’s
main default fund’’ (Grant and Hughes 2008). Similar success was
achieved on the U.S. side by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corpora-
tion in closing out market participants’ exposure in that country due
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to the Lehman collapse (Grant 2008). The result was that ‘‘both man-
aged down billions of dollars worth of outstanding Lehman exposures
without needing to dip into their default funds’’ (Grant 2009b). Al-
though complications with the Lehman bankruptcy persist, with other
unknowns surfacing, what is important is that the closeouts took place
in a context and format where risks could be managed more reliably,
even in the uncertainty that follows a panic.∂
To summarize, our framework expects movements away from macro-
design solutions for the financial crisis, and from actual micro opera-
tions by individual bankers and investors, to the middle domain. We
should expect professionals who work under persisting reliability man-
dates to move toward operating between system patterns now being
recognized across a run of micro operations and toward contingency
scenarios now being formulated based on design principles contextual-
ized for local conditions. We can and should anticipate more examples of
such practices to surface or reemerge in the future—not just because of,
but also in spite of, the flurry of official banking and finance legislation.
Major Types of Bad Mess Management
Managing policy messes poorly when they could be managed better is a
mess in which no professional wants or needs to be in. There are many
ways to be bad mess managers, and I encourage readers to use figure 3
in chapter 3 to map out how this happens in their own work. Here I
focus on three types of bad mess management that are widespread in
my reading, observation, and work as a practicing policy analyst: Deci-
sionmakers argue from only one hub or from a single standpoint at
that hub; they are just as apt to confuse one hub for another; and they
take shortcuts and bypass the unique knowledge and skills of mess and
reliability professionals. Creating and managing policy messes in these
interrelated ways take place not only in the financial mess, but also in
issues as diverse as global climate change, universal human rights, and
threats of global pandemics, as we shall see.
The Hub, the Standpoint
The mess in this case is that people treat an issue as if it were centered
on and solved in one hub or at a single standpoint. Getting the design
right, the numbers right, the right person for the right job, or identify-
ing the right scenario (not to mention asking the right questions) are
the seductions of those who want to believe that messes can be cleaned
up or avoided altogether. The appeal of starting and stopping with the
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micro-level individual or macro-level precept is so commonplace as to
be nothing other than the origin and driver of many policy messes.
Fixing the mess inside can never be the permanent starting point;
fixing the mess outside can never be the permanent end point (Goldie
2012; Peston and Knight 2012).
Sometimes the standpoint is rendered as ineluctable logic. If we just
had the political will, we would actually [fill in the blank]! The mess, of
course, is that we have too much political will, treating every policy as
if it were the priority. Sometimes the standpoint is said to be charis-
matic, worthy of being followed in its own right. How many times have
Americans been told that there are over forty million uninsured people
in their country, as if that must be the obvious starting point for
‘‘cleaning up’’ the healthcare mess?
More times than not, it is the preoccupation with the hub, not just
standpoints at it, that makes for poorly managed policy messes. At one
extreme is the bad mess management that comes with privileging
macro design. We already know we can’t expect Theory to guide every-
thing when it comes to managing mess reliably; what makes things
worse is when a specific theory is passed off as able to do just that. The
economic sciences provide many fine examples of this.
When rolling electrical blackouts take place, we ask our friends, the
economists, why. After a blackout, one of them tells us it was because
of all that underinvestment in the transmission grid you get when
treating the grid as a public good (see, for example, Heal 2003). During
a blackout, another assures us that having to shed load reflects the
negative externalities associated with prices’ not fully reflecting elec-
tricity’s true cost to consumers, who thus overconsume and overload
power lines. Before a blackout, a different economist declares that
deregulation will guarantee the reliability we want because it reflects
the Efficient Market Hypothesis in operation, where nothing can be
better than market prices in reflecting what is known about energy
supply and demand, including our willingness to pay for transmission
(see, for example, Winston 1998). To which still another economist
adds: Whether or not there is a blackout at all, rational expectations
theory tells us that policy interventions are hopelessly ineffective any-
way (see Economist 2006, 68). If we aren’t sufficiently convinced by this
point and press our friends about what we should do to prevent black-
outs altogether, they tell us not to worry—as long as electricity ser-
vices are in market equilibrium, with reserve margins optimal, every-
thing is okay. But is that realistic, we ask? Sure it is, they say, that’s
what deregulation is all about! But didn’t we fail when we tried to
deregulate electricity in California? Quite the contrary, deregulation
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wasn’t really tried, they counter. But isn’t that like saying the Cultural
Revolution failed because Madame Mao wasn’t really given a chance?
The point here is that very smart and talented economists over a
sustained period gave deregulated energy markets—and deregulated
financial services—their best shot, and there were still massive unfore-
seen and undesirable consequences that the participating economists
did not predict or forecast. We must never lose sight of the fact that
clever people end up in very bad messes when they manage from stand-
points huddled around macro design only. Reportedly, the father of the
artist Max Ernst once painted a picture of his garden, but he was so
upset at having left out his backyard tree for compositional reasons that
he cut down the tree to match the picture (Watson 2010, xvii).∑ I too
have cut down my share of trees to fit and frame a policy blueprint.∏
At the other extreme of macro design are those managing badly
because they privilege micro operations as their point of departure and
return. We saw some of this in our earlier discussion of street-level
workers. Perhaps the best example of this privileging is the importance
in policy given to naked personal opinion. Public opinion polls and
surveys habitually ask us what our views are on topics about which we
have never formed a view. The impulse is to dress up off-the-cuff
responses as considered opinion, given that human evolution has
made us all quick rationalizers (see, for example, Grigsby and Stevens
2000; Johansson et al. 2005, 119). Lipstick and the proverbial pig come
to mind here. Media reports from and regarding the last quarter of
2008—which featured the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the bailout of
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and the further bailouts of aig and
Citigroup—are smeared with hyperbole about ‘‘herd instincts,’’ ‘‘mob
mentality,’’ ‘‘mob rule,’’ ‘‘witch hunting,’’ ‘‘lynching,’’ ‘‘show trials,’’ and
the ubiquitous referencing of ‘‘scapegoats’’ and ‘‘scapegoating’’ (all
terms from contemporaneous reports in the Financial Times). What-
ever was going on in such views of what was happening, it was not
analysis about how to manage the financial mess.
None of this is new, and opinions are, to adapt T. S. Eliot’s lines from
the Four Quartets, very much ‘‘In the general mess of imprecision of
feeling, / Undisciplined squads of emotion.’’ David Hume called this
‘‘the irresistible contagion of opinion’’ (quoted in Gay 1966, 412). It may
not be, as Voltaire thought, that opinions govern the world, but the
confusion caused by decisionmakers who operate from opinion—or for
that matter from a single standpoint or one hub—in order to get the
policy right rather than manage major policy for the messes it neces-
sarily entails is assuredly a deep source of bad mess management in the
public and private arenas. However, this is not the only confusion.
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Confusion over Hubs, with Special Attention to Prediction
Decisionmakers frequently mistake principles, patterns, scenarios,
and experience for each other. The permutations are many, but I focus
here on a few that make for especially bad mess management.
Anticipations based on pattern recognition are often confused with
specific contingency scenarios. Go back to the mid-2000s, when Gary
Becker (2005), the Nobel Prize–winning economist, argued that the
performance record of nuclear reactors was by and large positive. That
may have been true. But his additional argument that this record
constituted a rationale for going ahead and building a reactor some-
where specific is an altogether different matter. Anticipation that a
trend will continue based on systemwide generalization is not a lo-
calized contingency scenario based on contextualizing a set of design
principles. The scenario for this locality right now with that technology
and these safeguards must first be posed and argued, irrespective of
risk assessments grounded in frequency tables across all operating
reactors.
Sometimes, the confusion goes the other way, as when local scenario
formulation is conflated with systemwide pattern recognition. A num-
ber of touted ‘‘best practices,’’ ranging from First World medicine to
Third World rural development, confuse a scenario or protocol that
works well in one case for the better practices that emerge across a run
of cases and that then have to be customized, site by site. As Jerome
Groopman puts it for medicine: ‘‘What may account for the repeated
failure of expert panels to identify and validate ‘best practices’? In
large part, the panels made a conceptual error. They did not distin-
guish between medical practices that can be standardized and not
significantly altered by the condition of the individual patient, and
those that must be adapted to a particular person’’ (2010, 13). In this
book, I avoid ‘‘best practice’’ (singular) in favor of ‘‘better practices’’
(plural), because neither systemwide patterns nor localized scenarios
are stable or decisive enough for a definitive ‘‘best’’ to be realized when
it comes to policy messes.
One especially bad form of confusing scenario and pattern has been
in post-9/11 risk assessment and management. It’s fair enough that
critical infrastructures and businesses should plan and design for the
‘‘worst-case scenario’’ and formulate case-specific emergency protocols
when seeking to ensure business continuity in the face of disaster. But
that is the contingency-scenario side of the professionals’ domain (fig-
ure 3). You cannot ask them to ignore the other side: the pattern
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recognition and the anticipations based on observed patterns across
many business continuity efforts. To be reliable, professionals also
look at the frequency of hazard occurrence and the magnitude of such
hazards (Roe and Schulman 2008). Otherwise, they can’t differentiate
risks that matter to them for the performance modes over which they
manage. It is their ability to probe both scenarios, the worst-case ones
and others, and multi-case patterns, patent or subtle, that helps them
navigate toward reliability—even if that navigation is a matter of de-
termining that what others take to be the worst-case is not worse
enough when it comes to scenarios.
Macro design and pattern recognition are also easily confused. The
head of Santander, Spain’s largest bank, proffered some advice for the
financial mess: ‘‘Never buy a product you do not understand; don’t sell
a product you would never buy yourself; and if you don’t know some of
your customers extremely well, don’t lend them money’’ (quoted in
Betts 2008). That may well be sensible, but woe to those who take the
advice as stable design principles instead of what may have been at
that time better-than-prevailing practices emerging out of dynamic
systems.
Pattern recognition appears in each of the preceding types of confu-
sion just discussed. This points to an added confusion. Remember, in
our framework, pattern recognition is associated with anticipation; we
base expectations and preparations on the patterns observed, when it
comes to trying to manage mess reliably. The problem is that the
cognitive activity of anticipation is often conflated with prediction,
while the other hubs also claim a role in prediction. The result is we
have different phenomena passing for prediction without people real-
izing that they’re actually talking about different things—which leads
to more mess. How so?
Clearly, macro design can be seen as its own kind of prediction—in
this instance, about what will happen if managers follow these princi-
ples rather than others. Localized contingency scenarios are also their
own sort of prediction, when formulated as worst-case scenarios con-
fronting reliability management. The reactive micro operations of a
professional also involve prediction to the extent that the term ‘‘reac-
tive’’ is based on the response that follows the stimulus. All too often
these different types of predictions are intermixed, when it might well
be better to ask just which type of prediction is at issue. ‘‘Even the
most intelligent and informed citizen (including lawyers and judges,
for that matter) cannot predict with any reasonable assurance whether
a wide range of seemingly ordinary activities might be regarded by
federal prosecutors as felonies,’’ argues a civil liberties lawyer (Silver-
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gate 2009). In this example, are laws ambiguous, which undermines
their predictable application, or do the run of actual prosecutions not
permit any firm prediction? Is it only that the federal courts have this
problem when it comes to what are or are not felonies, or is it that even
the best federal prosecutors react differently when it comes to making
felony determinations? The mess with respect to felony assignments
may not be that we can’t predict, but that we’re trying to predict all
over our management space, as if predicting were one activity only.
To conflate prediction in these ways is an especially acute form of bad
mess management and involves far more than the fact that few deci-
sionmakers know what lies ahead beyond the next step. ‘‘No one could
have predicted the coincidence [of high oil prices, poor harvests, rising
food demand, and high biofuel production] that has caused the food
price rise,’’ we were told by the director of Friends of the Earth, an
organization that had a few years before urged governments to encour-
age biofuel production (quoted in Harvey 2008). How, then, can these
same organizations confidently predict devastation decades ahead if
global climate change is not addressed immediately? More to the point,
why would we ever believe, let alone anticipate, that they are the ones to
manage us out of global climate change, if they can’t predict most—
some, a few, just one—perfect storm ahead? To be blunt, if people
cannot manage reliably just on time or just for now (that is, under
conditions of high volatility and variable options), why should we ex-
pect them to know now how to reduce volatility just this way or just in
case, performance requirements they see as necessary for future sus-
tainability? I return to the wider problems that prediction and the
future pose for reliable mess managers in this and later chapters, espe-
cially chapter 6.
Suffice it to say that, for a species that cannot anticipate how today’s
run of events will show up in their dreams tonight, you’d think we
would have more humility in using the same brains to jump from this
pattern to that anticipation. We would do well to remember that,
although some people anticipated the subprime mortgage crisis, most
thought the financial mess would start with hedge funds unraveling
(see, for example, Kay 2011). Certainly, no one we know predicted the
actual sequence of events, in which regulated banks and unregulated
investment firms, along with the commercial paper and money mar-
kets, would become problems well before hedge funds did.
Shortcut Leaps of Faith
Much of the poor management of policy messes comes from decision-
makers’ insistence that reliability is achieved through leaps of faith
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from hub to hub that bypass the unique knowledge bases of mess and
reliability professionals. Some of the cognitive shortcuts are extremely
significant, because they are undertaken all the time and are sure to
induce rather than manage a policy mess.
Jumping directly from macro design to micro operations, or the other way
around. Set the principle and everything should follow, or so we are
often told. Much of U.S. federal regulation of biotechnology, for in-
stance, has operated under that principle of substantial equivalence.
This doctrine asserts that no real difference exists between a biotech
product and any new plant or food product. The principle is so broad as
to make almost any case of biotechnology indistinguishable from any
case of a conventional plant or food product (see, for example, Falkner
2007; Riddle 2007).
When someone asserts that each person has the same human rights
as every other person, this move goes from a macro-design principle
directly to micro operations of personal experience. Those making this
leap of faith are then upset when macro principles—such as those in
the United Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights—are qualified by all manner of country-specific pro-
tocols and reservations. The covenant guarantees our rights to educa-
tion, marriage, and holidays—except, that is, when it is declared to
conflict with a country’s constitution, laws, or religion.
From the perspective of this book, such reservations are not hypo-
critical. Rather, they must be expected if human rights are to be treated
reliably. It has been left up to nation-states to enforce universalized
values, and the only way we really know that human rights as macro
principles are taken seriously is to see how they are applied through
context-specific scenarios, contingent according to each country when
not to each case. ‘‘Thou shall not kill’’ is all well and good, but we do not
know how seriously that principle is treated until we get to grappling
with qualifications such as ‘‘except in cases of self-defense.’’ ‘‘Granted
that I should love my neighbour,’’ wrote R. H. Tawney, the British eco-
nomic historian and critic, but ‘‘the questions which, under modern
conditions of large-scale organization, remain for solution are, ‘Who
precisely is my neighbour?’ and, ‘How exactly am I to make my love for
him effective in practice?’ ’’ (quoted in Caldwell 2008b). To ask ‘‘What is
the law?’’ is in effect to add the tacit suffix, ‘‘What is the law . . . in Roe v.
Wade specifically?’’ or ‘‘in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld specifically?’’ and so on
(MacCormick 2007, 5).
If rights and values exist only at the macro level, you counter, are we
not all at risk as individuals at the micro level? Yes, but not in the way
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you may mean. Just because we doubt that human rights actually exist
as overarching principles everywhere equally does not stop us from
recognizing that we are at risk when systems behave as if those rights
did not exist, and there may be better practices to deal with such
situations that are modifiable to the context in which we actually find
ourselves, here and now.π
What mess is involved in leaping from macro to micro directly, and
where is the bad mess management in all this? For some people, utili-
tarianism means that those of us who live above our needs should
support those who are perishing as a result of living below their needs,
especially when the latter would survive were we to transfer to them
the increment above our needs. For the cost of the restaurant meals
that I treat myself to every year, I could keep an African child alive. But
this leap directly from macro to micro asks me to erase all the other
knowledge and information I have beyond a macro-utilitarian ethics or
the micro experience of a human being I do not know. I give to my
church or the homeless in my town or my family members because I
know these people in ways that I do not know that African child. I am,
if you will, translating all the knowledge I possess within the networks
I operate, rather than ignoring the bulk of that knowledge, when I give
money to others. It should go without saying that I may choose to aid
an African child, but that would not be because of some half-smart,
macro-design principle applied universally to all children regardless of
what else I know. (The English essayist William Hazlitt, on seeing
Jeremy Bentham—the great expositor of utilitarianism—commented
to a friend: ‘‘Ah!, that is the great lawgiver, Bentham; a remarkable
man: he would make laws for the whole universe, but, as sailors say, ‘he
doesn’t allow for the wind’ ’’ [quoted in Wu 2008, 153].)
The financial mess itself has been littered with macro-micro leaps of
faith that ignore better practices at the pattern-recognition hub or
differences between local contexts when it comes to application sce-
narios of broad policy. To pick one example, a major part of financial-
reform efforts has focused on proposals to bring largely unregulated
over-the-counter (otc) derivatives into clearinghouses and exchanges,
where there would be greater supervision and regulation. Nonfinancial
institutions (for instance, in the food, transportation, and energy sec-
tors) argued against this, as they had long used derivatives as part of
their hedging strategies. In the view of nonfinancial institutions, they
were being blamed for financial turmoil that had instead been caused by
financial institutions in their speculative use of otc derivatives (Grant,
Milne, and van Duyn 2009). A blanket transfer of otc derivatives to the
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exchanges or clearinghouses would, in the view of these nonfinancial
institutions, penalize them for something they did not do, while at the
same time raise their cost of business without warrant. If so, you would
think that before passing a law to require that each derivative transac-
tion take place within a clearinghouse or exchange, someone would be
interested in what, if any, were the better practices that had emerged
from nonfinancial institutions’ use of such derivatives for hedging pur-
poses—if only to ensure that such a new law did not ban what already
worked. Yet I have not found one reference to any such investigation in
my reading and research.∫
We see all manner of reverse micro-to-macro metaphysics. A classic
move is to base one’s social or political ideals on one’s deep tacit
knowledge. Yet ideals based in individual experience make sense for
policy only when scenarios can be formulated and patterns recognized
that incorporate and differentiate the experiences, case by case and
across cases. How so? For example, the political philosopher Raymond
Geuss, argues:
It is not, then, that we proceed as follows: first we have an intuition about
‘‘equality’’ as the basis for political philosophy; then we observe that in this
particular case equality is violated (because not everyone is getting ‘‘equal’’
medical care); finally, we infer that we are in the presence of a social evil that
needs to be rectified. It is, rather, that there are any number of different
reasons for thinking that mass death for want of medical help is a bad thing
. . . and we think that in this case the reason that so many people are dying is
that those who need it are not receiving medical help, not that the treat-
ment is ‘‘unequally distributed.’’ (2008, 80) 
Other micro-to-macro moves are prevalent as well. Complex adaptive
systems are said to arise autochthonously and nonlinearly out of micro
behavior (see Ehrlich and Levin 2005 on the importance of thresholds
and phase transitions in ‘‘the evolution of norms’’). Individuals acting
under norms of economic rationality and the cleansing rinse of self-
interest are said to spontaneously generate efficient markets; widely
chaotic systems are argued to have underlying kernels of determinism.
No wonder such thinking leads to even more muddles. ‘‘Our default
reflex is that the world knows what it is doing, and that is extravagant
nonsense,’’ says Jeremy Grantham, a respected market strategist, about
human behavior leading up to the financial mess (quoted in Nocera
2009, b5). Adam Smith, who mentioned the ‘‘invisible hand’’ only three
times in his work—and then in dissimilar ways (Rothschild 2001, 116–
56)—also described commercial society far more aptly as ‘‘the great
scramble’’ (quoted in Porter 2000, 389). Yes, individual micro behavior
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can aggregate into patterns we can base empirical generalizations on.
Yes, human greed led to patterned behavior that included financial
bubbles, and, yes, policy design has a role in addressing them. Yes, bone
and muscle have something to do with anatomy and, yes, analysis carves
nature better at its joints. But all this sophistry to the effect that what
really matters truly reduces to the micro begs the question of who
synthesizes the scramble and jumble of patterns and anticipations to
manage the messes that arise on a case-by-case basis.
Jumping directly from pattern recognition to macro design, and then to
localized scenarios. The move from the systemic patterns to their sup-
posedly direct implications for policy and legislation, and then post-
haste to different scenarios or protocols to implement that overarch-
ing policy, is extremely popular. We teach our policy students to do this
all the time. Its popularity, however, does not make the move any less
disabling when we rely on it in our policy messes.
Global temperatures and the world’s carbon dioxide emissions are
increasing; therefore we must have a global strategy to deal with global
climate change. To be effective, any such worldwide strategy must
therefore differentiate and comprehensively deal with the United
States and China, if only because those two very different countries
together account for most of the emissions, albeit in very different
ways (see, for example, Wirth, Gray, and Podesta 2003). There are,
however, no ‘‘therefores’’ there.
What is missed in these leaps is the unique knowledge base of mess
and reliability professionals in the middle, whose task it is to make
sense of the differing scenarios and patterns for the sake of dealing
reliably with climate change. What is bypassed is how professionals are
actually adapting to a climate change they do not know how to reduce
or otherwise mitigate definitively (see, for example, Adger et al. 2005).
These professionals include those who are searching for better prac-
tices with respect to energy use, here and abroad, and who are familiar
with what it would take to translate and modify those practices so they
would actually work in the case at hand. In fact, when it comes to
global climate change, these managers are increasingly being asked to
take the region—not the globe—as the system of interest, and then to
determine what regional better practices have to be modified in light
of subregional or local differences. The atmospheric scientist Charles
Kennel points out:
Regional climate differs in complexity and character from global climate.
The factors that combine to drive global climate may have a different bal-
ance regionally. Today’s global models clearly delineate differences between
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the responses of oceans and continents and of high-latitude and tropical
zones to climate change. A true regional assessment, however, differs from
a regionalized global assessment in its spatial specificity; topography and
coastal proximity create local climatic and ecological zones that cannot be
resolved by contemporary global models, yet must be evaluated to make a
regional impact assessment meaningful. Increasing global models’ spatial
resolution is helpful but not sufficient; new analytic tools are needed to
provide useful regional climate forecasts. Scientists must develop truly re-
gional climate impact models that will help local leaders see what the future
holds and understand how actions they can take will make a difference in
their region. (2009, 48–49)
Needless to say, even with a specific region denominated as the system
of interest, the managers’ casting about for better practices will very
likely turn interregional at some point. Otherwise, we would expect
global climate changes to be managed more poorly than they are.Ω
What is especially troublesome about the direct jumps from patterns
to macro design and then to scenarios is how the anticipations based
on perceived patterns are articulated and extended to other hubs. Take
the numbers 186 and 800. They represent, respectively, the deaths at
the time of writing due to avian flu, also known as h5n1 influenza, and
sars, or severe acute respiratory syndrome (in comparison, Hurricane
Katrina killed an estimated 1,400 people, while nearly 285,000 people
were estimated to have died globally in the 2009 pandemic influenza A
[h1n1] epidemic [Science 2012, 1626]). Say that by the time you read
this, the avian flu and sars figures are some orders of magnitude
higher: Epidemiological and public health models predict up to 300
million and 25 million deaths, respectively, should the viruses lead to
pandemics.∞≠ We again see the move: Take a number, declare it so
charismatic that it must be followed, draw out its systemwide implica-
tions through global models, and then weave an anticipated crisis
narrative out of the concatenated hypotheticals. But what the global
crisis narrative about a possible worldwide pandemic should provoke is
not an urgent international policy change, but rather the insistent
question: Do localized scenarios, such as context-specific contagion
models, confirm or reinforce the globalized crisis narrative?
A pandemic crisis narrative is a crisis scenario, and for mess and
reliability professionals, scenarios are important for reliability pur-
poses when they are localized around how, in this case, regional sce-
narios differ from global ones. If the anticipation is that we should be
prepared for avian flu to kill up to 300 million people, then the imme-
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diate question should be: If we look at regional models involving the
h5n1 virus, do we get close to the anticipated 300 million deaths by
working from the local or regional scenarios, then across all scenarios,
to a worldwide estimate?
When a cluster of family members dies of avian flu somewhere in
Asia, the immediate response should not be to conclude that this first
and foremost has implications for human-to-human transmission of
the h5n1 virus on the global scale (see, for example, McNeil 2008;
Rosenthal 2006). Rather, the first-order policy response should be to
determine how these deaths fit into a regional (even country) epi-
demiological model for the spread of avian flu. Thereafter, what are
the interregional models for the spread of the contagion, if it starts in
Southeast Asia? It is important to recognize from the outset that
differences of scientific opinion exist over the incidence of the virus
even within countries and regions (see, for example, Zamiska and
Pottinger 2005).
Does this mean we need not be worried about avian flu on a global
scale? Are we to throw out these global epidemiological models or
forecasts? Of course not. The real questions are: Where do we start
when we determine what precautions to take—with systemwide pat-
terns and models, or with local and regional scenarios? Do we ask to
what extent the contagion models take into account and are based on
intraregional and then interregional models of the contagion spread?
The answer, in our framework’s perspective, is that we have to do both
if we want to provide vaccine reliably.∞∞
Just how does leaping directly from pattern recognition to macro
design—without first assessing localized contingency scenarios and
anticipations based on the recognition of system-level patterns—end
up making for more policy messes or making the ones we already have
worse? What’s really lost if we bypass mess managers, especially when
‘‘big picture’’ issues of design and global trends issue their clarion call?
A great deal is lost, and it is worth considering several examples to see
how this is so.
Consider three empirical generalizations that are currently popular:
(1) megaprojects to construct huge infrastructures, such as dams and
major road systems, are habitually underestimated in terms of cost,
overestimated in terms of benefits, and undervalued in terms of en-
vironmental impacts (see, for example, Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Roth-
engatter 2003); (2) a project developed incrementally is better than a
megaproject implemented all at once or only as originally designed
(see, for example, Easterly 2005); and (3) promoting trade is often
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better than project aid (see Bhagwati 2002, 2005).∞≤ Put aside for the
moment contrary evidence (see, for example, Sharma 2005) and accept
for the purposes of argument their status as generalizations (that is, as
mean observations over a wide distribution of observations).∞≥
Even if these statements were generalizable for the systems they de-
scribe (as I believe they are), they scarcely justify jumping to macro-
design principles that assert there should be no more planning for mega-
projects; what projects there are should be smaller and incremental; and
trade must be preferred over project aid. The three generalizations can in
no way be taken to argue against localized scenarios insisting that in this
case megaprojects and project aid are appropriate, because here other
things are not equal. The burden of proof, of course, rests with those who
argue for such context-deep contingency scenarios in the face of system-
level pattern recognition and anticipations to the contrary.
We see another example of taking empirical generalizations as cover-
ing principles in the pioneering work of Elinor Ostrom and her col-
leagues. Ostrom, the late Nobel laureate in economics, found in her re-
view of the literature and case studies eight ‘‘design principles’’ for the
management of common pool resource (cpr) institutions (1990, 90ff.).
These institutions include a variety of organizational forms—such as
grazing associations or groups of community gardeners or forest dwell-
ers—that manage common pool resources with few if any private prop-
erty rights.∞∂ Ostrom’s design principles for cpr management entail
the institution’s having clearly defined boundaries for the area being
managed, including access to graduated sanctions (such as the ability to
exclude outsiders) and conflict resolution mechanisms for cpr man-
agement. ‘‘By ‘design principle,’ ’’ Ostrom writes, ‘‘I mean an essential
element or condition that helps account for the success of these institu-
tions in sustaining the cprs and gaining the compliance of generation
after generation of appropriators to the rules in use’’ (90). She is quick
to point out that the principles should not be thought of as necessary
conditions for successful cpr management, though she speculates that
future scholarly work will ‘‘identify a set of necessary design principles
and that such a set will contain the core of what has been identified
here’’ (91).
Assume that Ostrom is correct: More scholarly work confirms that
clearly defined boundaries, graduated sanctions, and conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms are identified in cpr management systems across a
run of many more case studies (for her update, see Ostrom 2005,
258ff.). Such generalized findings in no way constitute design princi-
ples, even in her sense. At best they are a set of descriptive regularities
that may or may not anticipate better practices.
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To be clear, even macro design’s second best should not be confused
with a system’s better practices that surface across a run of cases of
micro operations. Every such distribution has its tail cases, and what
works best at one particular site may not coincide well with what
works best as an empirical average. Such blended knowledge simply
cannot be equated to a formal precept or covering principle, even if
disaggregated into context-specific protocols. In fact, the permanent
gap between pattern recognition and macro design in the framework is
quite a healthy one in avoiding bad messes when, as the philosopher
Gilbert Ryle observed: ‘‘Efficient practice precedes the theory for it’’
(1949, 30).
From the perspective of the mess and reliability framework, it is
possible that cpr management exists at some sites that in no way
evince the eight features, however generously scripted. Indeed, for a
Third World development that is complex, uncertain, disputed, and
unfinished, we would expect there to be different conditions that have
yet to be observed in the cases of past and current cpr management
reviewed in the scholarly work. If conditions were not that dynamic,
there would not be the pressures we continue to observe to modify
better cpr management practices in light of emerging conditions else-
where.
Other leaps of faith across the hubs. Our list of shortcuts to more mess
could easily be extended. Here, though, consider an example of an
especially mess-inducing leap, as exemplified by the controversy over
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in the United States. It is said
that implementation of this educational reform has failed some re-
gions and communities (failed local scenarios), therefore it has failed
children’s education at individual schools in those places (failed micro
operations), and therefore we need to redesign the act or replace it
altogether with some other macro policy (see, for example, Dillon
2005).
Yet there are more than fourteen thousand local school boards in the
United States (Kraft and Furlong 2004, 283). This too is a very large
number, and it means there is very probably a wide range of experience
with respect to implementation of the legislation—including that in
districts demographically like the ones that have failed. If so, why then
would anyone recommend that we change the act to make it work for
failed sites and students without first identifying those districts that
are similar to the ones that failed, but are doing better—even in the
absence of new legislation? Wouldn’t we first want to determine if the
failed sites could do as well if not better than their counterparts else-
where, under like conditions? Why would we ignore a higher bar that
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many children and teachers have jumped on the promise that over-
hauling macro design will deliver the right bar everywhere? Avoiding
the professional middle in such leaps erases the knowledge we already
have and wastes resources, an inefficiency we can ill afford when the
reliability stakes are as high as they are in U.S. education.
What If the Bad Mess Is the Management?
Up to this point, my focus has been on bad mess management. How-
ever, because mess can be its own form of management, it is important
to ask: Are there ways in which these messes manage us?
Janet Tavakoli, the president of a structured finance company, ar-
gued—as have many others—that bankers and investors knew that
securitized financial instruments were dangerous. These instruments
could nonetheless be assembled in ways that facilitated huge gains
through short selling (that is, selling a borrowed financial instrument
to make a profit by purchasing the instrument at a lower price later
and then returning it to its owner). ‘‘The risky tranches—those that
any investment banker worth their salt knew were write-offs—were
used to create other packages that their buddies ‘managed’ in one
fund, while shorting in their hedge funds,’’ Tavakoli maintains (2009).
Once the financial mess started signaling that ‘‘you’d be a fool not to
want to make money this way!,’’ it ended up managing the traders.
Some observers go further and argue that the financial mess con-
tinues to manage us, rather than the other way around. Jeffrey Fried-
man, the editor of Critical Review, insists that bankers and investors
reacted rationally to perverse incentives in banking regulations that
accreted over the decades preceding the financial meltdown. Worse,
such incentives can be expected to persist: Future ‘‘regulators will tend
to assume that the problem with which they are grappling is a new
[induced] ‘excess of capitalism,’ rather than an unintended conse-
quence of an old mistake in the regulation of capitalism. Thus, instead
of repealing the old regulation . . . they [will] add a new one, creating
fresh possibilities for the process to repeat itself ’’ (2009, 165; see also
Meltzer 2010).
If there is good news in any of this, it is that better management of
mess later on is not always possible without having first managed or
been managed poorly beforehand. Taking risks and failing raises the
premium on doing better later. ‘‘How can anyone settle for safety when
they have never taken a risk?’’ asked the famous racecar driver Hellé
Nice (Mount 2004). The psychologist Daniel Gilbert put it this way:
‘‘When we face the pain of rejection, loss, misfortune, and failure, the
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. . . healthy psychological immune system strikes a balance that allows
us to feel good enough to cope with the situation but bad enough to do
something about it’’ (Gilbert 2006, 177–78). My own view is that hav-
ing learned to manage a bad mess, say, for example, hunger, and being
now able to prevent it from worsening is a good mess to be in, because
hunger is something we can actually manage better.∞∑ For me, the crux
of good mess management is avoiding bad mess management. But




The question whether it’s best to swim with the current or against it
seems to me out of date. . . . The method of the yachtsman who tacks with
the wind as well as against it seems more fruitful. Such a procedure
applied to society demands stoic disbelief and the greatest attentiveness.
Anyone who wants to reach even the nearest goal must expect, step by
step, a thousand unpredictable variables and cannot put his trust in any
of them.—Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1992)
This chapter is longer than others, because it is important to establish
how much more can be said about good mess management than con-
veyed by that casual dismissal: Good messes are transitory, bad messes
aren’t. My argument here has two parts. First, I summarize the differ-
ent points we have learned so far about good messes and their manage-
ment. Then I spend considerable time discussing five major ways to
promote good mess management.
The Argument and Implications So Far
If we stay with the framework used in the preceding chapters, what
more is involved in managing policy well than avoiding managing it
poorly? What more do we need to say than that managing well means
you move across performance modes as conditions require with the
skills that you need?
As there is much more to say, let’s start with the points we now know.
When working under conditions that are highly unpredictable or un-
controllable, it is better to manage your options creatively up to the last
moment (just on time) than manage reactively with fewer options over
prolonged periods (just for now). One way to make conditions more
predictable (just this way) is by declaring an emergency, but that course
of action has built-in problems as well. We’ve seen how searching for
better practices may be the only viable avenue to reduce the volatility of
the task environment in which you work and to increase your options to
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respond to that volatility. All this is not without its own risks, but at
least they are risks that are known or knowable. Furthermore, as we
shall see more fully below, what makes for good mess management is
that ability to bounce back from a surprise or shock while planning the
next step ahead. Moreover, this resilience-with-anticipation involves
learning from the inevitable setbacks to management. It bears repeat-
ing that to manage this way means you have to work within a network
or networks of like professionals who are skilled in recognizing system-
wide patterns, formulating contingency-specific scenarios, and trans-
lating patterns and scenarios to achieve reliable services, both at the
system and case levels.
If managing messes poorly comes in part from mistaking the hubs
and standpoints around them in the mess and reliability space, then
managing a policy mess better entails sorting out the standpoints and
hubs. We, the mess and reliability professionals, do this to show the
many different standpoints and establish why managers are pushed
and pulled away from any single one. Is evolution a macro theory or an
empirical generalization, or does having to choose push and pull you to
more-nuanced positions? Is leadership a micro experience specific to
certain individuals, a scenario based on locally contingent leadership
principles, or some kind of composite? From time out of mind, the
farmer has been central to rural development. But to which hub are we
looking when we address better policy for farmers? The farmer we
know personally? The risk-averse farmer or the progressive farmer, so
loved in theory and project design? The female farmer, given the em-
pirical generalization that many farmers in the developing world are
women? Are we talking about ‘‘the farmer in Asia’’ as he or she differs
from ‘‘the farmer in the American Midwest’’ who in turn differs from
those of other regions and contexts of the world? Because farmers are
all this and more, the policy that can tell farmers apart is more ef-
fective than the one that homogenizes them together.
Won’t making such differences visibly worsen the mess? Doesn’t the
proliferation of and insistence on distinctions make for bad messes
rather than good ones? Such a conclusion may itself reflect one sce-
nario or set of patterns, but not the only one. Revealing hitherto
obscured elements may change the nature of the mess from bad to
good. You would think, for example, that people who are concerned
with poverty and inequality would be interested in not only unequal
incomes but also more-equal consumption patterns.∞ And you would
think that with so much attention being given to relative poverty and
inequality—the rest are poorer because the West is richer—there
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would be more empirical research on just how, if at all, real Indian
farmers or Chinese workers compare themselves to real U.S. farmers or
European workers (Panagariya 2003, 1289).
Or return to the major policy mess of having had more than forty
million uninsured Americans. This was not as large a group as those
without adequate water and sanitation worldwide, but forty million is
a big number, with the group including some uninsured people who are
better off and others who are worse off than the average uninsured.
Doesn’t this imply there was a good mess here to be managed—regard-
less of enacting any official healthcare reform—where those millions
of uninsured who were worse off had a variety of things to learn about
survival strategies from those millions who were better off but still
uninsured? Might it make more sense that we professionals assess
these strategies before we leap from the charismatic number of forty
million–plus directly to one macro-design ‘‘solution’’ of, say, a bigger
or more comprehensive single-payer system?≤ ‘‘If the world is complex
and messy, then at least some of the time we’re going to have to give up
on simplicities,’’ argues one mess researcher, John Law (2004, 2).
If the above is correct, then the most important question in a policy
and management analysis is not how do we solve this? Instead, net-
works of reliable mess managers have to ask: What are we missing by
way of patterns and scenarios? What are we not seeing that is right in
front of us by way of better practice? By asking what we are missing,
we also acknowledge our cognitive biases and limitations, and the role
of the network in adjusting for them rather than trying to eliminate
them once and for all. In fact, when it comes to managing mess well,
thinking that you or I can eliminate our own cognitive biases is the
cognitive bias that we have to adjust for in management. Ken Fisher, a
well-known asset manager, recommended asking yourself the follow-
ing when considering any investment: ‘‘What do you believe that is
actually false?’’; ‘‘What can you fathom that others find unfathom-
able?’’; and ‘‘What the heck is my brain doing to blindside me now?’’
(quoted in Gangahar 2006). This is still good advice.
While I stress the search for better practices, I must be clear that
mess and reliability management is also about what is being missed
when accounting for how context compels adaptation of principles and
precepts in light of local conditions. Another example helps under-
score this. Assume that the weight of the evidence indicates unionized
firms as compared to nonunionized firms have lower rates of produc-
tivity, employment creation, and investment, other things being equal
(see, for example, Karabegovic et al. 2004). Contrary evidence exists, as
GOOD MESS MANAGEMENT 81
is the case in any messy pattern recognition, but assume on net that
the negative relationship with economic growth holds on average
across firms. Even then, professionals must ask of this conclusion: So
what? It may be true as far as it goes, but it clearly does not go far
enough.
Even if the recognized pattern is as stated, localized scenarios in
which the opposite holds are possible. For example, considerable evi-
dence suggests that the ‘‘union/nonunion’’ dichotomy masks great
variability in collective bargaining laws and wage arrangements across
countries and regions (Aidt and Tzannatos 2008; Boeri, Brugiavini,
and Calmfors 2001). That variability, in turn, suggests we take another
look at the macro-design standpoints to which this local variability is a
response when it comes to the union/nonunion dichotomy. What hu-
man rights, for instance, are at issue when one talks about unioniza-
tion? In reviewing the literature, one quickly realizes that the rights
concerned relate not to any ‘‘right to unionization’’ but to the more
traditional ones of collective bargaining and freedom of association
(see Aidt and Tzannatos 2002). Taking the latter as the point of depar-
ture brings to the surface two issues that may well have been missed by
others. First, focusing on different rights means the prior focus on
unionization and economic growth at the pattern recognition hub is
too narrow. We should instead be looking at the evidence related to
growth and collective bargaining arrangements generally. Second, if we
did that, we would better understand why local conditions are so vari-
able with respect to ‘‘unions’’ now variously defined.
Last, by way of summarizing the implications of the argument so far,
asking what you and your network are not seeing in the policy mess
means you have to reflect on what matters for management. Not only
is it too easy to confuse a mess for a problem or a crisis, but we are also
apt to confuse our definition of the problem for the problem itself.
Then we wonder why trying to solve the problem definition ends up
producing a really bad mess.≥ ‘‘We had the wrong assumptions and
therefore we had the wrong plan to put into play,’’ concludes a U.S.
Army general of the planning mess for the post-2003 occupation of
Iraq (quoted in Gordon 2008).
We can, however, do much more by way of nurturing, expanding,
and protecting good mess management for better policy than the
above insights suggest. I turn now to five major ways to do so, along
with some of their specifics: recognize and protect mess and reliability
professionals; be your own mess and reliability professional; join disci-
plines that are becoming real-time professions; favor networked deci-
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sionmaking over problem-centered approaches; and manage setbacks
better. These interventions are neglected when they should be cham-
pioned, especially in light of the societal challenges in the next chapter.
Recognize and Protect Mess and Reliability Professionals
As our goal is managing well rather than poorly, we must protect those
professionals who do manage well. By protect, I mean that these middle-
level managers and networks need not only to be defended, but also
shielded and buffered from the wider volatility around them. These
professionals are under threat from economists who see them as rent-
seeking bureaucrats; business faddists who see middle-level manage-
ment as ripe for reengineering; and politicians who revile both regula-
tion and regulators but who nonetheless demand all kinds of real-time
protections to safeguard them from all manner of risk. There is also
that ‘‘us’’ whom reliability professionals need protection from, because
the more we-the-public know about how many close calls and near
misses are involved in order to keep our services reliable, the more we—
as consumers and citizens—demand high standards of performance
whose invariance would undermine that reliability even further.
But why should we protect professionals who take reliability se-
riously? Because, without them, all those glitches that are already
happening in our complex technical and service systems would turn
into major accidents and failures. The net present value of savings that
these managers and operators achieve every day across the world must
be in the billions of dollars. Depending on whom you ask, the ratio of
near misses to actual failures in our critical infrastructures ranges
between 1,000 and 100 to 1 (Robert Bea, personal communication).
Imagine what that number would be if no one were converting the
near misses into close calls and actual saves.
If mess and reliability professionals are not protected, who would
buffer society from actions based on risk management models that fail
to predict events that actually happen, or fail to provide scenarios
about what to do once the possible improbably does happen? Net-
works of such professionals are to be protected in major part because
of their dual ability to assess the probable (what is likely to happen in
light of the systemwide patterns observed) as well as the possible
(what can happen by way of scenarios given a constellation of con-
tingencies, few of which may have been encountered before).
Start with the probable. While the conventional definition of risk is
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the product of the magnitude of a hazard and the hazard’s probability
of occurrence, as we saw earlier, this is only a point of departure to
understanding risk from the perspective of mess and reliability. From
the other side, the development of worst-case scenarios—especially
when it involves thinking about what has not happened before—is
another conventional way to approach risk. To reiterate, these two
common views of risk represent the respective bookends of pattern
recognition and scenario formulation. In between is where mess man-
agers and professionals undertake the hard work of interpreting and
differentiating these risks in the name and under the discipline of
reliability-seeking management. It is in that hard work where the skills
of recognizing and formulating possibilities are also honed, as mess
managers move across performance modes and the specific risks en-
tailed in managing there.
While it is more familiar now to distinguish thinking about the
possible from estimating the probable (see, for example, Hirschman
1970, 343), for professionals in the middle these activities are recip-
rocal. Thinking about the possible is one way professionals manage
within a domain where system-based inferences and context-specific
deductions must be connected. To translate the patterns you see and
the scenarios you formulate so as to ensure reliable performance is
also to validate the possibility that you may have to add to, let alone
revise, your repertoires of patterns and scenarios. How so?
At the end of October 2007, during the firestorms then affecting San
Diego, I was in the control room of the California Independent System
Operator, which manages the state’s electricity grid. Engineers and
support staff were huddled around the shift supervisor’s conference
phone as he talked to his counterparts in San Diego and elsewhere. At
one point, a San Diego control room operator said something like,
‘‘The two lines relayed [went out of service] this morning, and that
could happen again this afternoon.’’ This immediately sent the engi-
neers and staff to their grid maps to figure out what such relays would
mean in terms of shifting the load later that day.
What is important about the episode is that the two lines went out
of service that morning in a way that had not been seen before, as far
as I could determine. While fires are a feature of the San Diego region,
the operators hadn’t seen this kind of event in that way. For them, this
one instance of relaying was enough to prove the truth of the state-
ment, ‘‘It could happen again.’’ If it happened in the morning, it could
happen in the afternoon. This if-then statement was not a conditional
probability—that is, a statement of what was likely to happen, given
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what had occurred. Probability in that sense requires a run of cases, yet
the defining feature of the episode was that the professionals involved
had never experienced this type of problem in that set of circum-
stances. Something had to be done, because harm to the electricity
supply was entirely possible.∂ Not just a scenario or—I concluded as I
listened—even a worst-case scenario, the relaying was a live possibility
as real as if the operators could have put odds on it happening.
We expect the professionals who provide critical services—again, not
just in control rooms—to move beyond pattern recognition of risk and
worst-case scenarios and manage in the face of the inevitable surprises
that contingencies bring. As Maynard Keynes famously quipped, ‘‘The
inevitable never happens. It is the unexpected, always.’’ We want profes-
sionals in their domain to navigate between the best that is possible
enough for them to anticipate (prepare for), given the system and local
scenario they confront, and the worst that is impossible for them to
dismiss, given the same system and scenarios (see, for example, dos
Anjos and Chick 1995, 257). In these circumstances, having to make a
decision becomes even more difficult to avoid because both probability
and possibility are evident to managers. The sensitivity of professionals
to such distinctions, I believe, comes from their ability to differentiate
and appraise risk—the probabilities and hazards and scenarios—under
shifting performance conditions. They have learned the importance of
possibility because no amount of retrospective success in management
prevents the manifest possibility—not just probability—of future fail-
ure (Roe and Schulman 2008). In a policy and management world where
decisionmakers reel from what was just inconceivable to what now
seems inevitable, it is essential to have and protect good managers who
don’t skip a step in between and who take seriously both multiple possi-
bilities and multiple risks.
How would the protection of the mess and reliability professionals
proceed for those involved in the financial mess? There certainly is the
need to protect that dog that hasn’t barked—yet. From this book’s
vantage point (chapter 2), the most important priority would be for
the government and regulators to protect the professionals managing
our other critical infrastructures, particularly electricity and telecoms,
from any cascading contagion in banking and finance. If they are not
protected—and presumably infrastructure protection is the good mess
in ‘‘protectionism’’—we potentially face a socioeconomic crisis more
dangerous than the one after late 2008.∑ Why? Because the Great
Recession has left us with fewer options and more volatility for gov-
ernments than before it, and some critical infrastructures are already
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operating close to their respective performance edges. If luck is when
skill meets opportunity, then many infrastructures may be running
out of luck, and we along with them.
We should also be protecting those professionals within banking and
finance. The entire sector did not melt down—to use our terminology,
not all its mess and reliability professionals were pulled out of their
domain of competence into unstudied conditions. ‘‘Contrary to popu-
lar perception,’’ writes Gillian Tett of the Financial Times, ‘‘by historical
standards, most of the financial world was not crazily leveraged in the
past decade. Instead, the crazy debt increase was focused on a small
group of brokers, and global banks’’ (2010). The banking and financial
sector was never in pervasive crisis globally or regionally. The United
States needed to look no further than next door, where a headline said
‘‘Canada banks prove envy of the world’’ (Mason and Simon 2009; see
also Flaherty 2008). Since not all banks and investment firms, in the
United States or abroad, weathered the financial mess in the same way
with the same effect, how similar banks were able to avoid disaster
should be of keen interest to managers, a point to which we return
throughout this book.∏
Some financial firms all along refused to involve themselves in
mortgage-backed securities or did not require bailout funds (see, for
example, Cohan 2009). One observer put it: ‘‘We should also recall that
not all public banks have behaved badly. For every Credit Lyonnaise
there is a bnp, which did a respectable job when state-owned’’ (Jack-
son 2008; Jolly 2012; on reliability in U.S. equity markets during the
financial upheaval, see Greifeld 2009).π European-based banks also var-
ied in terms of their performance (on the comparative success of San-
tander in Spain, see Mallet 2009). ‘‘Unlike so much of the financial
system, the mutual fund industry came through this crisis unscathed,’’
argue Niall Ferguson and Laurence Kotlikoff (2009). But, you ask, how
long can that continue? My point, precisely. If the first priority is to
protect those mess and reliability professionals in other, intercon-
nected infrastructures, then the second priority must assuredly be to
protect those that remain within finance itself.
Protecting professionals means protecting their networks. A number
of financial reform proposals have called for good bank–bad bank
mechanisms that would fence toxic assets off from viable ones (see
Blinder 2009; Jenkins and Johnson 2012; Sidel 2009). It is by no means
clear, however, how one improves reliability by breaking up networks
of competent managers and then expecting the segments to be reliable
once they are reassembled into banks with good assets and other
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banks with bad assets. Both types of banks require active manage-
ment, and they may well operate in the same global markets—yet the
two types may well require very different kinds of managers. ‘‘Bankers
want to keep customers. That’s how they define success,’’ according to
the head of the Swedish central bank, based on Sweden’s own experi-
ence with this kind of arrangement. ‘‘If you’re running a ‘bad bank,’
success is to get rid of your customers—and that means you have to
have a different mindset’’ (quoted in Thal Larsen and Giles 2009). Such
cognitive flips, as we shall seem, create considerable challenges ahead.
Be Your Own Mess and Reliability Professional
Reading this book makes you more than a student of mess and reli-
ability. A good number of you are already professionals—if only be-
cause the only reliable manager any individual has in the healthcare
mess is him- or herself.∫ The modern corporation has outsourced to
you not just your healthcare management but also other operational
responsibilities, be it your banking through atms or your tracking of
your own packages online (see Alvin Toffler in Gardels 2006). Many of
you are already networked into several other professional domains. So
far, my left eye has been operated on, well, let’s not count the number
of times, so it now exists within an extended network of ophthalmolo-
gists, glaucoma specialists, eye surgeons, and more—a network I be-
long to only because the eyeball in question happens to be in my body.
Many readers work in organizations or sociotechnical systems that
consider their services to be critical and for which reliability is a man-
date or part of their mission. To that end, you spend a good deal of
time caught between balancing the immediate past with the next step
ahead. This defines ‘‘real time’’ for many of us: a past that isn’t yet over
and a future that has already started, leaving the present mess in
between to be managed. In contrast to what some studies have found,
that people exhibit ‘‘an excessive preference for the present’’ (Offer
2006, 72), the professionals we are talking about exhibit a justifiable
preference for real time.
I think of my own profession in these terms. Policy analysts and
public managers are mess and reliability professionals charged with
making sense of the wider patterns and local contingency scenarios
they face, case by case and often just on time. They are caught up in the
middle of things, where it’s easier for them to say we’re in a policy mess
than to tell the story about how it began or will end (see Beer 1983; Roe
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1994, 2007). At their best, analysts and managers identify and sort out
the standpoints they confront around the four hubs of macro, micro,
pattern, and scenario, with an eye to rummaging out the good mess
from the rest when it counts the most—for this step and the next one
ahead. To do so means that analysts and managers are occasionally
pushed and pulled to think in terms of careers rather than solely in
terms of the immediate tasks, because no one job can provide the
unique knowledge and experience required for real-time management.
One way to become such a professional is to use the mess and re-
liability space in chapter 3’s figure 3 as a diagnostic in one’s own prac-
tice. Next time you are in a meeting about some policy mess, map the
positions you are hearing. If experience is any guide, you will find that
the participants feel compelled to map out all the hubs and major
standpoints around them before some of them are pushed from their
viewpoints and pulled to translating what all of this means for the case
at hand. After a time, someone finally asks, ‘‘Just what does all this
mean for what we should be doing?’’ Then you can answer with your
own question: ‘‘I wonder what other people in your situation have
done that actually worked?’’ This is why there is great virtue in the
practice of trying to ‘‘bring the system into the room,’’ so that com-
ments of stakeholders around the hubs driving the policy mess actu-
ally map the entire mess and reliability space. In these ways, you’re
muddling through, but you aren’t muddle-headed. All this seems horri-
bly counterintuitive to those who want to gloss over differences so as
to ‘‘get to the point,’’ albeit the point they get us to is more mess.
As with brainstorming, the point of mapping the mess and reliability
space for the policy issue is not to rush the talk by leaving out impor-
tant standpoints. Otherwise you and others risk not being pushed and
pulled to the mess that can be managed. It is in this middle where the
heavy lifting and balancing of that barbell with patterned anticipations
at one end and formulated contingency scenarios at the other has to
take place. Think of plotting and populating the hubs as the way you
can get to a position where everyone uses a constantly updated refer-
ence list of what has worked elsewhere and more effectively.
A critical part of becoming a mess and reliability professional is an
appreciation of the dangers inherent in both prolonged just-for-now
performance and operating outside of the competence and skills in any
of your networks. Mandating more for less, and then even more for
even less, is the surest prescription for backing managers into a corner,
forcing them to manage to the edge of failure while task volatility
remains high and options progressively fewer. But no manager believes
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professionalism lies in failing to fail. Prolonged just-for-now perfor-
mance, as we saw, is sure to deprofessionalize operators, and that
includes you. It is true that some features of just-in-time manufactur-
ing are now treated pejoratively (see, for example, Lynn 2005), but the
just-on-time performance discussed in this book is different. A par-
ticularly salutary feature of just-on-time performance, from a profes-
sional standpoint, is the search for alternative ways to assemble op-
tions even when task volatility is high.Ω It has been suggested that ‘‘one
of the strongest safeguards against cognitive errors’’ is ‘‘to generate a
short list of alternatives’’ (Groopman 2007, 66; see also Marcus 2008,
165). While professionals cannot eliminate their cognitive limits,∞≠ ad-
justing for them is one of the few things that professionals and teams
networked together are able to do, and do well (see, for example, G.
Klein 2009, 63; Sorensen 1992, 256–66).
Note that for just-on-time professionals the greatest danger is not
the lack of deliberation or analysis, although you will often be told
otherwise (see Sunstein 2007). It scarcely suffices to urge you to take
time and plan better, when conditions push and pull you differently in
the midst of an inescapable urgency. ‘‘Be deliberative!’’ or ‘‘Think through
the worse-case scenarios!’’ is a good macro principle as long as you remind
yourself of those cases in which deliberation had consequences that dif-
fered little from those well-documented instances of groupthink, escala-
tion, and entrapment in decisionmaking (see, for example, Drummond
2001). ‘‘Contrary to conventional wisdom,’’ concludes a Science article on
deliberating about complex matters, ‘‘it is not always advantageous to
engage in thorough conscious deliberation before choosing’’ (Dijkster-
huis et al. 2006, 1005). ‘‘Thinking Too Much: How Introspection Can
Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions’’ is the title of a well-
known article from the field of social psychology (T. Wilson and Schooler
1991). Better to rely on training our gut feelings and intuition, concludes
the well-known psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer (2007; see also G. Klein
2009).∞∞ Yes, of course, there are problems with just-on-time perfor-
mance; as we saw, it risks misjudgment. Yes, the downside is that rapid
adaptation is purchased at the cost of discouraging second thoughts be-
fore acting (see Schlesinger 1997, 7).
Yet Mintzberg (1973) demonstrated long ago that managerial work
almost always involves tough decisions under severe time constraints,
with incomplete information and in high-paced environments. Schol-
ars may aspire to completeness (see, for example, Nuttal 2003), but
analysts and managers are all about being timely without being defini-
tive. If politicians have to fight to get heard and be taken seriously—
GOOD MESS MANAGEMENT 89
and if when they succeed, it is only at the last minute, with but a vote
to spare, and then only after a great deal of very hard work—why
should things be different for the analyst and manager? Rather than
recommending ‘‘more deliberation’’ as the best solution—a mess-
inducing single standpoint, if there ever was one—wouldn’t it be better
to find out how real-time mess managers achieve reliability in the ways
they do and their practices in doing so?
Join Disciplines That Are Becoming Real-Time Professions
A forgotten thread of diplomatic folklore suggested that when the new
Kingdom of Belgium emerged in 1831—much to the annoyance of the
Congress Powers who had imposed the Vienna settlement on Europe
after 1815—there had been a demarcation error at the point where the
borders of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands met. Somewhere be-
tween Aachen and Verviers, there existed a tiny triangular space, big
enough to contain a house, a patch of field and a few fruit trees, which
belonged to nobody.—Neal Ascherson (2001, 8)
Disciplines and professions are also just like that: Their demarcators lay
down formal boundaries, while those operating locally find things
aren’t as sharp on the ground as they are on paper. In fact, the inter-
stices, though not officially recognized, sometimes provide just enough
room for those in the field to work well.
Professionals thrive in such spaces, and I can think of no better way
to protect, let alone become, a mess and reliability professional than by
working in real-time professions not (yet) recognized by their counter-
part mainline disciplines. Of course, a few professions have always
been real time. ‘‘Foreign policy,’’ a former U.S. Secretary of State, Dean
Acheson, said, ‘‘is one damn thing after another.’’ Hospital emergency
rooms and incident command centers are familiar examples of real-
time mess management when life and death are at stake. Other disci-
plines and fields are in different stages of emergence when it comes to
their real-time professions, and these evolving areas of knowledge are
their own training grounds for mess and reliability professionals. Here
I discuss two emerging fields of interest: real-time ecology, which I
discuss briefly, and real-time economics, which I discuss at length. It
turns out that understanding real-time economics better—if only to
acknowledge the field’s existence and practices—provides important
insight into the financial mess and better mess management.
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Real-Time Ecology
What has been called ‘‘real-time ecology’’ are the patterns, scenarios,
and knowledge of ecologists (writ broadly) involved in the day-to-day,
if not hour-to-hour, operation of large water and hydropower supplies
(Roe 2004). The involvement of these ecologists arises out of legisla-
tive and regulatory mandates for the protection of endangered species
and habitats as well as for the safety and reliability of water supplies.
The knowledge generation and transfer in this field typically take place
when ecologists advise and interact with infrastructure operators.
That ecological advice, in my experience, can be based on ecologists’
case-specific analyses, their anticipations founded on patterns per-
ceived across a run of (often patchy) cases, and their localized con-
tingency scenarios for cases that have not yet occurred but might well
—all frequently applied ‘‘just on time’’ for management or regulation
purposes.
What does that entail? The control room operator asks the ecologist:
What do I do now? Do I open that gate and save the endangered
species, or close it and dry out the already endangered habitat? Do I
shut down the pump to save the Delta smelt, even if I would risk
violating urban water-quality standards in the process? Do I bring
online that old generator to keep the lights going, but increase air
pollution at the same time? What do you, the staff scientist, recom-
mend I do, right now when it matters? (van Eeten and Roe 2002).
Answers to such questions contribute to its own ‘‘ecological’’ knowl-
edge base, albeit one not currently recognized or utilized by many
ecologists outside that domain of competence. It may seem that I am
suggesting that control room operators of society’s critical infrastruc-
tures could be better positioned to manage the environment than even
our most talented research scientists operating independently of our
infrastructures. You bet I am.
Much of academically based ecology is driven by theory and research
more than it is by better management practices emerging nationally
and internationally across often very different ecosystem manage-
ment programs and projects. In fact, a great deal of what passes for
management in ecology has been theory-based, scientifically sanc-
tioned ‘‘adaptive management’’ whose baseline is not existing better
practice by real-world resource managers but rather the null hypoth-
esis that little scientifically sanctioned ‘‘evidence-based’’ practice yet
exists. Much of the real-time ecology advice described above is sum-
marily dismissed by university researchers as ‘‘agency science.’’ Still,
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the drive to move away from macro-design theories of ecological man-
agement is a feature of ecology as a real-time discipline that is growing
and will continue to do so (for more on these issues, see Roe 2011).
Real-Time Economics
Doubtless, histories of the financial meltdown will continue to give
prominence to the disabling role played by the macro-to-micro short-
cuts of finance theory, risk modeling, and economic assumptions
about individual investor behavior (see, for example, Alloway 2012; S.
Patterson 2010). Here I want to highlight not just the importance of
the middle-level professionals who were not so deluded, but also the
underreported field to which they have been contributing: real-time
economics.∞≤
This emerging field differs considerably from what is taught in text-
book economics. Put yourself in the middle of the financial sector
looking out to the extremes of the mess and reliability space where the
economic sciences are said to hold sway. Off in the distance, the real-
time economist glimpses not one economic theory but many at the
macro-design hub of his or her cognitive space for economic reliability.
Neoclassical economics says it is a Good Thing when competitive mar-
kets are in equilibrium; Austrian economics says it can be a Very Good
Thing when competitive markets are in disequilibrium (see, for exam-
ple, Littlechild 2002, 7–16). Of course, there are business cycles; of
course, prices go up and down. But no real-time professional expects
those matters to be decided at the level of deductive principles in a
textbook. Of course, it would be a consolation for middle-level profes-
sionals to know if they were on the upside or downside of a credit
cycle, but they could never depend solely on knowing that to produce
real-time reliability for economic and financial services. After a point,
the seriatim laws of economics—Pareto’s law of unchangeable inequal-
ity of income, the iron law that wages never fall below subsistence
levels in the long run, Say’s law that supply creates its own demand,
Marx’s law of the falling rate of profit, Keynes’s consumption function
based on a ‘‘psychological law’’ (see, for example, Pizano 2009, 52)—do
no more than flare on the horizon as if dropping from another planet.
The far reach of distance also comes into view when the real-time
economic professional looks to the horizon in the opposite direction,
to the lower right-hand corner of the mess and reliability space where
micro operations thrive. There some would have us believe economic
agents operate individually at the micro level, each with his or her own
animal spirits and risk appetite. One agent responds in a risk-averse
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way when facing uncertainty; another one acts in an imitative fashion
under the very same conditions, which may be risk-taking depending
on whom he or she is imitating (Roe 1998). Neuroscientists and be-
havioral economists are tracking all manner of splotches in functional
magnetic resonance imaging brain scans in order to understand just
such micro decisionmaking (Tallis 2008).
Much closer to home for real-time economists and finance managers
are the systemwide patterns and localized scenarios they must syn-
thesize if their respective services are to be reliable in the present. The
real-time professional cannot expect one economic theory or micro
behavior to hold across all cases and contexts, including the one he or
she faces right now and in the networks they find themselves. Chey-
enne, real-time economists know, is not Shanghai, and markets vary
accordingly. Sadly, the situation differs for their academic counter-
parts, who ‘‘have moved steadily away from seeing location as a deter-
minant of human experience. Indeed, economic progress [for them] is
seen as a release from location’s grip,’’ writes Partha Dasgupta, a pro-
fessor of economics at Cambridge University (2005).
The real-time economists’ search is for better practices minus the illu-
sions—particularly the illusion that better-practice economics approxi-
mates textbook economics (see, for example, Kaplan 2011). In fact, real-
time economics can be thought of as better-practice economics that has
had to move well beyond the Economic Theory of the day and the Horatio
Alger stories of Today’s Model Entrepreneur.∞≥ As an example, debate
heats up from time to time between proponents of a principles-based
form of regulation and accounting and those who favor more specified
rules and procedures (see, for example, Wallison 2007). At one point,
Europeans preferred broad principles under which ‘‘light-touch’’ regula-
tion took place, while the United States favored less discretionary and
more formal enforcement of specific rules and regulations. At first
glance, the empirics seem to be a contrast between light-touch regula-
tion encouraging light-fingered corruption versus formal regulation
becoming murder by overregulation. At second glance, the difference
would seem to be between a macro-design approach grounded in princi-
ples and a localized-scenario approach based on regulatory protocols
applied to specific and varying cases at hand. But real-time economists
understand that the controversy has often been one revolving around
systemwide pattern recognition and anticipations—in other words, an
attempt to determine better-than-prevailing practices with respect to
regulation and accounting, be those new practices principle-based,
rule-based, or, as turned out to be the case, some hybrid version (see
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Duffie and Hu 2008; for postcrisis changes in positions, see A. Hill and
Leahy 2009; Thal Larsen 2009). Certainly the financial mess has fueled
the search for regulation that works for really existing entrepreneurs.
John Mack, the head of Morgan Stanley, is reported to have said in one of
his more candid moments in 2009 that ‘‘regulators have to be much more
involved,’’ adding ‘‘we cannot control ourselves’’ (quoted in Sorkin 2010).
Where are the real-time economists? Some examples are a network of
fourteen of the largest credit derivative dealers who, with their staff,
worked through an early backlog of over-the-counter transactions;
bankers at the Bank of International Settlements’ Financial Stability
Forum, who meet bimonthly; and the staff of the same bank who
worked on the Basel capital security accords (see, for example, Geith-
ner, McCarthy, and Nazareth 2006; Tett 2007b).∞∂ If contemporary
media accounts are correct, histories of the financial mess will find it
difficult to separate Henry Paulson and Timothy Geithner from their
networks, so frequently was each Secretary of the Treasury on the
phone (Anderson 2007; Solomon and Paletta 2009; Tett 2008a). There
are later examples of wider networks at work: ‘‘Back in the summer of
2011, when U.S. default loomed, the senior managers in the largest
banks spoke extensively with each other about their preparations. They
then communicated these collaborative moves in extensive detail to the
U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve and other regulators’’ (Tett 2012). By
and large, though, the real-time economic professionals are little re-
searched or understood. It thus bears repeating that these middle-level
staff and specialists are those who make the out-of-sight ‘‘plumbing’’ of
the financial infrastructure work (see, for example, Grant 2011a). Those
responsible for ‘‘clearing . . . ‘the essential plumbing’ that underpins
equities, derivatives and bond trading,’’ for example, have this know-
how (Grant 2011b). This is not quite Keynes’s idea of economists as
dentists, but it’s close enough when the practices that work are thrown
in. When described, these professionals are often defined by the experi-
ence they have had with highly volatile situations. ‘‘In any market that
is volatile, previous experience helps a tremendous amount,’’ reported
the head of one European commodity derivatives unit. ‘‘Traders who
are experienced are less inclined to panic, and keep their discipline
because they have seen it before. It’s not a shock to the system. If you’ve
been in a car crash once, then you know what to expect’’ (quoted in
Oakley, Mackintosh, and Gangahar 2008). ‘‘The supervision of major
financial institutions requires deep skills in credit, deep skills in risk
analysis techniques and it requires within that organization very skilled,
trained professional people,’’ counsels Henry Kaufman, a respected Wall
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Street economist, based on his own long career (quoted in van Duyn
2008). While the theory is that a firm depends on the transactions of
buyers and sellers who are price-taking, context-free (so-called method-
ological) individuals in markets that would not exist without them, real-
time managers find themselves facing highly context-dependent transac-
tions that would not take place in the absence of reliably managing the
underlying infrastructures for markets.
Quite clearly, the financial mess tested the limits of knowledge of
even the best of those economists, who were adept at working under
pressing time constraints and heightened reliability mandates.∞∑ For
example, initial improvements in financial modeling arising from the
mess fell short of ensuring the pattern recognition needed to avoid
just-for-now quick fixes by finance professionals. At one point, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed guidelines for im-
proving risk calculations related to the structured financial instru-
ments that were on the trading books of large banks. The committee
admitted, however, that factors connected to foreign exchange and
commodity prices that might ‘‘create large trading losses if they are not
managed effectively’’ were excluded from the guidelines. Why? Be-
cause even the proposed guidelines on their own went ‘‘well beyond
the current state of risk modelling at most banks’’ (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision 2008, 4). Nor did ‘‘questions about the re-
liability of the [risk] models’’ diminish later on (Masters 2012b).
It is all well and good to call for transparent financial instruments,
more savvy investors, and greater attention to moral hazard, but the
fact remains that the new financial instruments were and are still too
complicated to be transparent (see Tabb 2007). For real-time econo-
mists, the global financial system is patently complex; calls for greater
transparency only serve to demonstrate that others find it next to
impossible to get the ‘‘big picture’’ of the system. Paul Samuelson
summed it up neatly: ‘‘What makes this meltdown different is that we
have built such an elaborate house of cards on the fiendish financial
schemes of ‘brilliant’ mit and Wharton School graduates that it will
take a great deal of time to unwind the mess and rebuild confidence in
the financial system’’ (2009, 43).
This is why readers, let alone the economics profession, need to
know more about this emerging field of real-time economics, the skills
of its practitioners, and the better practices to be relied upon. Other-
wise, the conventional economics we have hitherto relied on risks
remaining in the same cognitive mess that it has been in for decades.
Friedrich von Hayek put it early and best in his speech accepting the
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Nobel Prize: ‘‘We [economists] have indeed at the moment little cause
for pride: as a profession we have made a mess of things. . . . What
looks superficially like the most scientific procedure is often the most
unscientific, and, beyond this, that in these fields [including econom-
ics] there are definite limits to what we can expect science to achieve’’
(1974).
Favor Networked Decisionmaking
What should you do if you cannot find a real-time version of your field
or discipline? Join a network of professionals within which to work,
for you will never be able to manage policy messes well on your own.
This applies to those in economics as well in finance and banking.∞∏
Substantial work has been done on network-based decisionmaking
and how it differs from conventional problem-centered decisionmak-
ing.∞π Much of the literature on the latter reverberates with macro-
design approaches to operations, while the literature on network-based
decisionmaking is more closely aligned to the domain of mess and re-
liability professionals. The contrast between the two approaches—here
too, little is hard and fast—is summarized in table 2. Both decisionmak-
ing approaches start in dynamic conditions, and both recognized that
the more turbulent the conditions, the greater the emphasis in deci-
sionmaking on managing reliably. For the problem-centered approach,
the best response to conditions is to ensure that problems and goals are
well defined before management starts. If the problem is ill structured,
then define it so that it can be addressed in the presence of clear goals
and objectives that drive the problem solving. The approach starts with
the problem’s dynamic features, including uncertainty about their sub-
stance, and the role of problem definition and goal specification is to
stabilize the assumptions needed for resolving the problem. The temp-
tation, of course, has been to resort to only macro principles as the best
way to stabilize those assumptions.
The network-centered approach responds to the dynamics differ-
ently. The driver here is the sense of urgency that a decision needs to
be made now or very soon and that management must proceed as
quickly but reliably as possible. For instance, a major setback has just
occurred, rendering the issue of management even more urgent (this is
one sense in which things have to get worse for them to get better).
Network participants and stakeholders know that some kind of inter-
vention has to be made, but the rest remains fuzzy. Decisionmakers
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Table ≤. Two decisionmaking approaches in dynamic environments
Problem-centered Network-centered
Problem exists for problem solvers Sense of urgency exists for
networked decisionmakers and
managers to intervene
Define problem for analysis Define rules of the game for
decisionmaking within the
professional network (for example,
procedures and processes)
Clearly defined goal of analysis is
formulated prior to problem
solving
Formulating the goal within
management network is an
ongoing process
Information, including design and
research, exists for analysis
Knowledge is negotiated in the
process of synthesizing
information and research about
better practices by networked
professionals
Decision follows from problem,
goal, and information and brings
closure
After decision, another round of
negotiations follows, with possible
new opportunities as network
comes to understand changes and
reconfigures itself
Lock it up! Keep options open!
Analysis Ø synthesis Ø action Action Ø synthesis Ø analysis
Problem solving is effective when
implementation achieves the goal
defined earlier
Network decisionmaking is
effective when information that
has been gathered is used,
including emerging better practices
Source: Adapted from de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof ≤≠≠≠
and managers end up formulating their goals as they go along. What
network professionals are doing may become clear to them only along
the way. In this manner, a ‘‘solution’’ may make visible for the first
time the real ‘‘problem’’ that ends up being managed. Such learning is
never guaranteed, however, and professionals may only be able to
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agree on the rules of the game for making decisions and undertaking
management interventions in light of the dynamic conditions.
Within problem-centered decisionmaking, just as a problem exists
to be solved, so too do the information and approaches for solving it.
The data and tactics may not be identified beforehand, but they are out
there to be researched, found, and analyzed. In network-centered deci-
sionmaking, information is also collected, but its importance—the
knowledge it conveys—is negotiated by those in the network. Deciding
what is to be gathered by way of information ends up being the way
knowledge is managed for use. The search for information about bet-
ter practices, for instance, produces its best results when the network
converts the knowledge it gains into better management.
For problem-centered decisionmaking, once the analysis has been
done and the big picture made clearer, the results are synthesized into
recommendations. If this is the problem and that is what the evidence
and its analysis show, then decisionmakers would be irresponsible not
to ‘‘lock in’’ the conclusions to be drawn. Not so for network-centered
decisionmaking. No decision is explicable solely in terms of where the
professionals started from, because changes in course are open to
renegotiation in light of new possibilities and emerging goals. In par-
ticular, what works by way of ‘‘best’’ practices is always evolving. The
overall drive in decisionmaking is to keep options open in the midst of
contingency—or, better yet, to create options as you go along. ‘‘The
best way to predict the future,’’ said the computer scientist Alan Kay,
‘‘is to invent it.’’
In sum, the problem-centered approach revolves around articulating
goals, analyzing problems, and synthesizing results: You make a deci-
sion and take action based on the results of analysis. In network-
centered decisionmaking, a sense of urgency compels networked pro-
fessionals to take action by coming together and synthesizing what
they can know and decide. The analysis and definition of the issue, the
goals to be pursued, and the knowledge on which they make their
management decisions all come out of the negotiated synthesis. In one
approach, the solution follows from a clear problem statement; in the
other, what the ‘‘problem’’ was or is becomes clear after probing a
number of possible interventions. In one, analysis leads to synthesis
and then action; in the other, action leads to synthesis and then to
analysis, although ‘‘synthesis’’ and ‘‘analysis’’ differ in the two ap-
proaches. One seeks to fix the mess and get out of it; the other finds
the mess that can be better managed and tolerated. Effectiveness for
problem-centered decisionmaking is measured by how well results
conform to the original goals; effectiveness for network-based deci-
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sionmaking is measured by how well better practices can be modified
locally in useful ways, as goals and options evolve over time for the
networked professionals.
The two approaches can occur together with variations. Let’s think
again about a traffic mess. As traffic becomes congested, more signage
goes up to sort the traffic out. At some point, an awful accident occurs,
which brings urgency to rethinking the mess that the traffic and sign-
age now pose. In a well-known Dutch example, a traffic engineer and
community members embarked on a process that led to taking down
traffic signs. This created a new mess that led drivers and pedestrians
to proceed more cautiously, thereby reducing the overall accident rate:
‘‘Without bumps or flashing warning signs, drivers slowed. . . . Rather
than clarity and segregation, [the traffic engineer] had created confu-
sion and ambiguity. Unsure of what space belonged to them, drivers
became more accommodating’’ (Vanderbilt 2008, 30). No one, of
course, should expect this new mess to last forever.
The decisionmaking differences between the two approaches are
profound for policy and management. In a world where reliability-
seeking professionals are pushed and pulled to work together, policy
formulation—as researchers have long insisted (see M. Hill and Hupe
2002, 77–79)—is much more a species of process and network manage-
ment than macro-design approaches to problem solutions would lead
us to believe. Leadership is about managing within a network rather
than designing solutions. Agenda setting takes place, but often after
the fact, when you know better what the agenda is. Implementation by
networked professionals turns out to be less a stage of a policy cycle
than a critique of policy having any ‘‘cycle,’’ idealized or otherwise.∞∫
Consequently, policy evaluation is difficult, if undertaken at all; it
could not be otherwise when goals are defined in a process whose driver
is to keep options open. All this is crucial to understand and expect
when it comes to ongoing management of the financial mess, as we will
see. Financial reform differs considerably, depending on whether the
reform treats contemporary finance as a problem to be solved or as a
mess to be managed. If seen as a problem, the public will insist on
decisionmakers coming up with the best reform possible, given the
constraints we all are operating under. If seen as a mess, networked
professionals will have to manage it and be evaluated on that manage-
ment, as it morphs in unpredicted directions in response to inevitable
setbacks along the way.
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Manage Setbacks Better
You cannot be a reliability-seeking mess manager and not expect set-
backs in your work. After all, most things are said to fail (see Oremond
2005). Something sudden or unexpected happens that stalls manage-
ment, and this setback is itself a mess that could go bad or good. It
depends on how the setback is managed. For our purposes, setback
management means managing events that are on the way to becoming
bad messes, unless managed better. If that happens, the setback could
even become a good mess. (For more on ‘‘managing the unexpected,’’
see Weick and Sutcliffe 2007.)
Try to put yourself in the position of the Secretary of the Treasury or
the head of the Federal Reserve in February 2008, before the collapse
of Lehman Brothers, the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae debacle, and the
bailouts of aig and Citigroup. What you lack in terms of predicting the
future has to be made up for by your attempts to prevent the subprime
mortgage mess from metamorphosing into the free fall it did become
in the last months of 2008.
What you do know in early 2008 is that underlying the subprime
mortgage mess are those novel financial instruments having virtually
no mandates to ensure their high reliability management.∞Ω The se-
curitized instruments were so baroque that the initial good news that
risk was to be dispersed through these instruments had, by the end of
2007, been more than offset by the bad news that risk had ended up
back on the banks’ balance sheets and under the purview of their
regulatory mandates. ‘‘Imagine nasa sending men to the moon before
it had figured out how to get them back home,’’ writes a columnist in
the Financial Times at the end of 2007. ‘‘That is sort of what happened
in the world of securitisation this year, as complex structures such as
collateralized debt obligations blew up’’ (Lex Column 2007).
By February 2008 you know enough to understand that the financial
instruments have increased the interconnectivity of the financial sec-
tor without the reliability requirements that the regulated banks had.
You know, in short, that you have to move to the very limits of your
competence to manage this mess. Why? Because you are now being
told that the debt these instruments represent constitute ‘‘an accident
waiting to happen’’ (Norris 2008; see also Wolf 2007). Indeed, the
management challenge had become, as one U.K. regulator put it ear-
lier, to turn ‘‘an accident waiting to happen into a near miss’’ (quoted in
P. Davies, Tett, and Scholtes 2006). That is what the Treasury and the
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Federal Reserve tried to do—to turn a very bad mess waiting to happen
into a close call—when March 2008 rolled into view, and with it came
the challenge of Bear Stearns, the investment bank.
In retrospect, the Bear Stearns bailout failed to prevent the financial
mess from imploding into a crisis. But would conditions have been
better or worse without the bailout? Having to answer that question
raises the issue of trying to manage any kind of setback inside versus
outside your domain of competence. For it is not possible to ascertain
the counterfactual when you are in unstudied conditions. The issue of
what would have happened had Bear Stearns not been bailed out will
be a major bone of contention for years ahead. ‘‘All one can say is, ‘It’s
probably not as bad as it would have been,’ ’’ Alice Rivlin, the former
director of the Congressional Budget Office, concludes (quoted in Ben-
david 2008). But can the professionals involved know enough to say
even that?
It is much better to manage the mess of a setback within your
domain of competence, even at the limits of what the professionals
know, as managers can then resort to strategies involving bouncing
back while planning the next steps ahead. If, however, the setback
occurs in the midst of what is for professionals profound ignorance, its
unpredictable consequences simply cannot be estimated. Under these
circumstances, the inability to measure risks associated with the set-
back so as to manage them is the threat that has to be coped with.
Coping is more reactive than it is resilient and anticipatory—coping is
less mess and reliability management than it is crisis management.
What do I mean by ‘‘resilient and anticipatory’’ as distinct from
‘‘reactive’’? There is no better place to start than with the definition of
a setback: an unanticipated or sudden check in progress. Being unan-
ticipated (that is, being unprepared for) has at least three implications
for reliably managing setbacks as messes. First, the pressure is to catch
setbacks early on. This means trying to address the conditions that
make them unanticipated. Second, since setbacks are sudden, man-
agers find them surprising. Third, because ignorance governs outside
the domain of competence, setbacks and surprises can be expected to
be more common when having to cope in that unchartered terrain. All
of this implies that we cannot anticipate all the contingencies ahead in
mess and reliability management, so we must have the resilience to
bounce back from or absorb that which we cannot anticipate.≤≠ The
further implication is that some degree of planning ahead is involved
when trying to manage setbacks, as no one can expect the lack of
anticipatory planning to be compensated for by greater resilience later.
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But how do resilience and anticipation actually work in mess and
reliability management? To answer this question, we can return to the
control room operators whom Paul Schulman and I study. For these
operators, anticipating the next step ahead is an instrumental part of
responding to an interruption or shock that just happened (Roe and
Schulman 2008). Anticipation is important because professionals may
well not want to return to the original position. Managers for any
critical service do not absorb shocks just so they can get back to the
bad mess from which they started. Bouncing back is bouncing forward
for them.
To translate the recognized patterns and contingency scenarios into
reliable services, operators, be they inside and outside the control
room, both plan the next steps ahead and respond to unanticipated
events during the current or preceding steps. Thus, managers are eager
to stay inside their domain of competence. Outside it, instead of being
resilient and anticipatory, they end up reactive. Firefighting, band-
aids, and quick fixes become the norm, but now to what end? What are
they bouncing forward to? A widening reactivity, and with it the im-
pulse to start all over again, become very much part of defining when a
mess becomes a crisis.≤∞ In effect, a crisis is the collapse of the mess
and reliability space into the reactive micro-operations hub of figure 3.
Resilience linked with anticipation, in contradistinction, are part of
that space’s middle domain of competence.
More often than not, however, the literature on crisis prevention
treats resilience and anticipation as separate, alternative strategies
rather than linked and as basically one strategy as just described. This
decoupling of resilience and anticipation, in turn, limits our under-
standing of the importance of managing setbacks. To see how, turn to
that wider literature on crisis prevention and its discussion of the
putative differences between anticipation and resilience.
A major part of crisis preparation is planning ahead in order to be
agile and quick (that is, resilient) when crisis hits. You plan now so you
are not solely reactive later; better anticipation today leads to better
resilience when you need it afterward. For example, The Federal Re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (2006), a report to the U.S.
president, identified eleven ‘‘critical actions’’ that had to be completed
before the next hurricane in order to have a ‘‘national preparedness sys-
tem’’ and a ‘‘culture of preparedness.’’ Six of the eleven are listed here:
—Co-locate relevant Federal, State, and local decision-makers, including
leaders of State National Guards, to enhance unity of effort;
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—Pre-position a fully resourced and integrated interagency Federal Joint
Field Office to coordinate and, if necessary, direct Federal support to the
disaster;
—Ensure situational awareness by establishing rapid deployable communi-
cations;
—Designate locations throughout the country for receiving, staging, mov-
ing, and integrating them;
—Encourage States to pre-contract with service providers for key disaster
relief efforts; and
—Enhance on-going review of State evacuation plans; and incorporate
planning for Continuity of Government to ensure essential and emer-
gency services.
Note that a setback in executing one or more of the action items
amplifies the crisis when it occurs. If you do not work out the coloca-
tion plans or service contracts or evacuation plans before the disaster,
you will be worse off when disaster strikes. A setback in anticipation
leads to the inability to respond as rapidly as you could have, had the
action item been implemented beforehand. Setback in anticipation
leads to setback in resilience.
Much the same complaint has been made about the financial mess. It
has been argued that the subprime mortgage mess was anticipated but
that warnings about it were not heeded.≤≤ Consequently, so this argu-
ment runs, emergency measures, not resilience, moved to the fore in
the form of reactive bailouts and policy U-turns (see Taylor 2009 on
the Federal Reserve).≤≥ From the perspective of the crisis prevention
literature, forecasting a mess but not taking action to prepare for it
because of this or that setback is a prescription for brittleness and lack
of resilience.
In other words—and here is the important point—the role of set-
backs in anticipation and resilience in crisis prevention turns out to be
orthogonal to the role of successful resilience and anticipation in mess
and reliability management. In the former case, the failure to antici-
pate reduces the ability to be resilient later on. In the latter, being
resilient and anticipatory occurs in the same moment—for example,
when operators respond to a shock, they are already preparing for
what’s next. The chief virtue of managing messes so they do not turn
into crises is then this: You get resilience and anticipation jointly, not
separately.
From the vantage point of mess and reliability, the response to
Hurricane Katrina might not have been better had there been more
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pre-Katrina reports pointing out levee deficiencies, more newspaper
articles on a pending disaster, and more ‘‘Hurricane Pam’’ simulations
that turned out to be prescient. What we had here was more complex
than a failure to anticipate, subsequently producing a failure to be
resilient. In the same way, crisis management in the financial mess
might not have been better had there been more experts, like the
Federal Reserve’s Ned Gramlich and the investor Warren Buffett,
sounding early alarms. From a mess and reliability management per-
spective, the primary problem was not anticipation per se. Rather, it
was what was happening as well to resilience before and afterward.
How so? The mess and reliability perspective would be asking the
following about Katrina: Given that before the hurricane some 60 per-
cent of U.S. grain exports went through New Orleans and over 25 per-
cent of domestic oil production—mostly offshore oil drilling—came
from the Gulf of Mexico, how did grain companies and oil refineries—
reliability-seeking mess managers extraordinaire—build resilience into
their operations before the disaster, and how did that capacity affect
their rebounding during and after it? Parallel questions were raised in
the financial mess, though not always with the priority their answering
deserved: Because not all banks and investment firms, in the United
States or abroad, weathered the financial mess in the same way with the
same effect, how similar banks were able to avoid or better accommo-
date similar problems is of acute interest, if only to compare the better
practices for mess management at those banks to what those more
reactive decisionmakers did by way of crisis management at the failing
banks. How, in short, did those oil and grain companies or these banks
and investment firms—which, like many public-sector agencies, have
long supply chains—manage the inevitable setbacks, and what can the
rest of us, as prospective better mess managers, learn from this?≤∂
Where, though, are the good messes in managing setbacks? Manag-
ing setbacks better is one thing; pulling the good messes out is an-
other. Positive setbacks are never far away, if only because ‘‘brains have
a remarkable talent for reframing suboptimal outcomes to see set-
backs in the best possible light’’ (Begley 2005b). My reading and work
suggest that there are four types of good mess management when it
comes to casting setbacks in that positive light. Most familiar is the
argument that organizations do not transition from one stage to an-
other in their life cycles without overcoming the obstacles characteris-
tic of the organization’s current stage (Harrison and Shirom 1999).
Other setbacks serve as a test bed for developing (more) resilient and
anticipatory strategies in the organization. Another cluster of setbacks
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can be better thought of as design and practice probes into whether
that organization is broadly on track and, if not, what track it should
be on. In yet other instances, setbacks serve to remind managers that
other things matter for what they are doing. Here, setbacks unsettle
what had been settled knowledge yet in a way that does not question
the premise of having to reliably manage regardless (see Hillman and
Phillips 2007).
In all four cases, the positive feature of the setback is to slow down—
or add a ‘‘lag’’ to—a process that could be very difficult to manage if
that interruption had not occurred. Unlike free-floating calls for more
deliberation, the ‘‘lag’’ here is the specific combination of being re-
silient and anticipatory at the same time, so as to cool down what
could be hot processes that would otherwise be even more difficult to
manage.≤∑ Suffice it to say that these positive setbacks are much better
messes to be in from the perspective of network-centered decision-
making than from that of its problem-centered counterpart.
Will the financial mess serve as a timely interruption that confirms
just how central the regulators are to the continuity of the financial
and credit systems? Will the mess end up as a much-needed probe of
just which financial institutions are staying on track and under man-
date? Will the mess be the test bed for strategies and practices that
ensure more resilience and anticipatory capacity in lending and invest-
ing? Last but not least, will the mess in effect be an obstacle, the
surmounting of which is necessary to promote the operational re-
design of the financial and banking sectors in more reliable ways?
Certainly policymakers and regulators have tried answering ‘‘yes’’ to
each of those questions, but that, as with all macro designers, is only a
first step. Reliably answering those questions is, I believe, a core task of
the real-time economists and financial professionals (Roe 2009). The
answers are also core to a financial regulation that took positive set-
backs and associated operational redesign of those regulated much
more seriously. This is particularly important when (1) senior execu-
tives of the organizations in which the setbacks are occurring are
denying that there are setbacks or (2) if the setbacks are recognized,
the organizations are so seized up in just-for-now management that
they do not have a longer-term perspective to render the setbacks
under way as positive.
By way of summary, many of the points about good mess management
in this chapter are neatly illustrated through the story behind one of
the most famous pieces of Chinese calligraphy, Wang Xizhi’s Preface to
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the Poems Composed at the Orchid Pavilion. It is said that on the third
day of the third month of the year 353, Wang Xizhi invited some forty
fellow scholars to a purification ceremony. After the ceremony, the
scholars sat on both banks of a winding stream to compose poems and
enjoy wine in a drinking contest. Cups of sake were floated down the
stream, and in one version of the story, wherever a cup stopped, the
scholar closest to it had to extemporaneously compose a poem. If he
could not come up with an impromptu poem quickly enough, he had to
drink the sake as a penalty. Merry he might end up, but the drunken
scholar risked his reputation as a poet in the process. At the end of the
contest, twenty-six of the participants had composed thirty-seven
poems. It is this pressure, skill, and contingency—all with the man-
dates governing their interaction, and most of it done just on time—
that describe this book’s professionals, the contest they undertake on
behalf of what matters, and the notion that being unprofessional has




Constantly shifting policy and markets, personnel churn and turnover,
fast-moving technological change, ever more regulations and new
reliability requirements, and ramifying interdependencies make for
more mess and ever greater demands for reliability. Much has been
written about this state of affairs, but here I address three societal
pressures working against better management that have not gotten
the attention they deserve: problematic cycles of mess and reliability;
poisonous macro design and micro operations; and the future as to-
day’s major policy mess, including its persisting politics of higher
volatility and fewer options. Chapter 7 discusses the professional chal-
lenges facing managers and operators in the middle as they respond to
the wider societal pressures discussed here.
Problematic Cycles of Mess and Reliability
We saw at the beginning of chapter 2 that stability in the financial
markets was said to have led to more risk taking and eventually to the
financial mess. We’re now in a position to be specific about that pro-
cess. Below I summarize a cycle of mutually reinforcing mess and
reliability in five rough and interrelated propositions. They derive
from my reading of the dynamic between mess and reliability in those
cases where single resources, such as electricity (or water, telecom-
munications, or a car), end up having to provide multiple services
under increasing reliability mandates. Note here only that the drive to
transform single resources into multiple services, and reliably so, can
be found in a variety of forms today, embracing as it does one-stop
shopping and service centers, multistrategy funds, biodiversity hot
spots, multichannel tv screens, and dual-use biotechnologies, among
many others.
Proposition 1: The more services demanded from a single resource,
the greater the demand for reliability in each service and the messier it
becomes to ensure reliability (where that reliability remains the safe
SOCIETAL CHALLENGES 107
and continuous provision of a vital service). The more you rely on the
hospital, the more services you demand from it. The same is true for
firefighting services. First, crews responded to fires; then they had to
respond to virtually any emergency call. Our power lines are expected
to carry not just electricity but now also broadband for Internet access.
Banks originally provided accounts and loans; then we required all
kinds of financial services from them. In such periods of expansion,
reliability mandates and service provision suffer growing pains; their
management becomes overstretched, however temporarily, as man-
agers maneuver across their four performance modes. Management
gets messy.
Proposition 2: The messier it is to provide multiple reliable services
from a single resource, the more the services are provided reliably only
in real time—if at all—when the performance standards are clearest.
Police now respond immediately only to 911 calls of activity in prog-
ress. The hospital focuses on the inpatient emergency room and the
intensive care unit, leaving much of the rest to outpatient services.
The bank shifts from waiting lines in front of few tellers, to many
atms, with the emphasis on the a for automatic. Why? Because per-
formance criteria and foregone alternatives (opportunity costs) are
clearer in real time: Did the police come at once, did you get your
emergency care, and is the cash actually there?
Proposition 3: The more the services are reliably provided in real time,
the more likely it is that there will be demand for new services from
that multiple-service resource, and the messier it will be to ensure that
any of those services is reliably provided, right now. This looks to be a
variant of Proposition 1, but managers find themselves now limited to
cycling between high-volatility performance modes only, what they
call the ‘‘real-time’’ reliability of just on time or just for now. To see
how, go back to your atm. Before, it provided cash and deposit ser-
vices; then it became a single stop for various transactions, such as the
purchase of postage stamps (Kingson 2006). A new mess confronts you
when the multipurpose atm and others nearby are all out of order,
and none of these expanded services are available. It’s the same with
your cellphone: ‘‘Imagine a magical device that could boost entrepre-
neurship and economic activity, provide an alternative to bad roads
and unreliable postal services, widen farmers’ access to markets, and
allow swift and secure transfers of money. Now stop imagining: the
device in question is the mobile phone’’ (Economist 2005).∞ But what
happens when reception drops, as the stakes are now so much higher?
Consider also the once humble car. The more congested our roads
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became and the more time spent stuck in traffic, the more pressure
there was to turn the automobile into a multiple-service resource, with
the addition of all manner of real-time services to the vehicle: cell-
phone and charger, usb port to install new software, dvd player in the
back, gps up front, and a great stereo system throughout. Having
added services—why not learn a new language while you’re stuck in
traffic?—we now have the problem of preventing cross-system failures
in the vehicle as a whole, including attention deficits and pressures to
multitask for the drivers.≤ As John Plender phrased an argument with
respect to financial systems before the mess, ‘‘the longer the market’s
superstructure proves reliant, the more reliance will be placed on it,
even though it has not been tested in really difficult times’’ (2006, 13).
Proposition 4: The more the services are reliable only in real-time and
the messier their reliability management, the greater the pressure to
decouple one or more services from the resource, and the more likely a
new resource will eventually be found or created to provide the de-
coupled service reliably. Banks ceased to be the only source of multiple
financial services; all manner of major financial transactions have
ended up being provided elsewhere, such as through hedge funds.
‘‘Credit derivatives,’’ we once thought, ‘‘permit risks to be unbundled
and transferred to those players in the financial markets best able to
absorb them’’ (Plender 2005). Among the responses to the financial
mess have been recommendations that firms be managed in ways that
make it easier to decouple their services: ‘‘The key requirement is that
assets that are needed for the continued provision of these [critical]
services can be quickly separated from the organizations engaged in
their supply. The businesses involved must be required to operate in
such a way that such a separation is possible’’ (Kay 2009c). ‘‘If regula-
tors want to protect against another financial crisis, it seems they’d be
better off trying to decouple executive pay from the expansion of
financial empires’’ (based on research discussed in Wilson Quarterly
2012, 64). Examples of easier decoupling are proposed ‘‘living wills’’ to
enable financial institutions, presently ‘‘too big to fail,’’ to unwind busi-
ness without a severe disruption to finance and banking as a whole.
That, however, depends on there being a new resource, in this case, new
regulations and methods with which to reliably determine and govern
‘‘systemically important financial institutions.’’
Proposition 5: The more reliably the service is provided from the new
resource, the greater the pressure will be to demand more services from
that resource . . . and so the dynamic continues. To stay with the finan-
cial mess, not only did the volume of credit derivatives increase, but so
did derivatives for other purposes and other types of risk. Yet we saw
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this news proved to be far from good. As early as 2007, a fixed-income
manager lamented: ‘‘The fact that the risk was diversified was a good
thing. Now everyone is panicking because they don’t know where it is’’
(quoted in Tett 2007a).≥ In case it needs saying, it is not obvious what new
resources, if any (including better regulations), will emerge from efforts
to decouple systems to prevent cross-system failure. Nor is there any-
thing inevitable about the dynamic. True, we have seen decoupling and
emerging new resources in the road transportation sector—the advent of
private toll roads separated from the more congested public freeways—
but this does not imply that such activity will happen everywhere.∂ Nor is
the implication that the dynamic in each and every case is as mess-
inducing as it has been in the financial sector, where what was thought to
be decoupling (unbundling risk) turned out to be concealed recoupling
(aggregating and correlating risks in unperceived ways).
Nor, finally, is there anything stopping decisionmakers from inter-
vening and precipitating more mess. Consider California’s electricity
deregulation in the late 1990s. Was it an example of premature inter-
vention by politicians or the expected decoupling of an over-mandated
service reliability? The dynamic leads us to expect that at some point
electricity as a service could have so many competing mandates that
new or different structures would evolve to handle these mandates
more reliably or less messily. Witness the proposals for a smarter grid
circulating at the time of writing. Yet, not once have I come across
anyone arguing that the integrated utilities were deregulated because
they were not reliable enough. The rationale for deregulation was just
the opposite. The integrated utilities were said to be overly expensive
because they were too reliable. What a waste it was to have those
utilities ensuring ‘‘six-nines reliability’’ (99.9999 percent)—or so we
were told before the crisis (Roe and Schulman 2008). In this instance,
the political intervention was clearly precipitate, and we ended up with
a new policy mess to manage—which it must be pointed out was man-
aged more reliably in the electricity control rooms than most people
realized (Roe and Schulman 2008, chapter 1).
Mess and reliability professionals always face society’s pressure to
turn resources into ‘‘critical’’ resources, each of which is expected to
provide more and different reliable services. The demands for mess
and reliability management must be expected to increase, and with
them, I argue, the difficulties just mentioned. New resources emerge at
different rates across different, but interconnected, critical service sys-
tems; often, interventions by others outside their respective domains
of competence turn out to be counterproductive for those inside. The
middle-domain professionals can also be expected to try to cobble
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together and recouple the disparate resources and services in order to
ensure some measure of ‘‘good enough reliability’’ (good enough be-
cause managers are fast enough with just enough, knowing full well
this is never enough all the time). Consequently, we can and should
expect professionals to move increasingly to the edge of their capabili-
ties across all performance modes as their task requirements acceler-
ate. Already, many reliable mess managers are at the limits of know-
how and competence in their networks.
Poisonous Macro Design and Micro Operations
Let us return to figure 3 (see chapter 3), where the arrows in the mess
and reliability space point from macro design to localized scenario
formulation and from reactive micro operations to systemwide pat-
tern recognition, as professionals navigate to service reliability. Those
arrows reverse when the following happens: (1) policymakers come to
think that the only scenario they confront is the need for more macro
design to correct (2) the only pattern they think they now confront—
namely, major human error at the micro-operator level. Decisionmak-
ers now believe they have no choice but to macro design better micro
operations directly. When this happens, ‘‘management’’ defaults to the
faith-based macro-to-micro shortcuts discussed in chapter 4.
The difficulty here is not only that the learning and expertise of mess
and reliability professionals are bypassed in the leap from designing
macro solutions to addressing micro-operator behavior. Worse, there
may no longer be much of a middle to bypass. We saw how professionals
in securitized finance were forced to work outside their domain of com-
petence, thereby making them more error prone without patterns or
scenarios to use in appraising and assessing multiple performance-
based risks. But the process of disorientation needn’t stop there. Even
where a domain of competence survives, prolonged just-for-now per-
formance can erode it. The longer a mismatch persists between the
skills that managers and operators have and the task requirements they
face, the less competent these professionals become.
The mismatch poisons management in two ways. First, the domain
of mess and reliability professionals shrinks due to the deprofessional-
ization of management expertise. If the unstable conditions persist
with their firefighting, band-aids, and quick fixes, then what mess
managers can handle reliably—the domain in which their cognitive
skills match the tasks required of them—constricts. Patterns and sce-
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narios that were of use in other performance conditions fall into dis-
use, since the conditions and related practices that matter are con-
tinually just for now.
This leads to the second lethal predicament. What was known before
is no longer ‘‘known.’’ Professionals are expected to perform reliably in
areas where they no longer manage but still operate. Either way, mess
managers are expected to rely on their judgment in new settings ex-
actly where that judgment is now least reliable and learning most
difficult. Here again they don’t manage; they have to cope—and there
are times when they cannot even do that. The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (2011) repeats the term ‘‘too little, too late’’ to describe
such conditions. One could even say that a key characteristic of the
part of the financial sector that went into meltdown was its ‘‘too-little-
too-late reliability.’’ For example, a leading (not lagging) indicator of
increasing financial distress may well have been the tightening (not
relaxing) of bank-lending practices beforehand (see Carlson, King, and
Lewis 2011).
Increased errors are inevitable when the skills-tasks mismatch per-
sists indefinitely. As mentioned in a preceding chapter, infrastructure
operators reported that they committed one kind of reliability viola-
tion in order to prevent other more serious violations from occurring,
so they wouldn’t back themselves into a corner they couldn’t get out of
during just-for-now performance conditions. As forced errors increase,
the calls for systemwide redesign to eliminate the errors can be ex-
pected to increase as well. After a point, when managers are having to
operate for longer and longer periods outside of their domain of compe-
tence, there is no longer a resilient and anticipatory middle domain to
even bypass in making the macro-to-micro leap. Instead of starting
from macro design and micro operations and moving to the middle,
policymakers end up with macro design as the single standpoint from
which to address micro errors at the operator level. By this time, poison
has spread through the organization that is managing for reliability.
The point, however, is that no amount of macro design can directly
correct for inadequate operator skills, especially capabilities that are
poisoned in the two ways just described. The more macro design, the
greater the human error when it comes to reliability management, for
reasons already outlined in chapter 3’s discussion of why it is necessary
to tack to reliability, in the sense of moving indirectly across and
through the mess and reliability space. It is very important for the
reader to understand how dangerous this attack on manager compe-
tence can be. Here is an extended example of how it can occur.
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On March 8, 2004, control room operators in caiso, the major man-
ager of California’s electrical grid, were taken to have contributed to a
major load-shedding event. Blackouts occurred in Southern California,
with an internal caiso review finding fault with the two generation
(‘‘gen’’) dispatchers in its control room during the incident. According
to a caiso press release, ‘‘Preliminary California iso Internal Inves-
tigation Finds Operator-Error Contributed to 20-Minute Outage in
Southern California.’’ Our research discussions with participants in the
incident found that the two gen dispatchers were managing to an edge
they felt was part of what had become normal grid operations under
persisting conditions of high volatility. In contrast, the crew’s shift
manager and the control room’s reliability coordinator felt that the
morning’s load increase required clear and timely actions to keep the
system from moving over the edge and into a corner out of which the
control room could no longer manage for reliability purposes. In our
terminology, the gen dispatchers saw themselves in just-on-time per-
formance mode, where they were managing a highly volatile system
with many options. The shift manager and reliability coordinator,
on the other hand, saw the dispatchers in just-for-now performance,
where there were far fewer options under such persisting conditions.
The dividing line between the two modes was no longer clear or agreed-
on by the professionals concerned (see figure 5).
In effect, the gen dispatchers tried to minimize Type II error (shed-
ding load unnecessarily), while the shift manager and reliability coordi-
nator saw Type I error (not shedding leading to major outages) increas-
ing dangerously as a result.∑ In my view, the difference in perceptions
arose because control room operators had to spend more and more time
in the most difficult mode for any mess and reliability professional:
just-for-now performance. In this view, the gen dispatchers’ perspec-
tive that they were in just-on-time mode was wrong. But prolonged just-
for-now conditions are exactly those that give rise to such differences in
how micro operations are perceived among operators and managers.
This conclusion, however, hinges on there being a correct decision.
In this view, the operators were or were not in a given performance
mode; whatever performance mode they were in, there was a proper
decision to be taken warranted by those prevailing conditions. Yet it
can be argued that in the March 8 disturbance, the determination of
what was the correct decision was precisely what was being disagreed
about, as if persisting just-for-now conditions had already pushed the
gen dispatchers into unknown terrain. It is not possible to determine if
that actually happened (for reasons that become clear below), which












Figure 5. Differing perceptions of the March 8, 2004, disturbance in
the caiso control room
The two dispatchers and the shift manager and reliability coordinator
insisted that they had not erred. For the gen dispatchers, the error was
the decision of the shift manager and reliability coordinator to second-
guess the dispatchers’ decision and end up shedding load when it was
not shown to their—the dispatchers’—satisfaction that this was neces-
sary. The shift manager and reliability coordinator saw it as their role
to shed load when conditions required it, whether or not gen dis-
patcher error was involved. This difference points to a potentially
major source of errors that can arise with reversing the arrows in the
mess and reliability space. Not only are there differences in perception
as to what performance mode the professionals are operating in, but
also—and more fundamentally—professionals may end up disagreeing
about just what the knowledge is within which they are managing and the
scale at which management is taking place. They begin by disagreeing
over what the patterns and scenarios are, but they end up disagree-
ing over what are in effect the very dimensions of the space in which
reliability and mess are to be managed: the scope of the issue and the
knowledge about what to do. Just when conditions are at the most
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urgent and require a proper decision, the event itself raises questions
about just what is the correct decision when issues of knowledge and
scope are no longer stable. As one of the gen dispatchers involved told
us, ‘‘It wasn’t ever explained to me whether it would have been better
had we not shed load.’’ In other words, that these professionals could
see the fundamentals so differently may have indicated a more serious
erosion of team situational awareness than initially thought existed.
We will never know whether that happened, if only because that re-
quires the same knowledge that those involved had then, but which
they may have been questioning in ways they didn’t even realize.
This is the poisonous nature of such developments wherever they
occur: What looks to be the macro designing of better micro opera-
tions can turn out to be nothing less than the attempt to macro design
the entire mess and reliability space, so as ‘‘to get rid of all that mess’’
in operator error and error-prone micro operations. What else can we
do, the senior executives and boards tell themselves, when our entire
business is on the line? We have to reinvent ourselves; we have to risk
failure in order to succeed. However—and here is the challenge—when
upper management seeks to implement these risk-taking changes in
critical service provision, they rely on middle-level professionals, who,
when they take risks, do so only in order to reduce the chances of failure.
How else can they manage a policy mess reliably? To reliability-seeking
professionals, the risk-taking activities of upper management or of-
ficialdom look like a form of suicide motivated by fear of death. It’s a
cognitive flip into an empty pool.
Such organizational suicide can be seen at work in events leading up
to and during the financial mess. Before the mess, good bank practice
was to hold capital as a cushion against unexpected losses; new capital
security accords then mandated that banks hold capital against losses
that must be expected because of their high-risk lending (Silverman
2003). Before the mess, mortgage brokers made money on the perfor-
mance and quality of their mortgages, once finalized; but the standard
compensation package changed to one based on the volume of loans
originated and passed on (fcic 2011, 7, 89). We know from the litera-
ture that such reversal of important decision rules can lead to organi-
zational failure on a wide scale (for the Challenger accident example,
see Roe 1989). Requiring cognitive flips on the part of managers and
operators that reverse what their skills tell them to do is a sure way to
dissolve the mess and reliability space into uncharted waters.
The double dose of poison—erode manager competence and then
send managers into conditions they don’t know or no longer have the
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2pskills to deal with—was also evident in other ways in the financial
meltdown. One important feature of the mess was how illiquid (un-
priceable or unmarketable) novel financial instruments became over
an extended period. As we saw in chapter 2, liquidity has a great deal to
do with having the flexibility and added options of just-on-time per-
formance in banking and finance. Illiquidity can be seen as the drying
up of flexibility and options, when the ability to assemble options
and maneuver creatively under the pressure of time dissipates.∏ Yet, at
some points, illiquidity in the financial mess may also have indicated
something altogether worse, more akin to the March 8 episode de-
scribed above. The financial mess became a crisis exactly when profes-
sionals and others could no longer trust the knowledge base from
which they were managing or the scope of the ‘‘problem’’ before them.
A well-known economist said of the financial upheaval that ‘‘the prob-
lem became huge because ‘policy innovations’ had been racing ahead of
comprehension. The securitisation of mortgages was an innovation
that led unwittingly to what Wall Street calls ‘betting the company’ ’’
(Bhagwati 2008). This turned into a world where ceos’ road maps to
exploiting modern finance and their materially misleading statements
about their companies’ financial health were matched by their cogni-
tive inability to see their financial death or near miss coming when and
how it did (see Eisinger 2012). It was an economy in which many
experienced professionals could not cognitively distinguish asset illi-
quidity from institutional insolvency.π Once managers are in condi-
tions that neither they nor the rest of us can comprehend, why should
it be surprising to them or us that what indicated success before—
lower mortgage rates, smaller down payments, rising income from
housing sales—ended up indicating something unimaginably bad in-
stead? We’re told at the beginning of 2012 that the ‘‘leaders of the
pack’’ in the s&p 500 ‘‘are still . . . technology, healthcare and finan-
cials’’ (Rosenberg 2012, 20)—as if this is on net a positive rather than
negative development?
The Future as Today’s Major Policy Mess
For the Wharton School’s Russell Ackoff, and Sheldon Rovin, ‘‘mess is
the future we are now in, barring any change’’ (2003, 97). Many of
today’s plans and projections assume a future that cannot happen, and
yet it is this seeming impossibility that we have to manage today. Our
biggest policy mess, in this view,
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is the future implied by our current practices and behavior and the changes
we expect in our environment. Such an implied future of every institution
would show how it is on a path to self-destruction because it failed to adapt
to (even expected) changes in its environment. . . . For example, the mess
the Federal Reserve Bank formulated in the 1970s showed that if nothing
new were done the bank would eventually require more check clearers in the
United States than there were people. It was the awareness of such a crisis
that led to development and propagation of the electronic funds transfer
system. A more current example is in health care. At the current rate of
increase of gross domestic product . . . about 100 percent will be devoted to
health care by the next century. Of course, this is absurd! We can’t and we
won’t spend all our nation’s money on health care. But knowing where we
are headed without significant intervention might help us make the appro-
priate changes. (97–98)
To be specific, the future with respect to almost any major sector is its
own policy mess today. While something like this has always been the
case (as in the fear of hell and damnation), clearly many of the messes,
like the financial one we are now in, have worsened in the last decade.
According to current projections, the annual interest on the U.S. gov-
ernment debt will eventually ‘‘rival defense expenditures . . . [and]
would exceed all domestic discretionary spending, a category that in-
cludes spending on infrastructure, education, energy, and agriculture—
in effect, anything other than entitlements and national security’’ (Alt-
man and Haass 2010, 27). That’s only for the national debt. There are
also pensions, Social Security, and Medicare. Earlier reports of the huge
structural overhang in federal liabilities found that ‘‘the U.S. currently
faces a future of chronic federal budget deficits totaling at least $44,200
billion [$44.2 trillion] in current U.S. dollars’’ (Despeignes 2003). Such
calculations, tied to the work of the economists Kent Smetters, Jag-
dessh Gokhale, and Laurence Kotlikoff, seek to estimate the net present
value of U.S. federal obligations, most of which are for Social Security
and Medicare, compared to forecasted revenues: ‘‘Smetters and Gok-
hale calculate it would take a 69 percent hike in all federal taxes or a 95
percent hike in payroll taxes to close the $44 trillion gap’’ (Bernasek
2003). But this conclusion too is absurd. Raising taxes that much would
destroy the political economy on which the taxes are based—and all
these calculations were made before the financial mess made things
worse.
The economist Martin Feldstein sums up the challenge: ‘‘What Larry
[Kotlikoff] has done is to say what happens if we don’t do anything to
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fill the gap. . . . That’s not what will happen. Either we’ll raise taxes, cut
benefits, or change the way we finance the system. Or it will be some
combination of all three’’ (quoted in Bernasek 2003). That is to say,
somehow we will have to manage, but the point is we do not know now
how this will happen—just what taxes will be increased, expenditure
cuts made, and finances curtailed—or how it all will be sorted out. To
take another example, it is easy enough to predict a major catastrophe
on the Bosphorus shipping lanes (see de Waal 2008), but who is to do
what about that prediction now, as you are reading this paragraph? In
sum, it is as if the long run is already here and that our challenge must
be ‘‘to foresee the present,’’ as A. R. J. Turgot, the eighteenth-century
French economist and statesman, put it (quoted in T. Clark 2012, 73).
The future is the mess we are in partly because present cognition
about that future has its many limitations. The psychologists Daniel
Gilbert and Timothy Wilson (2007) identified four kinds of errors in
thinking about the future and how we experience that prospection.
Our expectations of the future can be unrepresentative, because they
often are based on extreme, rather than common, events that have
happened to us; essentialized, because they leave out the details about
how the simulated future is to be achieved; abbreviated, because we
focus on a few select moments of the future, and early ones at that;
and decontextualized, because the context in which we form expecta-
tions about the future may well not be the same in which they are
realized, if in fact they are realized at all. Is it any wonder, then, that we
make a hash of it when we think about the future on our own, and why
it is so important, as discussed in chapter 5, to think within networks
of professionals who adjust for these biases without the expectation
that they can be eliminated? This is why current savings, and the flip-
side investments, are so important: They are inevitably networked
resources that enable their holders to imagine (if not anticipate) a
better future now—a good-mess present in which to be, given the
cognitive limitations just discussed.
These limitations were never far away in the financial mess and its
aftermath. ‘‘The next pending crisis,’’ Alan Greenspan told a U.S. gov-
ernment commission looking into the financial mess, ‘‘will no doubt
exhibit a plethora of new assets which have unintended toxic charac-
teristics which no one has heard of before, and which no one can
forecast today’’ (quoted in Politi and Rappeport 2010). Yes, but that
very inability to forecast is part of the mess we are in today, not just
later on. Or, to put the point the other way around, the only place the
future can be reliable is now, and only if we are managing our messes
right now in light of our inability to predict with any great assurance.
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‘‘In the short term, the question is: how do we get out of this [financial]
mess?’’ Gillian Tett, a respected commentator, asked (Financial Times
2009). The answer is that we cannot predict how, which is the mess we
must be managing for. And how could it be otherwise? If government
by definition is too big to fail—and if markets by definition consist of
firms, no one of which should be too big to fail—then when some
financial institutions become too big to fail, is it any surprise that
government intervenes, if not to protect what remains of the market,
then to protect what becomes of government? This is a huge policy
mess, and the challenge of sorting it out must include looking for
emerging sector-wide practices and adapting them locally, without
hoping to clear any of the mess away once and for all.
Such better practices—emerging while evolving (sometimes seren-
dipitously, other times not), never final and definitive as ‘‘best
practice’’—are important for mess management not just when they
represent added options and resources for managers already working
under volatile situations. That is to say, better practices are not only
important because they may make the difference between having to
manage reactively, just for now, rather than managing flexibly just on
time. Better practices also represent learning from managers like our-
selves who have managed more effectively in situations like the ones in
which we find ourselves. Those managers too have political, economic,
and social constraints; nonetheless, they have met a performance
standard higher than we ourselves face as we grapple with the same
constraints. There are 89,000 distinct governments in the United
States alone, and a good number of them must have something to
learn from those like themselves.
All too often more attention is given to those constraints than to the
emerging better practice taking place in spite of them. Politics, dollars,
and jerks—now they are the real source of our big policy messes, or so I
am frequently told. ‘‘We can’t be confident of anything after learning
of this cesspit,’’ said Paul Tucker, the deputy governor of the Bank of
England, when asked about another allegation of widespread banking
malpractices (quoted in Quirk 2012, 34). If only we had better politics;
if only money didn’t drive the politics we have; if only we didn’t have to
work for the jerks causing all this, then we wouldn’t be in the mess
we’re in. This has certainly been offered as a major explanation of the
financial meltdown by people even within the banking and finance
sector. To explain the financial mess, we are told to look no further
than to the banditti and politics of major financial institutions. The
chief executive of a large Austrian banking group asserts the reason
behind the nationalization of a major bank there as follows: ‘‘It’s a
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bunch of scumbags—in terms of banking and in terms of politics—
from Austria, who have [teamed] up with scumbags from central and
eastern Europe and a couple of idiots from further west, and out of this
came [our] huge mess’’ (quoted in J. Wilson 2010).
That’s one way to put it: ‘‘The System’’ becomes just another syn-
drome. The road maps to market failure profited and corrupted those
who found ways to exploit market power, asymmetric information,
and externalities for their own advantage. That said, blaming politics,
dollars, and jerks may be true as far as it goes, but as an explanation it
certainly does not go far enough when it comes to the politics actually
constraining management and within which management has to work.
To understand such politics from a mess and reliability perspective, we
must understand the cultures and organizations in which we manage
across the performance modes available to us. This large topic has not
been considered in ways that illuminate the messes around us and the
demand for their reliable management. In reality, a politics of higher
volatility and fewer options saturates the mess and reliability space,
and we need to know why, if only to understand that the search for
better practices under such conditions is paramount.
This societal challenge goes well beyond pressuring mess managers
to operate reliably in areas where they have few known patterns and
scenarios to follow. They are not just being pushed deeper into igno-
rance from a shrinking domain of competence. Professionals are also
being required to accommodate, if not resolve procedurally and admin-
istratively, deep cultural and organizational differences. Many pro-
fessionals operate within organizational arrangements that ensure
interagency conflict with respect to the outputs and outcomes of their
reliability and mess management activities. Furthermore, these differ-
ing cultures and organizations generate the dimensions of this book’s
performance modes and the mess and reliability space. The politics of
higher volatility and fewer options is so challenging to managers be-
cause it strikes to the core of their management. Given the importance
of these issues, I focus the remainder of this chapter on them.
To summarize this subsection’s argument, our knowledge bases, the
scales at which we operate, and our views of what we take to be vol-
atility and options—what we take to be mess and reliability—come
from the cultures we subscribe to as well as the organizations in which
we manage across different performance modes. The approaches I
draw from are cultural theory, with its focus on competing hierarchist,
individualist, egalitarian, and fatalist cultures; James Q. Wilson’s ty-
pology of production, craft, procedural, and coping agencies, each with
a different orientation to organizational outputs and outcomes; and
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the performance modes discussed in this book. The first two ap-
proaches are already familiar to a good number of academically trained
policy analysts and public managers. As I show below, the four perfor-
mance modes fit into each type of organization, and all four types of
organization are nested in a hierarchist culture that is itself at funda-
mental odds with the other cultures important to managing our crit-
ical services reliably. This nesting and the differences realized along
the way are the source of what I call the politics of higher volatility and
fewer options. I am aware that the approaches I rely on here are ab-
stract and can be little more than heuristics in describing what is
admittedly, first to last, a messy policy world. Their great virtue, I
believe, and the reason I choose to focus on them rather than others, is
that their abstractions frame policy messes better than the other ap-
proaches.
Start with culture, a much-written-about topic for which we can be
much more specific when it comes to mess and reliability (for a fuller
discussion of cultural theory and points raised below, see Roe 1998).
The cultural theory of Mary Douglas and her colleagues, especially
Michael Thompson and the late Aaron Wildavsky, posits four basic
cultures, which are exceptionally useful to understanding the drive to
mess and reliability. The cultures are hierarchist, egalitarian, individu-
alist, and fatalist, each one defined by where people locate themselves
in terms of the degree of social constraints they face (‘‘grid’’) and the
degree of group cohesion with which they act (‘‘group’’):
[Mary Douglas] argues that the variability of an individual’s involvement in
social life can be adequately captured by two dimensions of sociality: group
and grid. Group refers to the extent to which an individual is incorporated
into bounded units. The greater the incorporation, the more individual
choice is subject to group determination. Grid denotes the degree to which
an individual’s life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions. . . .
Strong group boundaries coupled with minimal prescriptions produce social
relations that are egalitarian. Because such groups lack (as a consequence of
their low grid position) internal role differentiation, relations between
group members are ambiguous. . . . When an individual’s social environment
is characterized by strong group boundaries and binding prescriptions, the
resulting social relations are hierarchical. Individuals in this social context
are subject to both the control of other members in the group and the
demands of socially imposed roles. . . . Individuals who are bound by neither
group incorporation nor prescribed roles inhabit an individualistic social
context. In such an environment all boundaries are provisional and subject
to negotiation. . . . People who find themselves subject to binding prescrip-
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tions and are excluded from group membership exemplify the fatalistic way
of life. Fatalists are controlled from without. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildav-
sky 1990, 5–7)
To give an example, many people argue that the way to achieve better
policy design is to bring those street-level workers discussed earlier and
their frontline knowledge directly into the planning process (M. Hill
and Hupe 2002). Cultural theory asks which kind of street-level worker?
Burnt-out caseworkers (fatalist)? Policy entrepreneurs able to exploit
bureaucratic loopholes for their own advantage (individualist)? Advo-
cates of grass-roots participation in the community (egalitarian)? Or
those managers who know both the local and the official and how to
work within the confines of each (hierarchist)?
The four cultures reinforce each other as a plural value system: ‘‘Each
way of life needs each of its rivals, either to make up for its deficiencies,
or to exploit, or to define itself against. . . . Were egalitarians to elimi-
nate hierarchists and individualists, for instance, their lack of a target
to be against would remove the justification for their strong group
boundary and thus undermine their way of life’’ (Thompson, Ellis, and
Wildavsky 1990, 4). The cultural theorist recognizes that these cul-
tures are in important respects incommensurable and that there is no
way to reconcile one entirely to another. Alliances exist but are not
guaranteed to last. Wildavsky and other cultural theorists stress that
the breakdown of alliances and cultural polarization characterize
much of recent U.S. politics.
The incommensurability and pluralism of cultures are the armature
of policy messes, as both insist on differences in the knowledge we have
and in the scope over which we work, when it comes to what we dif-
ferently define as mess or reliability. They also insist that the ‘‘we’’ are
most certainly not homogeneous. But why are multiple ways of know-
ing and behaving possible? The answer is the same unstudied condi-
tions that prowl around our policy messes. ‘‘There is always enough
irreducible uncertainty in the world for us to be able to bias our convic-
tions this way or that,’’ according to Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky
(1990, 10). ‘‘All that cultural theory requires is that there always be some
uncertainty of this kind.’’ Cultural theory frames how unstudied condi-
tions serve as the initial conditions against which mess and reliability
are to be defined, as well as managed.
It is important to identify the orthogonal views that the four cultures
hold about how to manage needs and resources, because these views later
relate to volatility and options.∫ ‘‘Needs and resources,’’ Thompson, Ellis,
and Wildavsky maintain, ‘‘are socially constructed’’ (1990, 39).Ω Each cul-
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ture has its own ‘‘need-and-resource-managing strategy’’ (48). To cut to
the quick, fatalists believe you can manage neither your needs nor your
resources; egalitarians believe you can manage your needs, but not your
resources; hierarchists believe you can manage your resources, but not
your needs; and individualists believe you can manage both needs and
resources. When so, it is hardly surprising that mess results and that
the demands for reliability differ when interactions are driven by the
various management strategies of these four cultures (for details, see
Thompson 1993; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). We can see how
the interaction of differing strategies works by returning to chapter 3’s
example of overpopulation. For egalitarians, it is essential to reduce
what they take to be rapid population growth and numbers. That way
you reduce needs directly. They also believe that we must change what
we take to be our needs, the very notions of development and growth,
arguing that this is the only earth we have. Hierarchists, in contrast,
believe it is essential to set limits:
In the hierarchist’s social construction, development is certainly possible
but not everywhere. Development that strays outside the pocket of stability
. . . will be unsustainable and will have to be identified ahead of time and
guarded against. Indicators of sustainability, safe limits, thresholds, critical
loads, carrying capacities, statutory assessments of the risks and benefits of
new technologies, and a host of similar concepts and procedures are the
means by which this vital sorting is implemented. (Thompson 1993, 24)
Mess and reliability professionals are, in terms of cultural theory, pri-
marily hierarchists and thus unavoidably in conflict with the other
three cultures’ approaches to managing needs and resources. Not only
do these cultural differences influence what knowledge is and the scale
at which that knowledge applies in the mess and reliability space, but
they also influence the volatility in the tasks before managers and their
perception of the options they have to respond to that volatility in
terms of their performance modes.
Options and volatility, along with knowledge and scale, are not de-
termined by culture alone. The organizations in which we work and
those we interact with also differ in fundamental ways for reliability-
seeking mess managers. The late James Q. Wilson famously identified
four types of organizations in which we work (1989, 158–71). His typol-
ogy has two dimensions, outputs and outcomes—each distinguished
by whether or not it can be observed and monitored, and each of which
is crucial for networks of mess and reliability professionals. ‘‘Outputs
consist of what an agency does,’’ while outcomes involve ‘‘how, if at all,
the world changes because of the outputs. Outcomes can be thought of
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as the results of agency work’’ (158). For instance, the ‘‘outputs of
police officers are the radio calls answered, beats walked, tickets writ-
ten, accidents investigated, and arrests made. The outcomes (or re-
sults) are the changes, if any, in the level of safety, security, order, and
amenity in the community’’ (158–59).
Outputs and outcomes vary in the degree to which they can be
monitored and accounted for:
Outputs—work—may be hard to observe because what the operator does is
esoteric (for example, a doctor performing a diagnosis or a physicist de-
veloping a theory) or because the operator acts out of view of the manager
(for example, a police officer handling a family quarrel or a ranger supervis-
ing a forest). . . . Outcomes—results—may be hard to observe because the
organization lacks a method for gathering information about the conse-
quences of its actions (for example, a suicide-prevention agency may actu-
ally prevent suicides but it has no way of counting the number of potential
suicides that did not occur); because the operator lacks a proven means to
produce an outcome (for example, prison psychologists do not know how to
rehabilitate criminals); because the outcome results from an unknown com-
bination of operator behavior and other factors (for example, a child’s score
on a test reflects some mix of pupil intelligence, parental influence, and
teacher skill); or because the outcome appears after a long delay (for exam-
ple, the penalty imposed on a criminal may lead to a reduction—or even an
increase—in the offender’s behavior five years later). (159)
The two factors—outputs and outcomes—and the distinction between
those that are relatively easy or difficult to observe and monitor result
in four ideal types of organizations: ‘‘Agencies in which both outputs
and outcomes can be observed; agencies in which outputs but not
outcomes can be observed; agencies in which outcomes but not out-
puts can be observed; and agencies in which neither outputs nor out-
comes can be observed. . . . I have called the first kind of agency a
production organization, the second a procedural organization, the
third a craft organization, and the fourth a coping organization’’ (159).
Policy messes are inevitable when the different organizational types
connect under differing reliability requirements. Evaluators recom-
mend sophisticated monitoring, evaluation, and assessment systems
for a coping agency; outsiders insist that all best practices in craft agen-
cies be evidence-based, with measurable outputs and outcomes. Discre-
tion that professionals had is displaced by expert systems grounded in
algorithms. And what better way to create a mess for policy than ram-
ming the round peg of a coping organization into the square hole of a
production agency?
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Before the financial mess, many banks were taken to be production
organizations when they were not craft organizations: Among other
things, they produced interest on savings accounts, which were their
outputs, enabling account holders to support themselves, which was
the achievable outcome. Some of the underlying financial activities
were complex and sophisticated, requiring great skill, but the outcome
—we used the money for our livelihoods—was by and large observable
and measurable. The financial mess was in large part about how some
banks and investment firms became coping organizations—the messi-
est of Wilson’s four categories—when not procedural in orientation.
Some outputs and outcomes were not observable or measurable be-
cause the ‘‘it’’ involved was ambiguous. Just under what conditions are
‘‘tier one capital instruments’’ bank debt, equity, or something in be-
tween (see P. Davies et al. 2009)? Just what is the price of an illiquid
asset—is it determined by the market, auction, model, or bureaucrat
(Hughes 2008b, 2008c; Scannell 2008)?∞≠ Just when is a credit default
officially a default? One response to all the coping was the demand of
decisionmakers that banks be supervised and inspected more strin-
gently. While some banks resisted what they saw as heavy-handed,
day-to-day regulation, others have been more procedurally oriented in
following bailout stipulations.∞∞
Mess intensifies and amplifies because professional operating net-
works frequently include all four types of organizations, rendering the
task environment more volatile. The network for U.S. electricity grid
operations includes production organizations (for example, the pri-
vate generators), craft organizations (high-reputation engineering
units in distribution utilities), procedural organizations (state and fed-
eral regulators), and coping organizations (public health agencies
whose systems depend on reliable electricity). The financial sector is as
rich and messy in its organizational types and networks.
Now place in the midst of these cultures and organizations the per-
formance modes, in which operators perform differently depending on
the volatility of their task environment and the options they have to
respond with. That is, connect how these different cultures and organi-
zations operate in terms of managing just in case, just on time, just for
now, and just this way. When the performance categories are com-
bined along with the cultural and organizational types just mentioned,
we end up with the politics of higher volatility and fewer options.
From the perspective of this book, politics is better described heuris-
tically as the nesting of the three sets of preceding typologies, one
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Figure 6. Types of organizations and performance modes
in hierarchist culture
modes, as do the two other types of organizations. This composite of
differing organizations, each with their four performance modes, fits in
turn into the hierarchist culture, as that culture is the most organiza-
tional and best captures the heartland of mess and reliability profes-
sionals.∞≤ The resulting hierarchist culture is not homogeneous. Rather,
it consists of the interaction of production, procedural, craft, and cop-
ing organizations, each of which in turn, in order to be reliable, has to
have recourse to the four performance modes of just in case, just on
time, just for now, and just this way, as shown in figure 6.∞≥
Out of this mix come higher task environment volatility for those
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involved and fewer options agreed upon by them. The nesting of modes
and organizations within a culture that is itself at odds with the other
three means that knowledge and scale are rendered as complex, uncer-
tain, disputed, and/or incomplete in all the respects that matter. When
it comes to the dimensions of knowledge and scope of the mess and
reliability space of professional activities (figure 3), macro design will
invariably be populated by multiple, conflicting, and incomplete posi-
tions; patterns and scenarios connecting outputs and outcomes will be
uncertain, complex, or in conflict; and just what is happening in terms
of operator error may be known only to that operator. In like fashion,
the nested model in figure 6 captures the difference between the ways
many people, including experts, think bureaucracies should act and the
ways they actually act. For example, to revert to the academic litera-
ture, the Weberian bureaucracy is the hierarchist production agency
acting just in case and just this way, while the garbage can bureaucracy is
the hierarchist’s coping agency acting just for now or, at best, just on
time.
Because the resulting volatility is higher and the options fewer, mess
and reliability professionals often find themselves limited to working
only in that real-time reliability of just on time and just for now, with
the major risks of misjudgment and amplification of error that those
conditions entail. (This is why higher volatility and fewer options
should not be equated solely with just-for-now performance.) It is im-
portant to underscore that the limitations imposed by working with
others from different cultures and different organizations not only
increase the volatility but also circumscribe the agreed-upon set of op-
tions professionals have in responding to the volatility they face.∞∂
We must be careful here, however, because even as the politics per-
sist, nothing is static or unidirectional. Some options may increase,
others decrease. In terms of figure 3, learning is taking place in the
form of evolving better practices; the networked professionals add or
drop patterns and scenarios from their repertoires. It is altogether
possible that new networks or network members bring new options.
This is an empirical question that cannot be settled a priori.∞∑ The
overall societal challenge under conditions of higher volatility is thus
to ensure that the ‘‘fewer’’ available options are sufficient enough not
only to avoid prolonged stays in just-for-now performance but also to
keep managing flexibly just on time. That said, let there be no doubt
about the overall consequences of the politics. They are the hydraulics
that make it more difficult to preserve the good messes we have and to
ensure that the bad messes we face do not get worse. Margins for error
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have become tighter and the complexities to be managed within them
more difficult, which make the identification of better practices and
their evolution all the more important. I now turn to the major impli-




Many long-lived debates in public policy and management have been
fought at the extreme hubs of mess and reliability: Market versus Hier-
archy; Hierarchy versus Coordination; Coordination versus Regulation;
Regulation versus Technology. We are told that, when it comes to high
reliability of critical infrastructures, macro design should trump micro
behavior (think: operator error); alternatively, micro behavior must
drive macro design (think: self-organizing complex adaptive systems).
If only we designed efficient energy markets, the grid would basically
take care of itself; if only we had real-time metering in every household
and business, the grid would basically take care of itself; if only we
distributed multi-agent software to have the grid repair itself, the grid
would basically take care of itself; if only we took shortcuts to reliability
and got rid of all that mess in between, we’d be much better off. We
might as well be talking about who’s more likely to be in a Christian
heaven, Plato or Aristotle.
If we keep thinking like that, our critical services will shift from a
mess that can be managed to crises that can’t. The societal challenges
discussed above promise a grim enough picture for reliability manage-
ment in a persistently messy political economy. Gerard Corrigan, the
former head of the New York Federal Reserve and chair of the Basel
Committee on Banking Regulation, warns that when it comes to a new
financial regulatory regime, ‘‘the complexity quotient is now so great
that the risk of the laws of unintended consequences taking over the
process are very high. I wish that it were easier to get all the stuff out
there and digest it but we have to be realistic’’ (2010).
We must be realistic, but in response to the reality that matters. Say
you are on one of the upper floors of a skyscraper, looking out at the
morning. That is Reality Number One: You are the observing subject
looking on reality. After a moment, you realize that the spot in the
distance is actually a plane headed toward you in the World Trade
Center. That is Reality Number Two: You become the object of reality,
in the grip of the real and no longer the observer.∞ There is, however,
Reality Number Three. In this example, it is the reality of the air traffic
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controllers on 9/11. Neither the observer of the first reality nor the
object of the second, these professionals achieved the unprecedented
without incident that day. They were instructed to land all commercial
and general aviation aircraft in the United States—some 4,500 air-
craft—and they did so (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States 2004, 29). Without overdrawing the analogy, so
too do we demand that our professionals ‘‘land’’ those water, elec-
tricity, transportation, and telecommunications services—and many
other critical ones—every day without major incident.
It is one thing to recommend protecting mess and reliability manag-
ers and operators who are already here and educating others to succeed
them. It is a much different assignment to address what reliability-
seeking professionals should be doing in a world that draws them more
and more into those unchartered waters where their unique risk-
appraisal skills are no longer effective. How can they stay professional
in this changing world? The short answer is that they need to rethink
policy, management, and professionalism.
Rethinking Policy
Much of contemporary policy wants to be magic. I mean more than the
magic of macro and micro solutions, with their one-way alchemy to
success. Policy as practiced also has much to do with the conjurer’s
misdirection. The policy directs your attention to one area, while the
real action happens elsewhere. You focus on the hand of the policy-
maker when the other hand of professionals ensures that rabbits and
hats go together. Without this misdirection, how could policymakers
make things happen the way they want the rest of us to believe?
We were told by policymakers that we had to get the politics right:
How could we have the society we need without getting the right
political arrangements in place? Then we were told we had to get the
economics right: After all, you can’t repeal the business cycle; so get
the right economic arrangements in place and the politics will follow.
Now we’re told that we first have to get the science right: Dummy, it’s
politics and economics that have gotten us into this mess and will keep
us there, unless we start from what best science tells us. But the same
misdirection is still going on: European and American farm corpora-
tions continue to get their subsidies—whether that’s because agricul-
ture is politically important, food is economically important, or carbon
sequestration mandates it from high.
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Many public policy issues deserve better than sleights of hand. Pol-
icy messes have to be managed without the sorcery of sweeping them
away. Subsidies are a mess, but subsidy policy is not a policy unless its
messes can be managed. This is true even if the only time the rest of us
may be aware of those managers is when their management is under
threat. Yet it is unmanageability that increasingly grabs the profes-
sionals’ attention. Credit default swaps (cdss) grew to an unmanage-
able size off the balance sheets of banks, and part of the financial mess
has been the recognition that not enough management capacity ex-
isted to manage those swaps well (Dizard 2008; see also Tett 2009e).
‘‘The [banking] industry let the growth and complexity in new instru-
ments outstrip their economic and social utility as well as the opera-
tional capacity to manage them,’’ concludes the head of Goldman Sachs
(quoted in Jenkins 2009). A sudden, inexplicable plunge in the stock
market leads a government official to worry that ‘‘the market has
outpaced the ability of the infrastructure to handle it’’ (quoted in M.
Mackenzie and Sender 2010). From this perspective, why on earth
would we believe policy creates management when the policy ensures
that managers are not there at all or, if there, unable to realize the
objectives posed by policy? You would expect that after 2008, the
better management strategy for cdss would have been to focus policy
on filling the gaps or shortfalls in the requisite management expertise.
Instead, the focus has been primarily on the swaps themselves (see, for
example, fcic 2011), while at the same time the cds sector has be-
come more concentrated and interconnected (Noyer 2009), and thus
more intractable to being managed well. In fact, ‘‘most of the big US
banks got bigger after the financial crisis’’ rendering them now ‘‘too-
bigger-to-fail than before,’’ according to the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas (quoted in Nasiripour 2012).
The important corollary has been raised at several junctures in this
book: Arenas that contain no mess and reliability managers should be
no-go areas for policy and policymakers. Why knowingly enter arenas
that have no one there to manage the mess resulting from your entry?
Another example is helpful: A recent permutation of the debate over
the global carrying capacity has been the proposal that we should not
produce carbon dioxide emissions that exceed an atmospheric thresh-
old of 450 parts per million or lower (see, for example, McKibben 2007,
39). If adopted, the only thing such a design principle would ensure is
all manner of unintended socioeconomic consequences across hetero-
geneous regions of the world, merely a scintilla of the costs of which
would be borne by the proposal’s proponents. No cadre of managers
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exists or is being trained that could competently carry out such a
design principle. No one has the skills or training to modify it in light
of regional differences, to determine the real patterns its implementa-
tion would cause across the globe, and to translate these patterns into
context-sensitive case scenarios.
I repeat: There is no one—and certainly not those who insist the
standard should instead be lowered to 350 parts per million (see Han-
sen et al. 2008; Revkin 2009).≤ To adopt such a ‘‘policy’’ is to trick
ourselves into believing it even qualifies as policy—that is, a course of
action that can be managed with any kind of realism known to human
beings (see Geuss 2008 on the importance of realism to what he terms
‘‘real politics’’). To counter by saying that we have no choice but to
manage to such a standard because ‘‘failure is not an option’’ is rub-
bish. It is precisely because failure is always ‘‘an option’’ that profes-
sionals manage as reliably as they can in order to prevent it. That in
turn means they know the mess they are in, the practices that work to
ameliorate it, and the specifics of how those better practices have to be
modified—region by region, case by case. What should really scare us is
that the total absence of such knowledge is the chief feature of his-
tory’s ‘‘desperate measures for desperate times.’’ (When you think
about it, what better way, save nuclear war, to bring the governments
of the world to their collective knees than geoengineering ‘‘solutions’’
like those that would engorge the skies with mirrors and the seas with
iron, all because global climate change left humanity no choice—no al-
ternative—but to be unreliable on unprecedented scales?)≥
Rethinking Management
Some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and
law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the statesman.
But to insist upon establishing, and upon establishing all at once, and in
spite of all opposition, every thing which that idea may seem to require,
must often be the highest degree of arrogance.—Adam Smith (1759)
Instead of operating on the assumption that reliability depends on
macro designers getting it right from the start, wouldn’t it make for
better management by bringing critical service professionals into the
planning and operational process from the outset? This way, so the
argument runs, you reduce the chances of management error later on,
because those doing the planning and managing would work together
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from the very beginning. ‘‘Apparently you can get to the top [in bank-
ing and finance] without ever having experienced all these things that
the people below you do,’’ the vice chairman of the congressional com-
mission on the financial crisis concluded (quoted in Politi, Guerrera,
and Rappeport 2010).
It should go without saying that program designers have prevented
big mistakes by consulting managers and operators ahead of time. A
closer look at the mess and reliability space, though, should disabuse
the reader of the view that this is the standpoint forward. We can no
more expect designers to distill principles from the unique knowledge
bases and better practices of the professionals in the middle (between
the macro and the micro) than we can expect those professionals to
apply principles in an unadulterated form (by bypassing the middle).
We can no more expect each micro operator to be representative of any
better practice than we can expect the professionals in the middle
domain to satisfy every micro operator out there. Remember: The
reasons we need reliable mess managers lie in the risks and hazards
posed by design—and by reactive micro operations from the other
side—to reliability management under messy conditions.
To believe that macro design changes in light of actual micro opera-
tions is misleading in the extreme. Yes, we know of cases where sce-
nario formulation feeds back into macro design (for example, when the
weight of legal interpretation leads to eventual change in the law) and
where pattern recognition feeds back into micro operations (such as
when overwhelming public opinion changes an individual’s belief). But
if you want design to learn from practice, that design has to be cen-
tered on professionals in the middle. ‘‘Maybe it is time to bring more
private sector bankers with a practical understanding of markets back
into monetary policy,’’ writes John Plender, a Financial Times colum-
nist. ‘‘Poachers turned gamekeepers might teach the academic central
bankers a bit of common sense’’ (2010a). Operational redesign, not
macro design, is the name of this search and hunt, as networked man-
agers skilled in pattern recognition, scenario formulation, and their
translation transform the original assumptions of policymakers and
lawgivers into reliable services. Operational redesign, to be specific, is
the addition, subtraction, and adjustment of practices and scenarios
within the professionals’ repertoire. The implications for regulation
are substantial. Of course, regulations, once published, need to be
altered in light of emerging better practice; otherwise, they’d be a
wheelbarrow without handles, hardly fit for their purpose.
That said, improved macro-design principles as principles are desir-
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able for mess and reliability management, three of which I will touch
on here (Roe and Schulman 2008). First—as a matter of principle—
context and time matter: as we have seen in this book, system knowl-
edge has to accommodate local knowledge in order to be able to man-
age. Second—again as a matter of principle—every design proposal
must pass the ‘‘reliability matters’’ test. Would the proposal, when
implemented, reduce the volatility that professional managers and
their networks face? Does it increase the options they can use to
respond to volatility? Does it increase their maneuverability in re-
sponding to different, often unpredictable or uncontrollable, perfor-
mance conditions? To be clear, the role of mess and reliability profes-
sionals in such a test is to assess and operationally redesign the policy
and management proposals of senior officials. In principle, the test of
efficacy is not ‘‘Have we designed a system that can be managed?’’ but
rather ‘‘Is this a system we can manage to redesign?’’
Third—as a final matter of principle—any design that compels oper-
ators to work for an extended period of time in a task environment
outside their domain of competence cannot be expected to produce or
sustain a system of reliable services. It is true that a crisis by definition
compels professionals to work beyond the limits of the known, and
even of the knowable—but management professionalism alone cannot
keep that kind of coping under way indefinitely.
What precisely is the point at which designers and managers can
engage with each other more productively? Return for the moment to
the mess and reliability space. When macro designers and middle pro-
fessionals meet, those consultations should be around the only real
contact point between the two hubs in that space: design principles
modified in light of local conditions as contingency scenarios (for prin-
ciples as interpretative concepts, see MacCormick 2007). The motivat-
ing question of such interactions centers on what one policy academic
has called ‘‘implementation robustness’’ (Bardach 2005, 33–34): How
can that macro design apply here in the face of these contingencies?
The answer also includes an eye on modifying system-wide better
practices for that local case at hand. Just as policy is not really policy
unless it can be modified in light of its actual application (see Shackle
1969, 277), design should not be treated as design unless it is open to
and can accommodate local contingency scenarios and better practices
not originally planned for. Design that cannot be managed through
operational redesigns is better thought of not as design but as surface
pieties so void of content as to be outside any knowledge base for
reliability with which humans are acquainted.
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What do I mean by ‘‘contingency’’? In 2006, Warren Buffett gave the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation $31 billion. Buffett was the first to
interest Bill Gates in setting up a foundation—through the chance sug-
gestion that Gates read a piece of conventionalized policy analysis. ‘‘Mr.
Gates credited Mr. Buffett for encouraging him, in the early 1990’s, to
read a copy of the World Development Report, put out by the World
Bank, that analyzed poverty levels around the world, thus sparking his
interest in philanthropy,’’ according to a New York Times report (L.
Thomas 2006; see also Leonhardt 2007). When one adds the Buffett
contribution to the Gates Foundation’s already large endowment, that
World Bank report may be the single most important item ever pro-
duced by the bank, and that occurred by happenstance. Contingency
matters; it need only happen once for it to be possible again.
If, as suggested above, a few macro-design principles for manage-
ment are possible, what about the task of managing for better micro
operations at the individual level? After all, we start in the workplace
not as full-blown professionals but as learners at the micro level. ‘‘Hu-
man nature no where exists in the abstract,’’ the Scottish philosopher
Adam Ferguson tells us, ‘‘and human virtue is attached, in every par-
ticular instance, to the use of particular materials, or to the application
of given materials to particular ends’’ (1792, 2:419). Just what kind of
individual psychology can we bring to the workplace that would make
us better mess and reliability professionals? What psychological orien-
tations enable the creativity, flexibility, and networking that are very
much part of mess and reliability management? The literature offers at
least one suggestion: Excel in improvisation; make do with what comes
to hand so as to avoid worse.
In a favorite passage of mine, the Austrian philosopher and social
scientist Otto Neurath compared an individual’s experience in the
world to that of sailors on the ocean:
Imagine sailors who, far out at sea, transform the shape of their vessel. . . .
They make use of some drifting timber, besides the timber of the old struc-
ture, to modify the skeleton and the hull of their vessel. But they cannot put
the ship in dock in order to start from scratch. During the work they stay on
the old structure and deal with heavy gales and thundering waves. In trans-
forming their ship they take care that dangerous leakages do not occur. A
new ship grows out of the old one, step by step—and while they are still
building, the sailors may already be thinking of a new structure, and they
will not always agree with one another. The whole business will go on in a
way we cannot even anticipate today. (1944, 47)
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Today professionals are out at sea, where returning to port for repairs
is not possible; we repair the ship with what is at hand,∂ tacking and
improvising where necessary, and sometimes we even come out with
something better than we had before or would have achieved by other
means.
In a contingent world, real-time improvising in the face of what
people cannot fully anticipate becomes its own version of the profes-
sional as a resilient self. (Or, from the other side, having designs that
work as planned is only one of the many contingencies we prepare for.)
Operators and managers are improvisers skilled at bricolage.∑ Their
management world looks considerably less like Theodor Adorno’s to-
tally administered society than the cluttered studios of the artists
Edgar Degas and Francis Bacon, or those traffic jams in Lagos that
street vendors capitalize on. It is a political economy, as we saw in
chapter 1, in which clutter is used for differing ends depending on how
the clutter has been sorted.
Adam Phillips helps us here. What he calls ‘‘the contingent self’’ is
someone who makes use of the luck, accidents, and coincidences that
come along (1994, 20) in the networks and domain of competence where
he or she is working. Such improvising, particularly the just-on-time
assembling of diverse options, is found in the real-time management of
critical infrastructures and large sociotechnical systems. Professionals
are eager to turn the mess of contingency into the management of re-
liability.∏ This contingent self, to put it in different terms, looks in to the
self and out to network relations. In much the same way, improvisation
looks inward to one’s flexibility and outward to all that interaction that
comes with repairing the ship at sea—the to-and-fro or, in the original
economic sense, the tâtonnement of negotiating.
This contingent improvisation comes with a decided twist, however.
Our professional networks are, in an important sense, like the in-
frastructures that support us: Both are ways to protect ourselves. We
need their help because we lack options and they provide them. But we
do not want a network of professionals just to help manage reliably; we
want the network to help us decide what really needs to be reliable in
the first place. In formal terms, the network stabilizes the dimensions
of the mess and reliability space and performance modes, so that the
managers involved can reconcile the patterns and scenarios reliably
and maneuver across performance modes as conditions warrant. Being
embedded in a network of reciprocating professionals reduces the
costs of transactions in mess and reliability management—not just
because other professionals are helping you to be reliable, but also
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because they are deciding what you and they need to keep reliable.
Team situational awareness is a classic example of this reciprocation
(Garbis and Artman 2004). To put it realistically, the network produces
us as professionals; we know ourselves in relation to what the others in
the network come to know about and expect from us. In this way, it is
the network that improvises the manager. The reliable mess manager
is both improviser and improvisation.π
It is worth pausing for a moment to ask ourselves: Who is the op-
posite of an improviser and improvisation? Improvisers not only think
they are in the midst of a mess, they know it. What they do not know is
how to get out of it other than by managing the mess with others.
Their opposites, then, would be those individuals who know we are in a
mess, know it has to be cleaned up, know exactly how to do that, and
know that they alone are the ones to do it. We call these individuals
without networks paranoiacs.
They are often us. How many times have we heard or said something
like ‘‘If implemented as planned . . . ,’’ ‘‘Assuming proper ethics . . . ,’’ or
‘‘Given the right prices . . . ‘‘—thereby only demonstrating that we
ourselves are deluded by such weasel words? ‘‘If implemented as
planned,’’ when we know that is exactly the assumption we cannot
make. ‘‘Assuming proper ethics,’’ when we know it is unethical to leave
it at that without specifying just what those ethics are, case by case.
‘‘Given the right prices,’’ when we know not only that markets in the
real world often do not clear (supply and demand do not equate at a
single price)—and even when they do, their ‘‘efficiencies’’ can under-
mine the very markets that produce those prices (more below). All
these givens end up little more than the magical thinking of a primi-
tive people. We could as well believe that the surest way to heat the
house in winter is by striking a match under the porch thermometer.
‘‘How is it . . . that we still remain barbarians?’’ asked the German
polymath Friedrich Schiller at the end of the eighteenth century. It is
because many of us continue to assume superior knowledge that we
actually do not have. ‘‘The paranoiac is the person who has really
noticed what a mess we are in and knows that the only sense he is
going to get is the sense that he can make. . . . The modern paranoiac
has realized that since God is dead someone has got to be god. Some-
one has to know what is going on, and there has to be a something that
is going on,’’ writes Phillips (2006, 268). The paranoiac calls for auto-
matic, binding, and unchangeable rules, hardwired into law as if that
were enough to propel us ahead toward where we must arrive. Reality
Number Three indicates otherwise: ‘‘Outside the paranoid map there
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[is] the mess of contingency, and the contingency of mess’’ (267)—that
is, the world of chance, accident, and luck in which improvising profes-
sionals find themselves. It is this world that cultivates their sense of
realism, which teaches that little can ever be finished and that a lot
must be cobbled together with the competencies we have as a way of
managing things, now and as a way of moving ahead.
Rethinking Professionalism
In the film Dr. Strangelove (1964), a darkly humorous example of failed
management occurs when General ‘‘Buck’’ Turgidson warns President
Muffley that planes containing nuclear weapons are about to strike
inside Russia, due to an order given by a rogue general barely holding
on to his sanity. When Muffley hears this news, he explodes at Turgid-
son, saying, ‘‘When you instituted the human reliability tests, you
assured me there was no possibility of such a thing ever occurring!’’ In
response, Turgidson replies, ‘‘Well, I, uh, don’t think it’s quite fair to
condemn a whole program because of a single slip-up, sir.’’ Sadly, Presi-
dent Muffley is not the only one who has been shocked and awed by
expert promises of perfectible reliability. How can professionals sur-
vive in such a world and still claim professionalism? To put it formally,
how do you remain professional in a politics of higher volatility and
fewer options so as to avoid dumbing down, prolonged deskilling, and
the sheer idiocy of happy talk?
The worst thing that can be said about any professional is that he or
she is naïve or unaware of his or her own naïveté. The professional is
not indifferent to reality. It is unprofessional to operate in Reality
Numbers One and Two, when the demands are for Reality Number
Three. Working in the latter requires a professionalism that under-
stands that the policy world does not fail because pattern recognition
falls short of macro design. There is always a gap between design and
practice when it comes to hard issues requiring reliable management.
Effectiveness and professionalism are not measured by how close man-
agement can bring practice to design, but rather by how well pattern
and scenario are transformed into reliable service provision. You insist
as a matter of principle that less government and small public sectors
are better. I counter with evidence that large public sectors are not
inimical to increases in the growth of economic markets and labor
productivity (Kearney 2002; Lindert 2004; Wolf 2005). But I cannot
convert that empirical finding into a design principle, and you have not
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shown how your principle need not be modified for the cases I am
talking about.
The professionalism we have been discussing in this book is not
without its limitations. Reliable mess managers run the risks of be-
coming complacent, misjudging the situation, backing themselves into
a corner, and failing to secure compliance when it is needed most.
Where mess and reliability professionals differ from the macro de-
signer and street-level worker, who make comparable mistakes, is in
the former’s value pluralism of having to accommodate competing
macro principles in the midst of conflicting patterns and context-
specific scenarios (see chapter 3). This value pluralism means that
there is no stable resting point along a gradient of formal to informal
professionalism: From this book’s perspective, macro design formal-
izes as a principle what professionals cannot help but treat more infor-
mally as localized contingency scenarios, while micro operations treat
informally what professionals cannot help but treat more formally
when they talk about emerging patterns and practices across cases.
This can’t but be a messy business.
The middle domain of competence demands a skill base that serves
as its own form of realism when it comes to managing the risks of
operating there rather than elsewhere in the mess and reliability space.
The skills isolate the essential differences between good and bad mess
management. Think of bad and worse management as gravitating to
the corners of the mess and reliability space outside the domain of
competence, while good and better mess management resides very
much within the domain. It cannot be said often enough that within
that domain, mess and reliability managers grapple with all manner of
consequences of macro design and micro behavior—intended and un-
intended, conscious and unconscious, systemwide and local—in ways
and with others that tie them together, strongly and weakly, con-
tingently or not, as professionals obligated by law, regulation, or mis-
sion to provide services reliably.
What does this actually mean for rethinking professionalism? Fore-
most, when confronted with a policy mess, we look for better practices
that we can modify in light of our local contingency scenarios. Such
practices, to repeat, have jumped a higher bar in the midst of politics,
dollars, and jerks that we too face in our own case (assuming those are
the politics that continue to preoccupy you). This search for better
practices should be a no-brainer, but sadly it isn’t. To return one last
time to the healthcare mess: If it is true, as we are told, that the United
States spends roughly $7,000 on healthcare per person each year while
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the rest of the developed world spends $3,500 per person and provides
more universal healthcare (Peterson 2009), why wouldn’t we hire those
developed-world experts to draft our healthcare proposal?∫ The last
thing Americans should want to do on their own is design their federal
healthcare system.
More generally, why would you assume that alternatives to the status
quo do not exist, without first seeing what other people facing similar
messes are doing or have done, from which you could learn something
useful? Margaret Thatcher was dubbed ‘‘Tina,’’ so frequently did she
insist, ‘‘There is no alternative.’’ The social and legal critic Roberto
Mangabeira Unger argues that the dilemma people face today is ‘‘the
dictatorship of no alternatives’’: ‘‘All over the world, people complain
that their national politics fail to deliver real alternatives’’ (2005, 1). Nor
is he the only commentator to make this point (see, for example, Runci-
man 2012). But if we actually looked ‘‘all over the world,’’ we would find
much by way of existing alternatives and practices potentially useful to
our own management. One of the founders of pragmatism, William
James, used to remind his audience that this philosophy is ‘‘the habit of
always seeing an alternative’’ (quoted in Mustain 2011, 119). It is bad
enough that management occurs without any guarantees, but why
would we start out blind to what works?
There is no Mallory’s camera to capture success or failure in our
professionalism. (In 1924 two British mountain climbers, George Mal-
lory and Andrew Irvine, attempted to conquer Mount Everest. No one
really knows which man, if either, made it to the top, though people
hoped that Mallory’s missing Kodak would be discovered and provide
the definitive answer.) We can produce no picture to demonstrate that
our policy messes are being reliably sorted out. What matters is that
we do not manage poorly when we could have managed better. That is
the message of this book. A group of banking and finance professionals
put it this way: ‘‘What matters most in order to make sense of reality
(which is inherently non-transparent to policy makers and the public
alike) and of policy makers’ behaviour is a coherent frame of reasoning
to interpret the subset of relevant information through clear mes-
sages’’ (Issing et al. 2005, 38). By this point in the book, I hope you
understand that mess management is a coherent frame of reasoning.
So what in the end is expected of us as professionals? Clearly, a
willingness to work under real-time pressures and know the difference
between just on time and just for now is a start. Understanding the
factors that pull you to just on time, as well as those that push you into
just for now, is also important. A good grasp of how risk and ignorance
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differ and what makes for Reality Number Three is just as significant.
Never far away is a high tolerance for surprise and a genuine capacity
to take advantage of setbacks. ‘‘What are we missing?’’ is always a good
question to ask about any mess you and your network are asked to
manage. In short, the better you and your network are at performing
cross-scale, context-dependent, case-by-case analysis, the better off we
all will be for your professionalism, given our political economy and
the realism it requires of you. What this means, in practice, is that
professionals have a strong aversion to macro designers or micro oper-
ators who insist on magicking a way to reliability. An article in the
Financial Times, ‘‘Scientists to Face Legal Action over [Their] Bangla-
desh Water Survey,’’ guides us here (Tait 2003). The scientists surveyed
the groundwater but did not test for the arsenic in their water supply.
Many of our politicians and pundits have committed comparable of-
fenses.Ω They insist that the water is never purer than at the well-
springs of uniform principle and individual experience—but they are
paid to know better. The arsenic when it comes to reliability manage-
ment is also at its strongest there and needs to be diluted with huge
flows of more and different knowledge. The mess starts at the source,
not downstream. To willfully ignore or otherwise dismiss this borders
on the criminal. Even ‘‘acting in good faith’’ with respect to the law
means more than behaving with a ‘‘pure heart and empty head’’ (Menn
2012, 5).
All of this is essential to appreciate if we are to determine whether
the financial mess and its aftermath are being managed well rather
than poorly, the topic to which we turn in the final chapter. First,
though, allow me to summarize the argument with respect to the
societal and professional challenges facing those who are or aspire to
be reliable mess managers.
Summary of the Challenges Professionals Face
I see four challenges confronting professionals in policy and manage-
ment today. They must manage better the complexity of the issues
with which they deal; build up their analytic and management capacity
for addressing the issues (most important, through their contact net-
works); capitalize more on diverse communities and stakeholders
when doing so (here, diversity refers to cultures, organizations, and
performance conditions); and operate in real time much more effec-
tively than often has been the case (Roe and Lindquist 2003).
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Caught as professionals are in a world of unavoidably multiple cul-
tures and different organizations requiring them to work across multi-
ple performance modes, they manage complexity by translating system
patterns and localized contingency scenarios into reliable service provi-
sion. Professionals build capacity, both analytic and managerial, be-
cause working in the middle, between patterns and scenarios, depends
on being connected and networked to others who can help identify,
assess, and ensure reliable services. Since no one professional can have
all the required knowledge, it’s the network(s) you must look for.∞≠
Making the most of diversity means engaging the other cultures and the
other types of organizations in which you are networked, since although
they increase volatility, they also offer the possibility of new resources
and better practices. Last, the ability to operate in real time is imperative
because of that increased volatility and the fewer options that are often at
hand when working with multiple cultures, multiple organizations, and
the networks that involve both. In effect, the four professional challenges
center on managing the inevitable setbacks along the way and making
the most of them by pulling the good from the bad.
What does this add up to? Most, if not all, readers have heard or said
something like ‘‘the biggest problem we have is implementing policy.’’
Actually, that’s wrong. The biggest problem is to adapt better practices,
where they exist, to policy and management issues faced locally, and to
do that we must address better the four specific challenges just sketched.
This entails a lot of hard work, but that work is more to the point and far
more exciting than the junk mail that passes for much of present policy.
Of course, there remains that illusion of policy as a mailbox in which we
send and receive important messages, including from time to time un-
important ones. But have you noticed just how mismatched many free-
standing mailboxes are and the houses they stand in front of, at least in
parts of the United States? The mailbox is weathered, rusting, flaked, or
chipped, while the house behind is much more interesting or cared for.
Contrary to the illusion, many policymaking processes are in reality just
such poor specimens of mailboxes—and who manages mailboxes any-
way? They scarcely reflect, let alone match, all the busy, domestic life
going on behind them, that domain honeycombed as it is with context
and practices.
If professionals and their networks meet the four professional chal-
lenges, they will be in a much better position to make time to do the
analysis and management they have been trained to do. I would go
further. Not only can they free up time for more analysis, but meeting
the four challenges also makes them better able to address that gap
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between outputs and outcomes discussed in the previous chapter. The
bold premise in direct macro-to-micro ‘‘solutions’’ has been that macro
design produces outputs at the micro-operations level that lead to
desired policy outcomes. Yet the gap between actual outputs and de-
sired outcomes persists and even grows under conventional analytical
and management approaches for our political economies.
The truth is that mess and reliability management can realize out-
comes that macro design only promises. Network-centered decision-
making, as we saw, can produce better impacts than a problem-centered
approach, when the activities (outputs) undertaken become part and
parcel of outcomes that those involved may not have originally planned
for but end up knowing they require. This is especially the case when
the contrasting problem-centered decisionmaking is reduced to just-
for-now performance: ‘‘I’m only asking for a temporary fix here!’’ We
have seen how network-centered decisionmaking could instead have
led to more options-rich, just-on-time behavior under the same pres-
sures of urgency. Participatory action research is full of cases of net-
works of community members undertaking activities that lead to new
and more achievable ends than initially conceived (see Minkler and
Wallenstein 2008). People come to know what they are able to analyze
and manage in ways that matter to them when it most matters to them.
Finally, those terms ‘‘just on time’’ and ‘‘just for now’’ seem to smack
of short-termism, don’t they? Nothing in this book, however, reduces
to ‘‘short term trumps long term,’’ when it comes to being a profes-
sional. There is no argument here that ‘‘since nothing is going to end
well, all we can expect from professionals is short-term relief.’’ Better
practices, after all, emerge across both time and scale, and when draw-
ing on and modifying those practices to manage the mess at hand, we
seek to exploit an informational advantage commonly associated with
both the longer term and the larger scale. In fact, you can see mess and
reliability management in real time as a no-regrets strategy. No set of
engineers can build a bridge to withstand the loads it must take once it
is operational, unless that bridge can first take greater loads placed on
it when it is being built.∞∞ Whether the long run can be guaranteed or
not, it is best to manage reliably in real time, whatever the stage of
development or operation. In fact, how is a reliable long run possible, if
the short-run messes can’t be managed better now?
But to recognize such challenges means that the reader must look
for and acknowledge them. You must also do the radical work of under-
standing how your survival requires the survival of messy sociotechni-
cal systems and their reliability managers, without which most of us
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would have few chances in life—let alone critical services when we
need them. And just what is this radical work? President Dwight Eisen-
hower’s farewell speech in January 1961 is best remembered for his
warning about the military-industrial complex. But he had another
caution for listeners that night. The president warned about the ‘‘dan-
ger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-
technological elite.’’∞≤ This is the elite that promises few surprises and
setbacks along the way, since—not to worry—they know what they are
doing. I can think of no more important policy mess facing our politi-
cal economy than the challenge of managing this aroused priesthood
and its biddable congregants.
These would be fine words with which to end, were it not for drawing
out the implications of this chapter and the preceding ones for this
book’s primary case study, the financial mess. I have beaten ceos,
regulators, and lawgivers about the shoulders, but when will we know
it is time to stop? Just how will we know that the messes left us by the
financial upheaval are in fact being managed well rather than poorly? I
conclude this book with some answers.
EIGHT
HOW WE KNOW THAT THE POLICY MESS
IS MANAGED BETTER
Several years after the 2008 meltdown, a senior investment officer of
one of the largest pension systems felt compelled to ask: ‘‘What if the
global financial crisis is not over?’’ (Dear 2011). Nor was he alone in
thinking that the aftermath debt crises had their roots in the melt-
down (Das 2011). To see if and how a policy mess is being managed
well, let’s return one last time to the financial mess and ask: What
would we be looking for to show that it’s being better managed?
First, we would have started to hear more about better practices
emerging in the banking and finance sector, along with differentiated
scenarios for modifying or applying those practices. We would also be
hearing about subsystem scales of governance and management at
which these practices actually work for the better. If and when this
happens, regional or subsectoral banking differences will be said to
matter greatly when it comes to adapting practices on the ground (see,
for example, Beattie 2009). This means we wouldn’t hear the panic
rhetoric of late 2008, when senior officials said that they had all the
tools they needed to manage the systemic event. As the Federal Re-
serve chair Ben Bernanke told us in late 2008: ‘‘I strongly believe that
we now have the tools we need to respond with the necessary force’’
(quoted in Guha and van Duyn 2008).∞ Only at the end of his tenure as
Secretary of the Treasury did Henry Paulson admit that he and others
had no such tools at the start of the crisis (Guha 2008b). Only in 2010
testimony do we find another federal regulator—Sheila Bair, chair of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—stating unequivocally
that ‘‘regulators were wholly unprepared and ill-equipped for a sys-
temic event that initially destroyed liquidity in the shadow banking
system and subsequently spread to the largest firms throughout the
financial system’’ (quoted in Braithwaite 2010, 4).
When it comes to managing policy messes, no tool is a tool until it has
been operationally redesigned by those who have alloyed system-wide
practices into prevailing practice locally (see, as an example, the lch.
Clearnet and Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation example in
chapter 4). Whether such translations have become widespread since
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the financial mess remains an open question. Prices generated by com-
puter models rather than historical prices continue to be a vital part of
financial services in the United States, such as mutual funds (Kaplan,
Merton, and Richard 2009). Credit default swaps, notwithstanding
their documented shortcomings (van Duyn 2010b), remain the basis for
ranking some European nations as riskier than ‘‘top’’ corporations
(Oakley 2010). Credit ratings agencies are still taken seriously when
they threaten to lower the ratings of countries that their errors helped
send into financial free fall. Now that some developed-country bonds
are no longer as reliable as they were in terms of providing that ‘‘risk-
free rate’’ against which investors benchmark other assets (Hughes
2010), pressure has been growing for alternatives—including the rates
associated with those credit default swaps that helped bring finance to
its knees. In such a world, headlines about how the poor and immiser-
ated will have to depend even more on discredited financial instru-
ments—such as ‘‘Microfinance Group in cdo Scheme’’ (O’Connor and
Grene 2009, 24)—do little to reassure us. ‘‘Fat tail’’ events may drive
extreme financial change; it is another thing to ensure that the tails are
obese. Yet such is what is happening after years of increasing the money
supply through central bank buying of government securities and other
securities under prolonged just-for-now quantitative easing (see, for
example, D. Mackenzie 2012).
We will know the financial mess and its aftermath are being man-
aged better when the role of regulation is rethought. The calls for this
or that regulator of systemic risk in the financial sector have been
insistent (see Dombret and Tucker 2012). Yet we have seen how the
greater systemic risk lies at the inter-infrastructural level where fi-
nance interconnects with other critical infrastructures, most impor-
tantly electricity and telecommunications (chapter 2). No regulators
exist for such intersections, and were they to exist, their real-time
regulatory challenge would be amplified by orders of magnitude. Who
is to monitor the impact of electricity and telecoms on finance, and
vice versa? Who is to demonstrate that the polluter-pays model from
the environmental sector would be effective if applied to the financial
sector—in other words, making the financial industry pay for its mis-
takes as a polluting company is supposed to (Labaton 2009)? It is not
credible that any regulator would be as skilled in real-time pattern
recognition and scenario formulation as the operators in the critical
infrastructures are, when it comes to managing the unforeseen set-
backs and redesigning operations due to interactions with other in-
frastructures.
Above I discussed the principle- versus rule-based approaches to
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regulation, noting that the latter reduces the regulatory discretion
permitted by the former. But when regulators operate outside their
domain of competence and in the absence of practice-tolerant policies
and protocols, as in the financial mess (fcic 2011), what is going on
scarcely constitutes discretion. ‘‘Discretion,’’ to reiterate, is a property
of the domain of competence and is required when policy is out of date
with respect to prevailing practice or not structured to be sufficiently
sensitive to local context. When policy exists but competence cannot,
then ‘‘regulation’’ indeed deserves to be put in quote marks. Better,
then, that regulators in the financial sector refocus their efforts to-
ward protecting the mess and reliability professionals already present
or nurturing those who are emerging.
Critics counter that the real problem is that regulation is always
reactively late or simply unable to prevent the determined fraudster. If
that is true, why then aren’t the psychiatrists and historians in charge
of regulation? After all, they thrive on taking a second look, and they
are rarely surprised when people and institutions prevaricate. My
point here is that no amount of preexisting legal theory or regulatory
law can substitute for practices evolving across cases that now exist, or
for that deep knowledge and familiarity that contextualize law and
regulation in real time, case by case. This means the financial mess, like
any major policy mess, will be better managed when we observe, as an
analogue to real-time ecology and real-time economics, real-time reg-
ulation on its way to becoming a full-fledged profession. Some of the
first signs of this happening will be when far more finance economists
and mbas start taking banking and investment supervision and in-
spection far more seriously (see Masters 2012a).
What do I mean by ‘‘seriously’’? All too often, the reliability of finan-
cial transactions has been treated as if it can be traded off against some
service attribute like the efficiency of transactions. In fact, the re-
liability of critical infrastructures is a state condition without which
there would be no markets. Economics assumes a theory of substituta-
bility, where goods and services have alternatives in the marketplace;
reliability, on the other hand, assumes a theory of nonfungibility,
where nothing can substitute for the reliability without which there
would be no market infrastructure for selecting among alternatives.
What, indeed, is money without the reliable institutions that secure it
as a means of payment, unit of account, and store of value (Münchau
2010)? Economists object by insisting ‘‘we pay for the level of reliability
we get’’ (as if reliability were thoroughly fungible).≤ But somewhere in
their line of argument, the same economists also insist on the neces-
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sity of ‘‘secure property rights,’’ when what they really mean is that a
hugely reliable infrastructure of contract law, insurance, and registra-
tion must be in place and ‘‘always on’’ (for example, de Soto 2012, 9). As
the financial crisis showed (see, for example, Hughes 2008a), if we
destroy the underlying reliability of market mechanisms, we end up
with financial products that have no reliably determined price. Econo-
mists and business schools may have to put this acknowledgment of
the seriousness of reliability in econo-speak—think of reliability as a
public good, a positive externality (like education), an insurance pre-
mium that society pays for having its critical infrastructures work, a
solution to network externalities, a hurdle fee that has to be met
before performance and service are provided, or some other economis-
tic formulation≥—but if they take it seriously, reliability management
by professionals will have a better chance of being more effective in
banking and finance.
We’ll know that the financial mess has been managed better when
efforts are made to rebuild a sector that can be managed and that
regulators can comprehend (see Krugman 2008b). Think of the worst
thing that could happen in the electricity grid: Blackouts ripple through
the system to the point that the grid collapses. When this happens, grid
managers have to recover the system, line by line, and the actual se-
quence of the process is rarely predetermined. (Indeed, the probability
of failure may well be higher in restoration than during ‘‘normal opera-
tions.’’) Each real-time decision—this line rather than that line—has to
be thought about carefully and by teams, as a mistake could mean
having to start restoring the system all over again. The same is true with
the financial sector. Yet ‘‘there are few initiatives to overhaul the ‘grid’
of the financial system,’’ according to the chief risk officer at a major
international bank (Banziger 2012).
The financial mess has been managed better if and when we learn
that the sector is in fact being restored bank by bank, firm by firm.
This, in turn, puts the premium on working through each recapitaliza-
tion initiative, one by one. What is needed for the postfinancial crisis,
according to the former chair of the U.K. Financial Services Authority,
is ‘‘a plan, country by country and bank by bank, to fortify the [finan-
cial] sector’’ (H. Davies 2011). The reassembly will be made easier, in
part, because major areas of service infrastructure have been, up to
this point of writing, bypassed in the meltdown (chapter 5). Other
elements will be easier to reconnect as and when they are far less
opaque and brittle (on the necessity for less impenetrable language in
structured securities, see D. MacKenzie 2010). The reassembly will
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have to be done in light of a few basic design and policy principles, but
there will be no pretense that the financial recovery depends solely or
even primarily on the path of policy or on that of principle. To recast
this in the terms of our framework, we are looking to reassemble a
financial system that can be operationally redesigned as performance
conditions change. If this occurs, it will be a slow process.∂ In such
ways, new Basel accords or banking reforms are at best the start of the
process, and at worst the misdirection of policymakers and reformers
who prefer us not to know if or how their messes are to be managed.
We will know the financial mess is managed when there is more
recognition and acceptance that the future of financial services is now.
Alan Greenspan, as we saw before, told the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission that the next financial mess will doubtless exhibit myriad
new assets and unintended consequences that cannot be foreseen (Pol-
iti and Rappeport 2010). But if the Greenspan future is the mess we are
in, then to change today’s mess is to change that future. To believe that
something out there in a future beyond our imagination could save us
is to ignore the fact that we are managing for those very resources and
alternatives in the policy messes we confront today. To manage is both
to allocate scarce resources and to generate more or fewer options,
more or less volatility. That is the central point of real-time economics.
This leads to my final set of points. We will know the financial mess
is better managed when mainstream economics recovers from the part
it played in the mess.∑ I tell my students that policy analysis is in-
debted to economics for a useful three-legged stool: Opportunity costs
are real, trade-offs drive priorities, and price is a coordinating mecha-
nism when opportunity costs and trade-offs are accurate. Each leg is
weak, but together the stool is strong. Passing itself off as best-of-show
theory, modern securitized finance has befouled each leg of that stool.∏
First to be stained was the notion that the opportunity cost of the
forgone alternative makes choice difficult. The financial mess was
what happened when money was decoupled from its opportunity cost,
as in all the talk about ‘‘free money’’ (see, for example, Price 2009).
Governments turned into atms from which cash was withdrawn at
near-zero interest rates for well-beyond-zero returns. We were told
that we’d be a fool not to dance when everyone else was. But there’s the
rub—deciding to take our chances on the floor or sit this one out
differs from choosing whether to go to the dance or do something
altogether different. In the former situation, I could lose what others
around me get; in the latter, I lose the other thing I would have gotten.
The dance was always a gamble; no forgone alternative ever is, or there
wouldn’t be such a thing as an opportunity cost.π
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Second to be soiled by mongrel financialization was the notion that
trade-offs drive priorities. Opportunity costs revolve around choosing
this versus that, but trade-offs are rarely only either-or; they usually
also involve having to choose enough of each—enough guns and but-
ter, because you cannot have it all. The unhinged view leading up to the
financial mess, however, was: ‘‘You can never have enough money.’’
Here, any amount of money we have is the burning reminder that we
can never have enough. Thus Canadians are derided for the very same
thing they were praised for: Their prudent behavior in the financial
mess has meant that they ‘‘missed out’’ on making more money by not
buying up all those delinquent banks in the United States (see, for
example, Cyran 2009). If that is true, then we end in the deepest irony,
a banking and finance sector in crisis because there is simply too much
money around to be managed reliably. If the point is that financial
regulation can always be circumvented, is that a failure of regulation or
of having more money than could ever be regulated?
The third leg of the stool, which is just as tainted as the other two, is
the notion of price as coordinating mechanism. When money is un-
hinged from opportunity cost and trade-offs are reduced to the ‘‘pri-
ority’’ of never, never, never having enough money, price ceases to
coordinate behavior, be it for allocation or production. If the financial
mess was about anything, it was about the difficulty in pricing subprime
mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, credit derivatives, credit de-
fault swaps, and other instruments. No small number of mark-to-
market assets ended up illiquid and unpriceable, and, as we have seen,
the opportunity cost of those illiquid assets was the very reliability of
markets that had to be forgone whenever these assets were ‘‘trans-
acted.’’ Or, to put this in a positive register, we should have learned from
the financial mess that the statement ‘‘most markets are mostly effi-
cient most of the time’’ cannot be treated as a starting principle. It is at
best an emerging generalization to be based on a wide range of empiri-
cal cases that, in turn, will have to be modified for new cases.
How will we know when this three-legged stool is fit to use again in
finance and banking? The answer is to look for the recoupling of op-
portunity costs, trade-offs, and prices to economic choice. The virtue
of a levy on individual financial services transactions (for example, a
surcharge or Tobin tax on major bank transactions) is not that it would
fund financial recovery in the next collapse (that could indeed encour-
age banks to take more risks, because they know that such a fund will
bail them out later). Rather, it is to give financial transactions an
opportunity cost they may not have and without which there would be
no moral hazard to worry about or correct.∫
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If recoupling is the focus, then we must look to those economists who
are willing and able to detail a new kind of market failure hitherto
largely undiscussed. The majority of economists will tell you there are
four types of market failure: public goods, externalities, asymmetric
information, and market power. In this book, I have spent considerable
time discussing an important hybrid: the failure of efficient markets to
value or price fully the reliability required for undertaking market
transactions. If, for example, algorithm-based high-frequency trading
strategies accelerate ‘‘flash crashes’’ in the very market infrastructure
that those strategies help to make more efficient, then the price of
maintaining this infrastructure reliably has to reflect more than the
efficiencies of those trading strategies. Otherwise, efficient markets can
become their own form of market failure. Some economists already
recognize that models of efficient markets undermined the infrastruc-
ture professionals needed to ensure reliable financial markets. Using
terms introduced earlier, the University of Chicago economist Raghuram
Rajan concluded that ‘‘modeling that took the plumbing for granted en-
sured the breakdown of the plumbing’’ (2010, 117).
How does this actually work? If it is, as The Financial Times assures
us, that ‘‘mark-to-market accounting is the price that banks must pay
for a securitized credit system’’ (Lex Column 2008b), then better man-
agement includes the costs of relying on this kind of accounting. The
debate over the structure of derivative clearinghouses—ranging from
quasi-public utilities to for-profit companies—reflects just this con-
cern to ensure that the full costs of ‘‘too big to fail’’ are priced from the
outset (Grant 2010).Ω This is also the case for the other avatar of
financial efficiency—the just-on-time liquidity of overnight banking.
When such overnight banking becomes the same road to the just-for-
now, last-resort financing of linchpin institutions that would other-
wise fail (as in the case of Bear Stearns), then the efficiency of one
financial market undermines the wider financial market (see, for ex-
ample, Goldstein 2008)—and without markets, what sense does it
make to correct for the other four types of market failure?
Perhaps there is no better example of this fifth, hybrid type of mar-
ket failure and its effects than the U.S. flash crash of May 6, 2010
(Bowley 2011; for an evaluation of the flash crash, start with Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission 2010a). In this case, market transactions happened so fast
and were so numerous under conditions of high-frequency trading and
collocated servers (to reduce transaction times even further), that
there came a point when no liquidity was left to meet proffered trans-
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actions: ‘‘Indeed, even in the absence of extraordinary market events,
limit order books can quickly empty and prices can crash simply due to
the speed and numbers of orders flowing into the market and due to
the ability to instantly cancel orders’’ (Commodity Futures Trading
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission 2010b, 2).
Once liquidity emptied from the market, so too went price discovery:
Markets can’t clear because efficient market transactions have ensured
that there is no market to clear. Increasing efficiencies, in other words,
can put market design and structure at risk: ‘‘Liquidity in a high-speed
world is not a given: market design and market structure must ensure
that liquidity provision arises continuously in a highly fragmented,
highly interconnected trading environment’’ (2). If such assurances are
not provided—and the federal report on the flash crash recommended
better pricing mechanisms as an important corrective—market effi-
ciency and market failure are perversely and positively correlated.
None of this was made any easier by the deliberate coupling of a highly
volatile derivatives market to a more stable equities market; if the
reliability of market infrastructure were a priority, you would have
expected buffering or decoupling to have taken place instead.
An economist might counter by asserting, ‘‘Obviously the markets were
not efficient or complete because the full costs of reliability were not inter-
nalized.’’ True, a great deal more can and must be done to bring reliability
into the cost equation. Paul Schulman and I have spent a considerable
amount of time developing indicators showing that reliability can be
better reflected in the real-time price of a critical service and the job
descriptions (and thus the salaries) of those doing the real-time man-
agement (Roe and Schulman 2008). However, there is a limit to what
can be done along these lines. Reliability mandates on banking and
finance pose nonfungible limits. There is a point after which the safe
and continuous provision of a critical service cannot be traded off
against cost or any other attribute of the service without undermining
those very trade-offs. In fact, the flash crash demonstrates what hap-
pens when reliability is treated as fully fungible with those attributes of
cost, speed, and convenience. Nor did such concerns about costly trad-
ing, software, and computer malfunctions stop with the 2010 event,
worries over which continue as well (Demos 2012). After an increased
number of computer glitches on the various exchanges, a well-known
industry expert reported in the New York Times: ‘‘In the race for speed,
however, some industry experts say reliability has been sacrificed.’’
How? ‘‘The markets basically gutted their high-cost, nonstop infra-
structures for very fast, low-cost infrastructures’’ (Popper 2012).
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Moreover—and this is a crucial point—when efficient markets work
to undermine market infrastructure, we must shift the concern for
moral hazard as well. The more the managers of these infrastructures
keep their systems reliable under increasing demands, the more the
infrastructure and managers are expected to manage ever more de-
mands reliably—until the system in question crashes, or its elements
are decoupled from the volatility. This is the dynamic described in
chapter 6’s five propositions. Too many people have incorrectly seen
the major moral hazard as banks and investment firms becoming more
risk-taking and less resilient because of easy credit and bailouts. A more
fearsome moral hazard, however, lies in senior executives and officials
taking predatory advantage of their organizations every time its mid-
dle managers and operators continue to be reliable in the face of their
predations. That is the sure road to destroying the middle managers’
capacity to be resilient and anticipatory at the same time (for more on
the role of executive management failures in modern-day disasters, see
Perrow 2007). We would do well to remember that the answer to weak
regulation is not efficient markets that undermine the infrastructures
for reliable markets and their regulation.
Resilience and anticipation are core to mess and reliability manage-
ment in the same way that productivity is to economics, and for the
same reason. Improving the resilience and anticipation skills of real-
time professionals is by and large the way we improve their productiv-
ity and the management of the critical service or infrastructure in
question. Although improvements in labor and capital productivity are
measured in increases in output, improvements in resilience and antic-
ipation among real-time professionals are measured in terms of sus-
taining the reliability, however messily realized, required for those
output increases.∞≠ That kind of productivity is important for mess
and reliability managers, if only to reframe inevitable setbacks as occa-
sions for subsequent learning and improved outputs. Productivity in
real-time economics has much more to do with operational redesign by
competent professionals than it does with stumbling on innovation as
an unintended consequence of having been thrust into unstudied con-
ditions. As we have seen, designers’ innovationpositive all too readily
turns out to be the managers’ innovationnegative. After all, isn’t one of
the major points of the financial mess that too much innovation led to
too much human and organizational error, thereby undermining pro-
ductivity across multiple factors?
The ethical implications of treating resilience and anticipation as
productivity are subtle but altogether visible for those who wish to see.
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The priority given to the resilience and anticipation in reliably operat-
ing within the domain between system patterns and localized sce-
narios means that a network’s sense of fairness shifts from universals
at the macro level and individual morality at the micro level. Instead, it
focuses on applying and modifying what are today taken to be better
practices to the context in which we find ourselves with the case at
hand. The French historian Pierre Rosanvallon made this point at
length in The New Social Question:
As society gains more knowledge of its differences, a considerable change in
the perception of fairness tends to be produced. . . . The increased knowl-
edge of the differences between individuals and groups strains the bases of
the social contract. If some know they will be spared some costly serious
illness, will they agree to continue paying the same contributions of health
insurance as those who are genetically condemned to develop that afflic-
tion? In an unpredictable universe, the essence of justice is procedural; it is
bound up with the search for a universal rule. Our increased knowledge of
inequalities and differences makes that definition of justice problematic. . . .
As long as society is perceived simplistically, as structured into classes as-
sumed to be homogeneous, the issue of justice can be formulated globally.
But when that condition disappears, society appears as what it is: an unsta-
ble tangle of individuals and multiple economic, social and professional
classifications. (2000, 29–30, 34)
A mess and reliability professional cannot be realistic about the tangle
of such work without adapting what has been found to be fair in like
situations, given that the default to totalizing universal principles or
individual exceptionalism would only make the messes worse. This
sense of fairness arises out of the network in which professionals find
themselves confronting the morphing challenges of policy and man-
agement. Part of this is the value pluralism of having to reconcile
multiple macro principles in the midst of competing trends, practices,
and context-rich scenarios. To my mind, this is pluralism worth having
because it actually works—thankfully without the perfect reliability
that leaders promise but cannot deliver, and with more mess than
some like when it comes to fairness. Why thankfully? Because if relied
on too much, even the most principled theory, and not only the most
unprincipled politics, will undermine mess and reliability professionals
and their networks. You do not need to be a Mussolini or an Eichmann
to want the trains to run on time in our political economy, nor can we
expect any political theory to secure such reliability for us.
And who, one last time, is this ‘‘us’’? I pointed out how the skills of
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mess and reliability professionals for managing the probable (in terms
of patterns and scenarios) also make them adept at identifying and
assessing the possible. The ‘‘we’’ of this book are also the ones who
work and manage their way to possibilities in the arenas in which we
find ourselves. The crux of this challenge is captured in a beautiful
passage by John Berger, the essayist, novelist, and painter:
The other day I saw a lorry carting blocks of stone, white in the sunlight,
from the quarries on the other side of the village. On top of the blocks was a
wooden box with tools in it. On top of them, carefully placed so that it
should not blow away, lay a sprig of cherry blossom. In the rockface is buried
the promise of dynamite: in the dynamite the promise of space: in the space
grows the promise of a tree: in the core of the tree the promise of blossom.
That was the relationship between the spray and the blocks of stone on the
lorry. (2003, 213)
That too is the relationship we have to possibilities when we are work-
ing the rock face of mess and reliability. It is here where policy, man-
agement, and politics metamorphose under heat and pressure, and
where their possibilities have to be managed. Some call this intersec-
tion of practice and possibility, hope.
NOTES
ONE Introducing Policy Messes
1. On the search for narratives to make sense of the financial mess, see
Yergin 2009 and Crook 2010.
2. A ‘‘wicked’’ problem has features that render it intractable to conven-
tional policy analysis (see, for example, Rittel and Webber 1973). First, there is
no definitive formulation of a problem and thus no definitive solution. Each
wicked problem is a symptom of other wicked problems and is therefore
difficult to parse and explain. Accordingly, the boundaries of problems and
solutions are under dispute, because the problems are so interrelated and
unpredictably so. Whatever solutions the decisionmaker generates are pro-
duced in the absence of any clear test to determine if they are really feasible or
effective over time. The financial meltdown has been termed a wicked prob-
lem (see, for example, Stapleton 2010).
3. When Kingdon writes of the ‘‘messiness’’ of public policy and agendas, he
allies it with ‘‘accident, fortuitous coupling and dumb luck’’ (1995, 206). Sim-
ilarly, Stone writes, ‘‘Politics is ‘messy,’ ‘unpredictable,’ an ‘obstacle course’ for
policy, and ‘a hostile environment’ for policy analysis’’ (2002, 376). Manage-
ment experts refer to the ‘‘messy process of experimentation, failure and
feedback’’ (London 2003).
4. Although not concerned with policy messes, Abrahamson and Freedman
(2006, chapters 3 and 5) list many kinds of mess and messy people found in
daily life (for another popular view, see Rigby 2008).
5. ‘‘Far from promoting ‘dispersion’ or ‘diversification’ [financial] innovation
has ended up producing concentrations of risk, plagued with deadly correla-
tions’’ (Tett 2009d).
6. Martin Feldstein, a Harvard economist and advocate of competitive mar-
kets, wrote about the issue of pricing toxic assets associated with the sub-
prime mortgage crisis: ‘‘The Treasury’s preliminary idea was to use a ‘reverse
auction,’ a method that works well when used to buy a single homogeneous
security (like a firm buying back its own shares). But that is not feasible for
buying the impaired securities, because of the enormous variety of underlying
mortgages and of the almost limitless number of different derivatives based
on those mortgages. The buyback will therefore involve a large number of
arbitrary valuation decisions by the Treasury staff and their investment-
banker advisers’’ (2008).
7. The 2008 financial mess and its sequelae have done little to dampen
Shiller’s promotion of financialization and innovation (Shiller 2012).
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8. A very different kind of leader, U.S. General David Petraeus, said we
should be content with a ‘‘messy, sloppy status quo’’ in Iraq (quoted in Dom-
bey and Savastopulo 2009).
9. Mitroff, Alpaslan, and Green suggest that problems in crisis management
are, in part, ‘‘relatively structured messes that have been extracted from poten-
tially highly unstructured messes for the purpose of better managing current
and future messes’’ (italics in the original; 2004, 177).
10. Those wishing to pursue Ackoff’s insights on mess in business and
related fields can start with Ackoff 1999 and Ackoff and Rovin 2003. Those
interested in the role of mess in other fields should begin with mess theory in
literary criticism (Trotter 2000), rubbish theory in anthropology (Thompson
1979), or the heap paradox in philosophy (that is, at what point does, say, a
heap of sand cease to be a heap, as grains of sand are removed one by one? See
Williamson 1994).
TWO When Reliability Is Mess Management
1. ‘‘There is no agreed [on] definition of financial stability, except perhaps to
identify it with the stability of the banking system, itself sometimes defined
simply as the lack of collapsing banks’’ (McDonald 2009).
2. It appears that bust and burst are to be expected from economic booms,
as happened with export-driven growth in Asia and Latin America (Klein and
Cukier 2009; Rodrigues et al. 2009).
3. Contrast this state of affairs with the earlier stability that led to, well,
stability. By ensuring stability, the integrated utilities for pre-deregulation elec-
tricity and telecommunications—and banks—actually continued to be reliable.
No wonder a nostalgia for banks as utilities, divorced from their latter-day
casinos, has grown (see, for example, Wolf 2008b).
4. This section builds on research reported in Roe and Schulman (2008) with
revisions in light of subsequent work.
5. One former head of a major private banking unit argued that ‘‘all utilities
need in-built redundancy and careful balancing. Without that margin of safety
in electricity, for example, the lights may constantly go off. Redundancy and
balance are . . . exactly what the promoters of [the Basel II Capital Security
Accords] removed from the financial system’’ (quoted in Plender 2009a). So,
too, for European capital rules, hammered out after the failure of the Basel
Accords during the financial meltdown: ‘‘But the real risk . . . is that people
start to believe too much [in these new models and rules] and drive out
redundancy, or margin for error,’’ said one financial analyst (quoted in P.
Davies 2009). However, some banks increased reserve margins above what
regulators required to ensure positive redundancy: ‘‘The traditional ‘Swiss
finish’ whereby the authorities added 20 per cent to whatever number the
Basel calculations delivered for their big banks, has been replaced by a dou-
bling of the Basel number. This might be characterised as the ‘think of a
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number and double it’ approach to setting capital, but may be none the worse
for that’’ (H. Davies 2009).
6. For a popular account of how experts rapidly sort through a great deal of
clutter to discern patterns that matter, see Gladwell 2005. The ability to as-
semble an option or response through different pathways may be a cognitive
feature of the brain (see, for example, Edelman 2007, 1105).
7. The presence in financial markets and on trading floors of what I am
calling here just-on-time performance has been well documented (see Knorr
Cetina and Bruegger 2002). Zaloom reports one trader saying: ‘‘Just at the
right time, I mean literally it was within a second, a split second. I literally
caught a little pause in his offer where he was just kind of looking in all
directions. I just happened to jump and bid and scream at him literally—I
mean I’m not even going to say tenths of a second—I’m going to say hun-
dredths. . . . If I didn’t jump a foot and a half off the ground and bid fours at
that guy just as I did and the way I did it, he wouldn’t have seen me’’ (2006,
150). Other cases of just-on-time performance can be sedate by comparison:
‘‘It’s day by day, hour by hour,’’ said one participant in a case study of public-
private collaboration in regulating derivatives (Faerman, McCaffrey, and Van
Slyke 2001, 378).
8. For a different case, see Wood 2009. For more on bank nationalization
and beyond, see Boyarchenko and Levendorskii 2009.
9. Legal reservations have been expressed about other developments in the
financial crisis, such as then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson’s require-
ment that the ceos of nine major financial institutions sign a document per-
mitting government equity participation in their firms (see Poole 2008). Even
less salubrious examples may include the 2012 libor scandal, which raised
issues of ‘‘underreporting of rates’’ with respect to the London Interbank Of-
fered Rate during 2007–8 (see Plender 2012 for what could be some just-for-
now features). Other legal questions have been raised, for example, concerning
specific Federal Reserve interventions (Hubbard, Scott, and Thornton 2009).
Even judges were accused of not following foreclosure law due to the exigencies
of the financial crisis (see, for example, Efrati 2009).
10. ‘‘A clearing house stands between two parties to a trade, guaranteeing
that a transaction is completed even if one party defaults. The lack of such a
mechanism in most of the otc [over the counter] markets prior to the Leh-
man Brothers default was one reason why shockwaves were sent through the
financial system’’ (Grant 2009d).
11. To put this in perspective, ‘‘financial services account for 8 percent of
[U.K.] gross domestic product, which is similar to the US and much less than
Singapore or Hong Kong’’ (Plender 2009b). Others put U.K. financial services at
about 12 percent of its gnp (Brittan 2008); banking assets are a considerably
higher percentage of gdp or gnp, however (see, for example, Wolf 2010). As for
the United States and using a different measure, Benjamin Friedman reports
that the ‘‘share of the ‘finance’ sector in total corporate profits rose from 10
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percent on average from the 1950s through the 1980s, to 22 percent in the
1990s, and an astonishing 34 percent in the first half of this decade’’ (2009, 42).
12. Note again the importance of electricity and telecom in a cross-infra-
structure perspective. According to the tno summary: ‘‘The energy sector
initiates more cascades than it receives. Interdependencies occur very infre-
quently. . . . Fixed telecom disruptions affect atms and electronic payments
(financial sector), . . .governmental services, and internet and telecom ser-
vices. Within the energy sector, most dependencies (61) occur between power
generation, transmission and distribution’’ (Luiijf et al. 2008). Using an earlier
and different database, Zimmerman (2004) also found that disruptions in
electricity and gas, water, and roads are more likely to generate cascades in
other infrastructures.
THREE The Wider Framework for Managing Mess
1. The term ‘‘reliable mess manager’’ is shorthand for the more formally
termed ‘‘mess and reliability professionals.’’ They are those reliability-seeking
managers and operators as described by James Q. Wilson (see Wilson 1989 for
a fuller discussion of the latter categories). For our purposes, these managers
are those who specifically provide reliable critical services in ways that require
them to manage messes in the process.
2. I thank Paul Schulman for the basic framework here, though he is not
responsible for my adaptations and extensions. This section’s discussion
builds on earlier research work in Roe and Schulman 2008, but with some
substantial revisions. For a review of the research on which this section is
based, see Auerswald et al. 2005, Roe et al. 2002 and 2005, Roe and Schulman
2008, and Schulman et al. 2004.
3. The focus is on the mix of knowledge, as there is no single gradient
between deduction and induction. Such intermixed knowledge used in manag-
ing reliably is related to the familiar topic known as ‘‘the reliability of knowl-
edge.’’ The degree to which information is reliable depends on how uncertain,
complex, incomplete, and disputed it is; in other words, just how messy is that
information. Some critical services, including those in finance and banking,
are so knotted together with the reliability of information that the two are
difficult to untangle.
4. See Schell 2008 (231).
5. In the presence of large amounts of data and detected signals, Sull and
Bryant ask: ‘‘How can managers make sense of this deluge of information? The
task is primarily one of pattern recognition’’ (2006). In case it needs saying,
pattern recognition as well as scenario formulation proceed both consciously
and unconsciously (for a fascinating discussion on the importance of non-
conscious human processing of pattern recognition, see Grigsby and Stevens
2000, chapter 12).
6. Recognizing patterns and formulating scenarios are rooted in the evolu-
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tion of the human brain. What some psychologists call contextual memory,
for instance, is an evolved responsiveness both to site-specific cues and to the
piecing together of those and other cues (Marcus 2008, 18–39).
7. Speaking of the better coordination of anticorruption investigations and
regulation, one observer concludes: ‘‘Officials know each other’s phone num-
bers, they talk and meet frequently . . . I see [a recent statement on antibribery
investigations] as a formal acceptance of many of the previously informal
techniques and thus as a sign of convergence’’ (quoted in Chung 2009).
8. The real-time nature of the translation exercise has been long understood
(see, for example, Hayek 1945). I thank Paul Schulman for pointing out this
work to me.
9. In the words of the finance economist Avinash Persaud: ‘‘Many politicians
and watchdogs think of risk as a single fixed thing inherent in instruments. . . .
But risk is a chameleon: it changes depending on who is holding it. Declaring
something safe can make it risky and vice versa’’ (2009, 9).
10. Street-level workers ‘‘do not tell stories about efficiently implementing
public policy; they tell stories about using policy and the system to serve
individuals’’ (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 49).
11. An earlier version of the following discussion appeared in Roe 2007. This
section represents a considerable rethinking of that earlier case study.
12. The well-known ecologist Stuart Pimm and his colleague Jeff Harvey
criticized Bjørn Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist as follows: ‘‘The text
employs the strategy of those who, for example, argue that . . . Jews weren’t
singled out by the Nazis for extermination’’ (quoted in Brander 2002, 973).
13. There are also regional differences in other areas with respect to global
climate change. ‘‘In Europe, governments are implementing the Kyoto Pro-
tocol on climate change by customizing it to local and regional needs,’’ reports
an informed observer. ‘‘Meanwhile, governments elsewhere are also develop-
ing their own locally tailored trading systems. The authors of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol [in contrast] envisioned a single global trading system with a single
price’’ (Victor 2006, 100).
14. The long-term horizon has in fact been key to the comparative success of
investing in timberland (Boyde 2011).
15. The complexity of international and regional globalization should not
distract one from the sheer complexity found at lower scales of analysis. In the
mess and reliability space, the ‘‘system’’ could as well be a corporation or organi-
zation that operates transnationally. For example, Citigroup, damaged in the
financial mess, had 16,000 offices across some 140 countries in 2009 (A. Lee
2009). At the time of its collapse, aig was an organization of more than 4,300
legal entities with 116,000 employees and operations in 130 countries (Felsted
and Guerrera 2008; Morgenson 2008). Its collapse is said to have started within
just one of those entities, a 377-person unit in London (Morgenson 2008). So
too elsewhere: ‘‘At Royal Bank of Scotland, with 170,000 employees around the
world, the business was crippled by activities that more than 169,000 of them
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did not know about and were not engaged in’’ (Kay 2009b). Nor is any of this
new. In 1998 the collapse of a single hedge fund firm, Long-Term Capital Man-
agement, nearly brought a good deal of the U.S. economy down with it. In the
words of a senior New York Times financial columnist, ‘‘the notion that a private
hedge fund with but 16 partners and fewer than 200 employees could cause
lasting harm was never truly examined’’ (Lowenstein 2008).
16. Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, argued that
government executives had to fulfill duties that were so numerous and en-
gaged so many other people that these tasks could never be fully specified in
any legislation. Because his explanation closely approximates what I have
described as networked professionals, I quote at length from a letter by Hamil-
ton to William Heth, dated June 23, 1791: ‘‘My opinion is that there is and
necessarily must be a great number of undefined particulars incident to the
general duty of every officer, for the requiring of which no special warrant is to
be found in any law. . . . If it be said the law should then require this [or that], I
answer that the detail would be endless. And surely it would not answer in
respect to any officer that to say he must do whatever he is required to do. And
if all that he is to do is to be defined the Statutes of the United States must be
more voluminous than those of any Country in the world. . . . Consult, my
Dear Sir, the Code of any nation whatever and examine the practice in relation
to the point in question and you will find there is no law providing for a
thousandth part of the duties which each officer performs in the great politi-
cal machine & which unless performed would arrest its motions’’ (Hamilton
1965, 499–500).
17. Nonacademic summaries of the unique knowledge, however, are many. A
good one that overlaps with points made here is McPhee 2006 (57).
18. Let us start with some statistics about the mess in which African Ameri-
can men find themselves in the United States:
—‘‘Black Americans, a mere 13 percent of the population, constitute half of
this country’s prisoners. A tenth of all black men between ages 20 and 35
are in jail or prison’’ (O. Patterson 2007, 13).
—‘‘Something like one third of our young African American men between
18 and 25 are now connected to the juvenile justice system or the federal
justice system. They’re on probation, they’re in jail, they’re under indict-
ment or they’re incarcerated’’ (Benjamin Barber in ‘‘Afro-America at the
start of a new century,’’ 2002, 100).
—‘‘[Based on recent national statistics,] the most striking thing is the high
portion of black men with zero reported income: about 18 percent of
black men, compared to about 7 percent for whites and Hispanics’’
(Besharov 2007, 45).
—‘‘After declining throughout the 1980s, employment rates of young, less-
educated white and Latino men remained flat during the 1990s. Among
black men aged 16 through 24, employment rates actually dropped. In
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fact, this group’s employment declined more during the 1990s (when it
fell from 59 percent to 52 percent) than during the preceding decade’’
(Holzer and Offner 2004, 74–75).
—‘‘The most dramatic, the most unfortunate of the several disastrous out-
comes is the high rate of paternal abandonment of children[:] 60% of
Afro-American children are being brought up without the emotional,
economic or social support of their fathers’’ (Orlando Patterson in ‘‘Afro-
America at the start of a new century,’’ 2002, 91).
If the figures about male African-Americans are true, then would we—that is,
those of us who are tasked with managing this—not want to touch base with
the nine-tenths who were not in prison, the two-thirds who were not con-
nected with the criminal justice system, the four-fifths who did not have zero
income, the nearly half who were employed, and the two-fifths who had not
abandoned their children, in order to find out what they are doing right, so the
rest of us could do things better?
FOUR Bad Mess Management
1. This may be one reason why the exercise of presidential prerogative in the
face of unforeseen emergencies has never really been sufficient to establish
precedent for future executive or legal action (Fatovic 2009, 56, 66).
2. In high reliability organizations, it is said that professionals are as reliable
as their last case (Roe and Schulman 2008). So too for this example: Forensic
science ‘‘is a business where you’re as good as your last case,’’ according to a
former president of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (quoted in
Hamill 2008; for a book-length review of the issues, see Fisher 2008).
3. ‘‘Today, more than 30 per cent of all stock transactions in the US do not
occur on regulated exchanges. Dark pools, less regulated trading venues that
match anonymous buyers and sellers without displaying prices publicly, and
other alternative trading platforms can play an important role by enhancing
liquidity for certain investors, but these benefits come at the cost of less
overall transparency and price discovery across the marketplace,’’ reports the
ceo of nyse Euronext (Niederauer 2010). By mid-2012, Niederauer had re-
vised the figures upward: ‘‘Today, approximately 50 dark pools in the US
operate largely outside regulatory oversight and, along with equally opaque
internal trading operations by major brokers, handle nearly 40 per cent of
daily trading volume. For more than 1,200 widely held equities, more than 50
per cent of trades now occur ‘in the dark’—nearly a 150 per cent increase over
the past two years’’ (2012).
4. Nor is this the sole example of a sometimes messy reliability manage-
ment under way in the midst of a crisis. As of this writing, the money market
mutual funds have been stabilized through one of the Treasury’s bailout pro-
grams (Anand 2009).
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5. Similarly, ‘‘Carl Linnaeus published the first edition of his classification of
living things, the Systema Naturae, in 1735. Shortly thereafter, while having
lunch with a colleague at the University of Leiden, he was in the middle of
explaining the nature of his classification system, when the colleague stopped
him in mid-explanation. A beetle had crawled onto the table, and the colleague
wanted to know where this particular type of beetle fit into the classification
system. Linnaeus examined the bug carefully, and frowned. Then he squished
the bug with a thumb, flicked it from the table, and asked, ‘What beetle?’ ’’
(Trickett, Schunn, and Trafton 2005, 97).
6. ‘‘It is claimed that a Dutch colonial administrator, noting the higher price
achieved by mace in the 17th century global commodity market, ordained that
nutmeg trees in the Moluccas—not, after all, called the spice islands for noth-
ing—should be uprooted to make space for the much more remunerative mace
trees. It is cheering to know that bureaucracy has not changed much in 400
years. Had he been better informed, he would have realised that mace and
nutmeg are from the same tree’’ (Leigh 2006, W11).
7. Better practices need not counter an individual bad practice; instead, they
can counter a combination of bad practices (Guha 2007b).
8. It appears that unregulated otc transactions were more profitable, on
the whole, than many of those that went through regulated clearinghouses. A
senior official in one exchange observed that ‘‘otc clearing in general is a
utility business’’ adding: ‘‘Nobody will make a lot of money out of it’’ (quoted
in Grant 2009a).
9. Distinguishing between regional and global levels of analysis and man-
agement is especially crucial in responding to global climate change. For exam-
ple, a Science article argues that environmental false alarms do indeed happen
at the global level, but they nonetheless are a useful feature of global environ-
mental action (Pacala et al. 2003). The authors go on to point out that the
optimal number of environmental alarms occurs when the marginal benefits
of environmental alarms are equal to their marginal costs. We must wonder,
however, if the authors and like-minded associates have been hard at work on
showing how that happy equation varies within and across multiple regions of
the world and is confirmed by a regional analysis well beyond the United
States alone.
10. Such figures are highly uncertain. For a first-pass set of estimates, see
the special issue of Foreign Affairs (‘‘The Next Pandemic?’’ 2005), particularly
Osterholm 2005. See also Osterholm 2007. My comments are not a blanket
condemnation of quantitative modeling or its potential usefulness for real-
time operations. David King, a former U.K. science advisor, tells of the impor-
tance that modeling the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Great Brit-
ain had for decisionmaking: ‘‘Within a few days, we were able to advise the
government, on the basis of modeling, that we had come up with a new
control procedure. That was the cue for the prime minister to say, ‘Fine, we’re
going with this.’ And it followed through. Within a few days, we’d switched
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[the virus’s] exponential growth to exponential decay, and the cabinet learned
in real time that science could model an extremely complex situation and
provide very robust advice for action’’ (2007, 1862). Notice that the modeling
was successful because it produced a control protocol for the case at hand.
11. The importance of translation as a middle domain function, with its
focus on translation of system patterns and specific scenarios—all networked
—has been highlighted in Science: ‘‘Broader networks could expand linkages to
other like-minded organizations. . . . We believe that more frequent robust
exchanges of know-how among an expanding universe of public- and private-
players would accelerate innovation and expedite the translation of knowl-
edge about diseases of the poor while also reflecting national sensitivities,
changing contexts, and the concomitant desire for economic growth’’ (Morel
et al. 2005, 403). Certainly, one factor accounting for successful microfinanc-
ing schemes among the poor has been the network-based support that indi-
vidual borrowers have received. On advances and constraints in community-
based health care networks, see Adams 2010.
12. For an early slant on large-scale initiatives and the case for incremental-
ism, see Collingridge 1992. My thanks to Paul ‘t Hart for the reference.
13. The adjective ‘‘wide,’’ modifying any distribution, denotes that uncer-
tainty includes variability in human behavior with respect to the policy messes
in which people find themselves: ‘‘Variability is an inherent characteristic of a
population, inasmuch as people vary substantially in their exposures and their
susceptibility to potentially harmful effects. . . . Variability cannot be reduced,
but it can be better characterized with improved information’’ (National Re-
search Council 2009, 6).
14. The acronym cpr is also associated with ‘‘common property resources,’’
though not all common pool resources have property status.
15. Any way the mess and reliability manager looks at development, hunger
is the priority (Sanchez and Swaminathan 2005). Even economists have found
positive net benefit to hunger and malnutrition programs whose benefits well
outweigh their costs (see Copenhagen Consensus n.d.). No one who under-
stands mess and reliability really believes that we must first solve poverty and
inequality if we are to reduce hunger appreciably, yet poverty and inequality
receive more attention.
FIVE Good Mess Management
1. Consumption turns out to have been more equal than income, at least in
the United States (Johnson 2002). That is to say, ‘‘there has been a large
increase in income inequality but no concurrent increase in consumption
inequality in the 1990s,’’ according to an analysis of major data sets by Fisher
and Johnson (2006). ‘‘One could argue that [Americans] don’t care about
inequality because the poor do pretty well in America, if one looks at the
measure of consumption rather than income inequality’’ (Glazer 2003, 111).
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2. Of course, one reason for differences among the uninsured could well be
that the better off are healthier or have more assets than the poorer unin-
sured (for example, a number of the better off are young, or they have not
signed up for Medicare or the Children’s Health Insurance Program, even
though they are eligible to do so). The merit of that explanation, though, is an
empirical question, not one that can be settled a priori by any macro designer.
3. My thanks to Ian Mitroff for the insight.
4. Assessing the possible rather than the probable is far from Reverend
Bayes’s updating of probabilities; it is closer to the economist G. L. S. Shackle’s
work on surprise and the possible. People who are serious about mess and
reliability should be worried about the prominence of Bayesian analysis (see
Körding 2007). The notion that the brain has evolved into an optimal Bayesian
decisionmaking apparatus rather than the kluge it actually is deserves to be
examined more fully (Marcus 2008).
5. ‘‘Since the international system depends on the free, reliable and orderly
flow of financial resources,’’ writes Strobe Talbott, the head of the Brookings
Institution, ‘‘failure to solve the current mess will stymie progress in those
other areas—trade, climate and proliferation’’ (2008, 11).
6. One avoidance mechanism has been regulation. ‘‘ ‘The oft-derided exist-
ing regulatory toolkit has been deployed more effectively in some jurisdictions
than others,’ concludes the Governor of the Bank of Canada’’ (Guha 2009b).
For a perspective on how Australia successfully weathered the financial mess,
see ‘‘The World Looks on with Envy’’ in the Weekend Australian Financial
Review of September 5–6, 2009.
7. Other reliability-seeking examples merit attention: ‘‘Since 2000 banks
there [in Spain] have had to make provisions for latent portfolio losses—those
likely to occur but which are unrecognised by conventional accounting. This
buffer takes the form of a reserve deducted from capital in good times and
released in the downturn. It is calculated by comparing long-run credit growth
in the economy with the current rate of credit growth. ‘Dynamic provisioning’
offers a better idea of profitability and solvency over time and helps prevent
dividend increases in good times that might undermine banks’ solvency. But
the Spanish model is not compliant with global accounting standards. And it
did not prevent a housing bubble as the macro-prudential approach battled a
fierce monetary headwind—the European Central Bank’s one-size-fits-all in-
terest rate was lower than appropriate for a boom economy. Spain’s banking
system has nonetheless come through the crisis in better shape than most’’
(Plender 2009c). Note again that nothing is permanent about good messes, as
banking complications arising out of the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in
Spain indicate (Lex Column 2012).
8. Nevertheless, unless this is made easier, we can expect all manner of
resistance to being your own healthcare manager—and for the same reason
that it is difficult to be your own financial manager: ‘‘The idea that small
savers are equipped to assess the risk associated with these [bond and invest-
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ment] products by reading the small print [of their prospectuses] is absurd’’
(Kay 2010). Absurd it may be, but increasingly required it is.
9. The ability to consider multiple pathways and assemble options creatively
appears to be a contribution of the frontopolar cortex to human cognition (see
Koechlin and Hyafil 2007).
10. In addition to confirmation bias (selectively accepting and not attending
to factors) and attribution error (fitting the situation into a positive or nega-
tive stereotype), any list of cognitive biases includes much more: ‘‘Most people
are irrational in the ways they assess and manage risk. We overestimate the
dangers of the rare and unfamiliar; we worry irrationally little about banal
everyday dangers; we think situations where we have no control more dan-
gerous than those where we think we have some, even though that is often
wrong. So we worry far more about the dangers of train crashes than we do
about car accidents, even though we are far more likely to die on the roads; we
obsess about bse or aids or other rare diseases more than we do about the
prosaic killers, even though we would improve our life chances far more by
giving up smoking, eating better diets and taking moderate amounts of ex-
ercise’’ (Honigmann 2004; see also Pronin 2008). Making cognition even more
complex, ‘‘consciousness rarely has access to the actual causes of our behavior,
although it is capable of creating a plausible and adaptive model of reality that
is good enough for most purposes and that seems to have been good enough
for natural selection’’ (Grigsby and Stevens 2000, 262).
11. The work and research of Gary Klein and his colleagues (1998, 2003,
2009) show that decisionmakers rarely undertake formal deliberative analysis
under conditions of urgency in a classic stepwise process. This finding is
especially pertinent for mess managers operating under a reliability mandate.
Their alternatives and options are typically limned in the initial conditions for
problem definition, and what sets experienced decisionmakers apart from the
less experienced ones is the former’s ability to see these alternatives from the
outset—that is, they are better able ‘‘to size up the situation . . . [by recogniz-
ing] plausible courses of action as the first ones to consider’’ (G. Klein 1998,
95). Much depends on the technical system(s) being managed; some systems
allow for deliberation when time is available (Janne Hukkinen, personal com-
munication). That said, one ‘‘obvious feature of many . . . settings is that
decisions are made under significant time pressure. . . . This time pressure has
several obvious but important implications. . . . Decision strategies that de-
mand deliberation—for example, the extensive evaluation of multiple options
recommended by many decision theorists—are simply not feasible’’ (Orasanu
and Connolly 1993, 9).
12. This is not to be confused with the work of McDermott (2003) on real
time in economics.
13. Can we say something more about better-practice economics? Imagine
practitioners come together to create the Professional Society of Real-Time
Economics. Its mission would be to document how economic theories are
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rendered into local scenarios; what better practices, if any, exist for a given
economic activity based on actual micro behavior; and how these practices are
modified in light of specific contexts and local protocols, thereby updating
practice. The society would also maintain an updated website with reports on
these issues and bring professionals together to review, evaluate, and update
practices (for example, through meta-analysis of an expanding set of case
materials). The society would also have an ethical code listing the ways in
which members would be accountable for their advice (see DeMartino 2005,
2011). The society could even award its own prize, where a Warren Buffett
would have a better chance of winning than a Robert Shiller.
14. Some financial institutions, most notably Goldman Sachs, accent their
real-time networks. Lloyd Blankfein, the chairman of Goldman, made the
point this way, in remarks summarized by a respected columnist: ‘‘The firm
put great emphasis on ensuring that risk concerns were constantly communi-
cated to higher levels of management, ‘getting more fingerprints’ on potential
problem risks and challenging the notion that a business group leader ought
to make independent decisions on risks that affected the entire firm. There
was intense accountability through a host of management committees that
evaluated all aspects of risk [at Goldman]’’ (Plender 2007).
15. In case it needs saying, the financial mess also challenged active investors
and funds that, we now know, operated entirely in unstudied conditions (see,
for example, El-Erian 2007; Partnoy 2007; see also Croft 2009). ‘‘Nobody had
imagined a scenario where the money markets froze up like this. It just wasn’t
in the stress testing models,’’ said a policymaker caught up in the credit mess
(quoted in Tett 2007c; for the ‘‘stress-test mess,’’ see the Economist 2009a).
16. According to the ceo of Citigroup, banking and finance have ‘‘gravitated
from a hub-and-spoke world, where everything used to go through large finan-
cial institutions, to a network of millions of points of contact with each
other. . . . You need a network management approach’’ (quoted in Jenkins,
Braithwaite, and Masters 2012).
17. I had the good fortune to work with Hans de Bruijn and others at the Delft
University of Technology. Part of my task was to compare two approaches to
decisionmaking in dynamic environments. One was a problem-centered ap-
proach; the other was a network-centered approach, which de Bruijn and his
colleagues have mapped (see, for example, de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 2000).
What follows in the text is based on a draft of that work, though any errors in
summarizing their work are mine.
18. Not only is the policy cycle a mess, but so is every step of the textbook
policy analysis process (on the latter, see Bardach 2005). Its first step is to
define the problem, but in doing so we vastly overestimate and underestimate
the risks associated with important policy and management decisions. Next,
assemble the evidence, but here we search out evidence that supports our
positions and ignore what does not. Construct the alternatives, but they are
often embedded in our initial problem definition rather than constructed
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after assembling the evidence. Select the evaluative criteria, but our prefer-
ences for and predispositions toward efficiency, equity, and other benchmarks
clearly vary across cultures, while attitudes and values are poor guides to what
people actually do (see, for example, J. Q. Wilson 1989, 50ff.). Project the
outcomes, but human beings are notoriously bad at forecasting the future, let
alone predicting what will make them happy (Nisbett 2006; Oswald 2006).
Assess the options and choose, but—as has been pointed out countless times
—deliberation can make choosing feel like losing (Skapinker 2003). Implement
and evaluate, but as Sherman, Crawford, and McConnell (2004, 151) record, we
prefer choices where we never learn the outcomes of alternate selections. In
this way, the conventionalized ‘‘steps in a policy analysis’’ end up as rather
unconventional stations of the cross for the more reflective policy analyst and
public manager.
19. Reliability standards were also weakened in the subprime mortgage
crisis with respect to industrywide housing appraisal standards.
20. Resilience is taken to have an increasingly important role in regulation.
In listing ‘‘six principles for a new regulatory order,’’ Lawrence Summers, in his
role as an economist, maintains: ‘‘Third, regulation must be premised on the
inability of institutions or their regulators to predict future market conditions
with much confidence. . . . Rather than judging where and when the next crisis
will occur, regulators need to try to assure the resilience of the system with
respect to economic shocks or problems in any one sector or institution’’
(2008).
21. Policymakers assume frequently that an unprecedented event requires
an unprecedented response, thereby conflating what is a mess with what is a
crisis. The chair of the U.K. Financial Services Authority argues: ‘‘When you’ve
been through a [financial] crisis like this, it’s rather sensible to wipe the slate
clean in terms of your previous assumptions, rather than say: ‘because this has
previously been my policy line, I still stick to my policy line’ ’’ (quoted in Thal
Larsen 2008). This is dangerous thinking if it means pushing those operators
managing the financial mess into having to ‘‘manage’’ a terra incognita with no
known patterns and scenarios.
22. Ned Gramlich, a former governor of the Federal Reserve, warned early
about the dangers of the subprime mortgage ‘‘boom and bust,’’ as he called it
(quoted in Andrews 2007). Other Cassandras included Brooksley Born, who
was a former head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Paul
Volcker, and others in the Bank of International Settlement (for more, see
Bezemer 2009; Blackburn 2008, 81–84; Giles 2008).
23. What is not appreciated is how beguiled others in the Federal Reserve,
not just Alan Greenspan, were by the allure of these new financial instru-
ments. Roger Ferguson, former vice chair of the Fed, often ‘‘presented the
official creed of the Washington financial elite—namely that financial innova-
tion was helping to spread risk around the system in a manner that had made
the 21st-century banking world more safe, vibrant and efficient than ever
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before’’ (Tett 2009a). Don Kohn, another Fed vice chair, assured us before the
meltdown that credit derivative markets ‘‘facilitate risk transfer and diversifi-
cation, thus increasing the resilience of the financial system,’’ all of which
proved to be illusionary (quoted in Guha 2007a). Randall Kroszner, a Fed
governor, harmonized: ‘‘These developments have greatly enhanced the effi-
ciency and stability of the credit markets and the broader financial system’’
(quoted in ibid.).
24. To take another example, how were derivative exchanges with central
clearing able to survive the shocks of the financial turmoil in ways that some
over-the-counter credit default swaps did not (see Steil 2008, 11)? ‘‘Regulated
exchanges have a track record of transparency and reliability that served
investors well through many periods of market disruptions,’’ according to the
chief executive of a large exchange (Niederauer 2009).
25. If lags can function as system coolants, we might need to rethink the
conventional wisdom that a system is no stronger than its weakest link. Could
it be that in some system contexts or periods, a weak link or node acts as a
kind of loose coupling, which—when it ‘‘fails’’—forestalls wider interactivity?
Alessandro Vespignani (2009, 428), a network theorist and analyst, reports
that taking out a certain number of nodes or links could make the network
stronger (in the sense of forestalling a full cascade).
SIX Societal Challenges
1. ‘‘Mobile phones became a God-given gift to all Somalia,’’ said one ob-
server. ‘‘If you shut down the mobile phones, everything would stop’’ (quoted
in Akam 2006).
2. Not only did the car become a single resource with multiple services, but
so did other units in the supply chain around automobiles. Some vehicle
insurers have had their own repair shops, and at least one insurer had its own
medical clinic for accidents and injuries (Fleming 2005). Prior to the financial
meltdown, Wal-Mart announced it would be opening up to four hundred walk-
in health clinics in its stores (Birchall 2007).
3. ‘‘The whole credit derivatives world has exploded at such a dizzy pace that
nobody is exactly sure where the loan risk has gone’’ (Tett 2006a; see also Tett
2005). In the absence of knowing where and how credit derivatives were
dispersed, scenarios were appealed to—‘‘in essence, the financial system looks
increasingly like a giant version of Enron’’—and their implications became
more and more specific (in our terminology, localized): ‘‘It will also require a
controversial step that groups such as the New York Federal Reserve and the
UK’s Financial Services Authority are inching towards: getting unregulated en-
tities, such as hedge funds, to supply better data to authorities’’ (Tett 2006a).
4. Some theories of economic growth and technological innovation center
on finding new uses for novel recombinations of existing technologies and
resources (see, for example, Ellerman 2005, 69; see also Edgerton 2007).
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Table ≥. Taylor-Russell diagram of Type I and II errors
proper decision
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Correct decision Type I error














Source: Adapted from Little ≤≠≠∑
5. Let’s assume there is a proper decision to be made with respect to actually
shedding or not shedding load. In that case, Type I and II errors are defined
with respect to what are incorrect decisions (see table 3 here). Trying to
minimize the Type II error cell would mean pulling the dividing lines in the
table to the left or down; but the more that is done, the larger the cell for Type
I error on the right or above becomes (Little 2005).
6. Jean-Claude Trichet, then president of the European Central Bank,
touched on this point when he counseled: ‘‘The fragility not only of global
finance but of the global economy itself, is something we should reflect on.
You know, there are some key intermediate inputs that are produced in only
three factories in the world. This is not reliable . . . [and] which in case of a
shock might make the full body of the real economy more immediately vulner-
able. In the financial system we have eliminated a number of cushions and
shock absorbers that we have had here and there’’ (quoted in Atkins and
Barber 2008).
7. ‘‘The bottom line is that, given declining assets and increasing liabilities,
many—perhaps most—big banks are essentially insolvent and have been for a
long time,’’ concluded Frank Partnoy, a professor of finance and law. ‘‘It is
incredible that they lost so much money on derivatives but even more amaz-
ing that they have stayed alive for so long afterwards’’ (2009, 9). Not so if you
believe in mess.
8. For a more general but highly detailed discussion on how cultural theory
illuminates the field of public management, rather than just the management
of needs and resources, see Hood 2000.
9. When it comes to markets, the social construction can be quite literal.
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With reference to pricing credit default swaps, the head of a major financial
information service provider stated: ‘‘We take data from multiple sources
including 40 banks’ books of record, buy-side institutions and interdealer
brokers. We then aggregate and clean the data, and in many cases discard up to
60 per cent to publish a comprehensive, high quality dataset’’ (quoted in van
Duyn, Mackenzie, and Tett 2009; see also Whalen 2008 on the lack of definite
prices in a number of asset markets).
10. The financiers who profited from the assets they created before the
financial mess, assets they could not auction off during the mess without
taking a loss, went on to complain that, because the value of the government
warrants they received during their bailouts was not determined by the mar-
ket, the amount they should pay back to the government should reflect that
deficiency (Beales and Cyran 2009). The roar you hear is the gods’ laughing.
Realism in contrast requires recognizing that in many cases and even in good
times quoted market prices are unavailable for most assets, including those
listed on exchanges, and that many assets have shallow markets with deep
prices characterizing only a small portion (see Whalen 2008).
11. The report of the Group of 30—an organization of international econo-
mists and financial policymakers—whose lead author was Paul Volcker, ‘‘of-
fered 18 recommendations that would insert government regulators into the
boardrooms of financial institutions as never before’’ (Faiola 2009).
12. Other cultures have organizational formations as well (Flentje 2000;
Hood 2000). However, nesting the composite typologies into the others—for
example, the egalitarian or individualist—would only reinforce the conclusion
drawn here.
13. You can think of the nesting as an increasing refinement of the dimen-
sions of the three typologies. The hierarchist culture is calibrated in terms of
how high social constraints and high group cohesion work out as activities in
terms of the outputs, outcomes, and their observability. The latter are spec-
ified in terms of the options and task environment volatility associated with
producing those outcomes and outputs reliably. In brief, four types of organi-
zations, each of which has four types of performance modes, can be said to
characterize hierarchist culture.
14. The literature on collaborative networks of professionals managing un-
der time pressures is growing (see, for example, Moynihan 2005; see also de
Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 2000). On craftspeople and trust in these processes,
compare the differing treatments but overlapping conclusions in Bardach
1998, Josipovici 1999, and Sennett 2008.
15. According to the sociologist Ronald Burt, changing a network can pro-
vide new opportunities for participants who are able to offer third-party
assistance to other network members who remain unconnected. Burt calls
such resulting gaps between people who could be interconnected, but are not,
‘‘structural holes.’’ Reconfigure a network, and new holes open up among
network members: ‘‘People on either side of a structural hole circulate in
different flows of information. Structural holes are thus an opportunity to
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broker the flow of information between people, and control the projects that
bring together people from the opposite sides of the hole’’ (2001, 35; see also
Burt 1992). In this way, the set of options changes.
SEVEN Professional Challenges
1. This distinction and example are suggested by Sass 2003.
2. We must be careful here, as policy may address no-go areas for reasons
other than management. Policy can be a form of bearing witness to something
that people cannot change or fully comprehend. Such instances are the limit-
ing conditions of mess and reliability management because these are the
messes we cannot manage. I give considerable attention elsewhere (Roe 1998)
to the role of acknowledging the unmanageable in conventional policy analysis
and management.
3. Does the use of ‘‘unprecedented’’ here make me a believer in that other
infantilizing analysis stopper: ‘‘These are unprecedented times requiring un-
precedented solutions’’? On the contrary, in our framework ‘‘unprecedented’’
denotes cognitively unstudied conditions in which people have to cope because
they cannot manage or problem solve. In other words, the idea that coping
mechanisms are ‘‘solutions’’ is risible. However, coping mechanisms in the face
of crises, like better management practices in the face of messes we are examin-
ing in this book, have evolved over time. So when someone tries to short-circuit
analysis by insisting ‘‘unprecedented times demand unprecedented action,’’ the
analyst must respond, ‘‘That may be true as far as it goes, but it certainly does
not go far enough.’’ Do they really mean to imply that, after more than 50,000
years of the evolution of the human prefrontal cortex and a population of more
than 7 billion people across more than 190 countries and habitations so nu-
merous as to defy practical calculation, there remain too few examples of ‘‘un-
precedented times and responses’’ from which to learn how to better cope with
the latest version of those seriatim ‘‘unprecedented problems’’?
4. The expression ‘‘what is at hand’’ is crucial in setting the improviser apart
from others with different orientations. Thinkers as varied as the essayist
Montaigne and the sociologist Alfred Schütz distinguish what is within our
reach for the purpose at hand versus what exceeds our grasp. For such think-
ers, these distinctions help define one’s self and relation to a world (see, for
example, Schütz 1964, 120–34; Shattuck 1996, 29; see also Stanford 2006).
5. For an excellent review of organizational and network examples, see
Baker and Nelson 2005; for a broader perspective on organizational bricolage,
see Boxenbaum and Rouleau 2011.
6. ‘‘More than 70 percent of learning experiences in the workplace are infor-
mal or accidental, not structured or sponsored by an employer or a school. . . .
This kind of learning is pervasive, continuous, and profoundly social. It hap-
pens wherever people do their work’’ (Thackara 2006, 158).
7. This paragraph owes much to Adam Phillips (2010).
8. George Bernard Shaw, in one of his polemics against the U.S. Constitu-
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tion, counseled Americans to farm out running the place to Europeans: ‘‘Some
years ago I suggested as a remedy that the American cities should be managed
from Europe by committees of capable Europeans trained in municipal affairs
in London, Berlin, Paris, etc. San Francisco rejected my advice and tried an
earthquake instead, not altogether without success as an awakener of public
conscience. But earthquakes, though much cheaper and less disastrous than
municipal imbecility and corruption, are too uncertain and unpopular to come
into regular use’’ (1907, 862).
9. The Bangladeshi claim against the British Geological Survey was even-
tually thrown out by the U.K. Appeals Court (Proffitt 2004).
10. Jeffrey Garten, former dean of the Yale School of Management, writes:
‘‘The truth is, the [financial] system has become too big and too complex for
anyone truly to understand it, let alone know how it would perform in the
next major crisis’’ (2006, 11).
11. My thanks to Ian Mitroff for this point.
12. Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘‘Farewell Radio and Television Address to the Amer-
ican People,’’ January 17, 1961 (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=12086&st=&st1=).
EIGHT How We Know the Policy Mess Is Managed Better
1. Bernanke was not alone in this happy talk. A former Fed chair, Paul
Volcker, made similar assurances in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, ‘‘We Have the
Tools to Manage the Crisis’’ (2008). A Wharton School professor of finance
sang from the same hymnal: ‘‘We have all the tools necessary to avoid repeat-
ing the mistakes. . . .We must not hesitate to use them’’ (Siegel 2008).
2. Some market inefficiencies are the price we pay for high reliability perfor-
mance. Economists are right in pointing out that interventions—such as price
caps—to ensure, for example, electricity reliability can entail efficiency losses.
The deadweight loss resulting from such limits, however, is one measure of
how much reliability matters to society.
3. Some financial specialists have also argued that clearinghouse reliability
should be treated as a Veblen good: The higher the price of reliability, the more
desirable it is to investors (van Duyn 2010a).
4. If operational redesign occurs entails a big ‘‘if.’’ Citigroup, to take a sin-
gle example from many, refused to concede that it did not make full legal
disclosure to weaknesses in internal controls during events leading up to
the financial mess. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act required Citigroup to disclose ‘‘all
significant deficiencies’’ and ‘‘material weaknesses’’ in such controls. Its reg-
ulator informed Citigroup in early 2008 that ‘‘several deficiencies . . . need
to be addressed,’’ none of which were disclosed at the time of Citigroup’s
certification of prior accounts. In 2011 and in response to the findings of
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Citigroup maintained that those
deficiencies actually did not constitute ‘‘material weaknesses’’ (Guerrera
2011).
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5. That process of formal recovery has already begun (see Turner’s impor-
tant start, Economics after the Crisis [2012]). I thank Paul Schulman for his help
in thinking through this material, though I absolve him of my conclusions.
6. In the words of Henry Kaufman, longtime Wall Street economist and
financial consultant, a ‘‘look back over the past few decades of U.S. history
does not show mainstream economics in a good light. It is hard to be optimis-
tic that today’s leading economists—whose distinguished careers have defined
the status quo—will offer innovative ways of integrating economics and fi-
nance. Others must come to the fore. We urgently need economic minds with
a broad analytical reach to rise to the occasion’’ (2010).
7. To my mind, the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle set great mischief
loose upon the political economy. Before Hicks-Kaldor, gainers would have to
compensate losers; since Hicks-Kaldor, it’s okay if the former could in theory
compensate the latter, even if no real compensation exists.
8. Banks that emerged from the financial mess relatively unscathed under-
standably saw no need for such a levy, as their financial prudence had already
reflected real opportunity costs (see, for example, P. Smith 2010).
9. The lack of market infrastructure for the novel securitized financial in-
struments was telling. Citigroup for instance was criticized by the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission for ‘‘lack of proper infrastructure and internal
control’’ with respect to its collateralized derivative obligations (2011, 303).
10. The last public lecture of Herbert Simon, the Nobel laureate, linked
issues of productivity to what this book calls the reliability of infrastructure
and its management: ‘‘Let me pose a simple question. Consider the income
that you or your family now earn as members of American society (which most
of you are) and compare it with the income that you would expect to earn if
you were equally hardworking members of Chinese or Indian society, or the
society of any other Third World nation. I expect that for most of you, the
difference between the two incomes is one or more orders of magnitude, at
least 10 to 1 and perhaps even more than 100 to 1.
‘‘Now, I would like you to consider the causes for the gap between the 10 and
the 1 or the 100 and the 1. How much of it do you wish to attribute to your
superior energy, motivation, and application of effort as compared with your
Third World counterparts? And how much do you wish to attribute to your
good luck or good judgement [sic] in being born in, or joining, the highly
productive and democratic American society?
‘‘If we are very generous with ourselves, I suppose we might claim that we
‘earned’ as much as one fifth of it. The rest is patrimony associated with being
a member of an enormously productive social system, which has accumulated
a vast store of physical capital, and an even larger store of intellectual capital—
including knowledge, skills, and organizational know-how held by all of us—
so that interaction with our equally talented fellow citizens rubs off on us
both much of this knowledge and this generous allotment of unearned in-
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